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Formaldehyde, one of the most widely used chemicals in modern
industry, has recently become one of the most controversial as well. A
plethora of lawsuits, congressional hearings, and scholarly analyses have
centered on formaldehyde, and more particularly on federal agency res-
ponses to new data indicating that it ma~ be a carcinogen (cancer-causing
substance). These developments were sparked by an October 1979 report
from the Chemical Industry Institute of Toxicology (CIIT) that formal-
dehyde causes cancer in rats.2
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1. Formaldehyde, a simple organic molecule composed of one carbon atom, one
oxygen atom, and two hydrogen atoms, is used in paper, plywood, cosmetics, fertilizers,
particleboard, insulation, and explosives, and in a variety of manufacturing and other
industrial processes. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Formaldehyde:
Evidence of Carcinogenicity, Current Intelligence Bulletin No. 34 at 2 (April 15, 1981).
According to producers, formaldehyde is "used in products that account for about eight
percent of the United States' three-trillion dollar Gross National Product." Formaldehyde
Institute, Formaldehyde: A Building Block of Our Society (1983) (available from the For-
maldehyde Institute).
2. Chemical Industry Institute of Toxicology, Statement Concerning Research Find-
ings, Docket No. 11109 (Oct. 8, 1979).
297
......__ · ___ I~~I _~__ 1  __1_1_11_ _
Harvard Environmental Law Review
Because of the chemical's widespread use and distribution - do-
mestic production exceeds seven billion pounds per year,3 and at least
five million people are exposed to the chemical at greater than ambient
atmospheric levels4 - federal agencies responsible for toxic chemical
control became concerned about its potential carcinogenicity in humans.
Since 1979, a number of federal agencies have considered regulatory
action. The controversy over formaldehyde has been intensified by the
inconsistent treatment it has received at the hands of the various federal
agencies.
This article examines the formaldehyde deliberations of three of
those agencies: the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and the Consumer
Product Safety Commission (CPSC). Part I provides an overview of the
formaldehyde controversy, summarizing the actions taken by EPA,
OSHA, and CPSC. Part II sets forth an analytic framework for evaluating
those actions. Specifically, we address the legal standard of "reasoned
decisionmaking" that has developed through judicial review of adminis-
trative decisions, the distinction between hard science and science policy
issues, and the technical criteria for assessing health risks. Part III re-
views the bioassay 5 and epidemiologic 6 evidence indicating that formal-
dehyde is carcinogenic, and then examines the data on human exposure.
Parts IV through VI examine in turn EPA's, OSHA's, and CPSC's for-
maldehyde deliberations. The article concludes that CPSC acted well
within its statutory authority in its evaluation of formaldehyde's cancer
risk, but that EPA and OSHA may have violated their procedural and
substantive mandates in refusing to take regulatory action.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE FORMALDEHYDE DETERMINATIONS
A. The Federal Panel on Formaldehyde
Upon receiving the CIIT findings, EPA, OSHA, CPSC, and other
agencies undertook several joint actions, the most important of which
was to form the Federal Panel on Formaldehyde.7 The panel was com-
posed of top scientists from the federal government and was directed to
evaluate all available information on the long-term effects of exposure to
3. STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE, CHEMICAL ECONOMICS HANDBOOK 68.50310
(1979).
4. Those people exposed include workers and consumers of formaldehyde-based
products. OFFICE OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
TECHNICAL DOCUMENT ON FORMALDEHYDE 59-62 Table 7 (Nov. 1981) [hereinafter cited
as TECHNICAL DOCUMENT].
5. See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 89.
7. See generally Report of the Federal Panel on Formaldehyde, 43 ENVTL. HEALTH
PERSP. 139 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Federal Panel Report].
_____I__ _
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formaldehyde and to assess the human health risks. 8 In November 1980,
the Panel presented its report to the agencies. 9 Based on its review of
the available data, the Panel concluded that "formaldehyde should be
presumed to pose a carcinogenic risk to humans." 0
B. Agency Responses
In March 1981, the Deputy Assistant Administrator for Toxic Sub-
stances and other officials of EPA, an executive branch regulatory
agency, reviewed the existing evidence of the cancer risks to the U.S.
population from exposures to formaldehyde." They determined that the
evidence was sufficient to require EPA to consider the chemical under
section 4(f) of the Toxic Substances Control Act' 2 and prepared a draft
Federal Register notice to that effect. When Anne Gorsuch, the incoming
EPA Administrator, and John Hernandez, the incoming Deputy Admin-
istrator, assumed office in May 1981, formal publication of the notice was
delayed.' 3 Ultimately, EPA declined to designate formaldehyde a section
4(f) chemical.
In December 1980, OSHA, also an executive branch regulatory
agency, acting in conjunction with the National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health (NIOSH) and under the authority of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act (OSHAct), released a Current Intelligence Bulletin
for formaldehyde.' 4 The bulletin recommended that formaldehyde be
considered a potential carcinogen, and that appropriate controls be im-
plemented to reduce worker exposure to the chemical. In March 1981,
Thorne Auchter, the newly confirmed Assistant Secretary of Labor for
OSHA, took charge of the agency. Shortly thereafter he rescinded
OSHA's sponsorship of the Bulletin. In January 1982, OSHA denied a
petition by labor unions for an emergency temporary standard to reduce
formaldehyde levels in the workplace.
In February 1981, CPSC, an independent regulatory commission,
proposed a ban on urea-formaldehyde foam insulation.' 5 In February




11. See infra notes 155-80 and accompanying text (discussing EPA's formaldehyde
deliberations).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 2603(f) (1976).
13. Anne (Gorsuch) Burford resigned as EPA Administrator on March 9, 1983. [13
Curr. Dev.] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 2027 (Mar. 11, 1983). John Hernandez, Jr., assumed the
position of Acting Administrator until March 25, 1983, when he also resigned. Id. at 2179
(Apr. 1, 1983).
14. See infra notes 325-48 and accompanying text (discussing OSHA's formaldehyde
deliberations).
15. See infra notes 409-26 and accompanying text (discussing CPSC's formaldehyde
deliberations).
16. On April 7, 1983, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated
I rr a I . -- - ` -
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Not surprisingly, the disparities in federal agencies' treatment of
formaldehyde have attracted considerable attention. Numerous articles
have been written about one or all of the agencies' decisions, 7 and
several congressional hearings have been held to examine various aspects
of these decisions.' 8 Though the agencies have defended their formalde-
hyde decisions as well-grounded in scientific evidence,1 9 public interest
groups and several Congressmen have charged that EPA and OSHA were
unduly influenced by industry,2 0 while industry representatives have
claimed that CPSC was biased in its handling of formaldehyde data.2 '
C. Departures from Federal Cancer Policy
One major ground on which EPA and OSHA have been criticized is
that in their formaldehyde deliberations both agencies departed from the
federal cancer risk assessment policies that they had developed over the
last decade.22 Federal control of human exposure to carcinogens is largely
the ban. Gulf South Insulation v. CPSC, 701 F.2d 1137. See infra text accompanying notes
451-74.
17. See, e.g., Perera & Petito, Formaldehyde: A Question of Cancer Policy?, 216
SCIENCE 1285 (1982); Hileman, Formaldehyde: How Did EPA Develop Its Formaldehyde
Policy?, 16 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 543 (1982); Sandler, EPA's Secret Science Courts, 24
ENVIRONMENT 4 (1982); Sun, Agencies in Dispute Over Cancer Policy, 217 SCIENCE 233
(1982); Letup in the Drive to Regulate Formaldehyde, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 12, 1981, at 80.
18. Various aspects of the EPA and OSHA formaldehyde deliberations were dis-
cussed during at least five House of Representatives hearings. See The Proposed Firing of
Dr. Peter Infante by OSHA: A Case Study in Science and Regulation: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the House Comm. on Science and
Technology, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (1981) (chaired by Rep. Gore) [hereinafter cited as
Gore OSHA Hearings]; The Environmental Protection Agency--Private Meetings and
Water Protection Programs: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Environment, Energy and
Natural Resources of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 97th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1981) (chaired by Rep. Moffett) [hereinafter cited as Moffett Hearings]; Environmental
Protection Agency Research and Development Posture Hearing: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Natural Resources, Agriculture Research, and Environment of the House Comm.
on Science and Technology, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (chaired by Rep. Scheuer) [here-
inafter cited as Scheuer Hearings]; Hearings to Review the Scientific Basis of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency's Carcinogenic Risk Assessment on Formaldehyde Before the
Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the House Comm. on Science and Technol-
ogy, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (chaired by Rep. Gore) (currently in press, so hereafter
no page numbers can be cited except in reference to prepared testimony) [hereinafter cited
as Gore EPA Hearings]; EPA's Failure to Regulate Asbestos Exposure: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Commerce, Transportation, and Tourism of the House Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (chaired by Rep. Florio) [hereinafter cited as
Florio Hearings].
19. See, e.g., Gore EPA Hearings, supra note 18 (testimony by John Todhunter);
Gore OSHA Hearings, supra note 18, at 57-83 (testimony by Thorne Auchter).
20. See, e.g., Moffett Hearings, supra note 18, at 162-96 (statement by Jacqueline
Warren, Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council); Gore EPA Hearings, supra note
18 (statements by Rep. Gore); Gore OSHA Hearings, supra note 18, at 1-2 (statement by
Rep. Gore).
21. See infia text accompanying note 418.
22. See supra sources cited at note 17.
_·_ 1__1_·_____ I____  rr_ _IC_ 
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exercised through statutes administered by EPA, OSHA, CPSC, and the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA). 23 Although the various statutory
mandates differ with respect to the degree of protection to be provided2 4
and the criteria by which social costs and benefits are to be balanced,2
a rather uniform approach towards the assessment of carcinogenic risk
did evolve in the 1970's and early 1980's.
The key issues that had to be resolved in developing this approach
were the nature and quality of the evidence required to designate a
particular substance a human carcinogen for regulatory purposes. In
addressing these issues, the agencies necessarily made a number of policy
choices in areas where existing scientific evidence does not permit a
purely technical determination. 2 6 The federal courts generally have en-
dorsed such choices, noting that issues of this nature are "on the frontiers
of scientific knowledge" 27 and that regulatory agencies may be compelled
by their statutory mandates to make determinations of policy in the face
of scientific uncertainty. 28
OSHA has been responsible for a major part of the regulatory activity
on carcinogens. In January 1980, after successfully defending a number
of its carcinogen exposure standards in court,29 OSHA codified the evolv-
ing policies by promulgating a generic cancer standard.30 The major goal
23. See generally Ashford, Legal Implications of Working with Carcinogens, in CAR-
CINOGENS IN INDUSTRY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 47 (J. Sontag ed. 1981).
24. See generally Ashford, Federal Control of Toxic Substances in the Environment
and Workplace: Legal, Regulatory and Scientific Complexities, 329 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD.
SCI. 246 (1979).
25. See generally M. BARAM, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: AN INADEQUATE BASIS
FOR HEALTH, SAFETY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONMAKING, (report to the Adminis-
trative Conference of the United States) (1979); Rodgers, Benefits, Costs, and Risks:
Oversight of Health and Environmental Decisionmaking, 4 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 191
(1980).
26. See generally infra text accompanying notes 70-103.
27. Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (reviewing
OSHA standards for worker exposure to asbestos).
28. See Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 658 (1980);
United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1206-07 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
453 U.S. 913 (1981); Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 636 F.2d 1267, 1277-78 (D.C.
Cir. 1980); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 27 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
941 (1976); Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 507 n.20 (8th. Cir. 1975) (en banc);
Society of Plastics Indus. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
992 (1975)); Amoco Oil v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722, 740 (D.C. Cir 1974).
29. See Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155 (3d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975) (permanent standard for ethyleneimine) [hereinafter
cited as SOCMA I]; Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 506 F.2d 385 (3d
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 830 (1975) (permanent standards for three carcinogens)
[hereinafter cited as SOCMA II]; Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (asbestos standard) (note however that OSHA regulated asbestos as a lung toxin,
not as a carcinogen); Society of Plastics Indus. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 992) (1975) (vinyl chloride standard); American Iron and Steel Inst. v.
OSHA, 577 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 448 U.S. 917 (1980) (coke oven
emissions standard).
30. This standard was first proposed in 1977, 42 Fed. Reg. 54,148 (1977) (advance
rrr rr. I. ran --- irrrrsrr--------
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of the standard was to expedite the lengthy process involved in setting
standards for suspected carcinogens on a substance-by-substance basis.
By resolving certain policy issues and standardizing carcinogen regula-
tion, OSHA hoped to develop a more efficient, effective, and predictable
rulemaking process.3 '
CPSC also developed a generic cancer policy,3 2 but withdrew it3 3 in
favor of a "statement" on regulation of chemical carcinogens developed
by the Regulatory Council.3 4 That statement was published in October
1979 to "inform the public of the practices and principles the participating
Federal regulatory agencies will follow in initiating regulatory actions
relating to chemical carcinogens."3 5 The Council based its policy in part
on scientific work by the Interagency Regulatory Liaison Group (IRLG),
which was then made up of OSHA, EPA, CPSC, and FDA. IRLG pre-
sented its work in a report published in a peer-reviewed scientific journal
in July 1979.36 It described the report as incorporating the best judgment
of senior scientists at the National Cancer Institute (NCI) and the Na-
tional Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS), as well as
the agency scientists, "on scientific concepts and methods currently in
use to identify and evaluate substances that may pose a risk of cancer to
humans. "37
In October 1979, the same month that the Regulatory Council pub-
lished its statement, the CIIT released its formaldehyde findings. The
federal cancer policy expressed in the Council statement and in the
OSHA generic standard would have been expected to guide agency de-
liberations on formaldehyde. CPSC apparently followed that policy. As
will be discussed in Parts IV and V of this article, however, both EPA
and OSHA departed from that policy in several respects, and adopted
positions far less protective of public health. Perhaps more importantly,
notice of proposed rulemaking) and was later promulgated under the title "Identification,
Classification and Regulation of Potential Occupational Carcinogens," 45 Fed. Reg. 5002
(1980) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1990) (1982).
31. See generally McGarity, OSHA's Generic Carcinogen Policy: Rule Making Under
Scientific and Legal Uncertainty, in LAW AND SCIENCE IN COLLABORATION: RESOLVING
REGULATORY ISSUES OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 55 (J. Nyhart & M. Carrow eds.
1983).
32. 43 Fed. Reg. 26,558 (1978). For a discussion of CPSC's cancer policy delibera-
tions, see generally Merrill, CPSC Regulation of Cancer Risks in Consumer Products: 1972
- 81, 67 VA. L. REV. 1261, 1297-1304 (1981).
33. 44 Fed. Reg. 23,821 (1979).
34. Regulatory Council, Statement on Regulation of Chemical Carcinogens Policy
and Request for Public Comment, 44 Fed. Reg. 60,038 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Regu-
latory Council Statement]. The Regulatory Council, composed of 35 federal agencies and
departments, was established by President Carter in October 1978 to coordinate and stream-
line federal regulatory activities. See 44 Fed. Reg. 11,388 (1979).
35. 44 Fed. Reg. 60,038 (1979).
36. Interagency Regulatory Liaison Group, Scientific Bases for Identification of Po-
tential Carcinogens and Estimation of Risks, 63 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 241 (1979) [here-
inafter cited as IRLG Risk Assessment Document], reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 39,858 (1979).
37. IRLG Risk Assessment Document, supra note 36, at 245.
___1___ _1_11 _ ---- ·__J·IIII-·C--^-_·_-· I
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they failed to acknowledge their departures as such. In Part II, we offer
a framework to facilitate the identification of such policy shifts in the
field of health risk assessment.
II. A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING THE FORMALDEHYDE DECISIONS
The great weight of authority suggests that the appropriate legal
standard by which to evaluate agency decisions is whether the agency
engaged in "reasoned decisionmaking."3 8 As recently articulated by the
38. The phrase "reasoned decisionmaking" was apparently first used in this context
in Greater Boston Television Corporation v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 444 F.2d 841, 852
(D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971), where the D.C. Circuit stated: "Gen-
erally ... the applicable doctrine that has evolved with the enormous growth and signifi-
cance of administrative determination in the past forty or fifty years has insisted on reasoned
decision-making."
Thereafter, without specifically referring to reasoned decisionmaking, the Supreme
Court outlined a three-step review process in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). The Court noted that reviewing courts applying the "arbitrary
and capricious" standard must engage in "a substantial inquiry . . . a thorough, probing,
in-depth review." Id. at 415. It directed reviewing courts to determine: (1) whether the
agency acted within the scope of its statutory authority; (2) whether the agency's decision
"was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear
error of judgment"; and (3) whether the agency "followed the necessary procedural require-
ments." Id. at 416-17. The D.C. Circuit further refined the reasoned decisionmaking concept
on the basis of Overton Park. See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478
F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, J., concurring) (an agency must establish "a decision-
making process which assures a reasoned decision"); ASG Indus. v. CPSC, 593 F.2d 1323,
1373 (D.C. Cir. 1979); State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. v. Department of Transp., 680 F.2d
206 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 340 (1982). The Fifth Circuit recently adopted the
phrase "reasoned decisionmaking." See City of Houston v. Federal Aviation Admin., 679
F.2d 1184, 1190 (1982). Other circuits, while not referring specifically to "reasoned deci-
sionmaking," have applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Overton Park.
See, e.g., Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 673 F.2d 1124 (10th
Cir. 1982); see generally Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA L. REV.
185 (1974).
The viability of Overton Park, and thus of the reasoned decisionmaking standard,
may have been thrown into question by Vermont Yankee Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978), where the Supreme Court overturned the D.C.
Circuit's reversal of a Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) decision to grant licenses
for two nuclear power plants. The lower court had, in effect, required the RC to provide
an opportunity for cross-examination in its informal rulemaking process. See 435 U.S. at
541-42. As the relevant statutes contain no such requirement, the Supreme Court reversed,
cautioning reviewing courts "against engrafting their own notions of proper procedures
upon agencies entrusted with substantive functions by Congress." Id. at 525.
Some commentators have read the case as a retreat from the "substantial inquiry"
standard enunciated in Overton Park. Others, however, have argued that the case actually
confirms the earlier doctrine. Although Justice Rehnquist's opinion focuses narrowly on
the impropriety of requiring agencies to adopt rulemaking procedures beyond those required
by statute, it does reaffirm both "the importance of a record supporting the decision and
the reviewing court's authority to require additional justification for the agency decision."
Delong, Informal Rulemaking and the Integration of Law and Policy, 65 VA. L. REV. 257
(1979). Indeed, the Court's ultimate description of the appropriate standard of judicial
review under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) appears consistent with the
I 1_ I I -- __I .I
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D.C. Circuit, an agency practices reasoned decisionmaking when it:
(1) takes a "hard look . . . at the relevant issues"; (2) deliberates "in a
manner calculated to negate the danger of arbitrariness and irrationality";
(3) violates "no law"; and (4) provides an "articulated justification" that
makes a "rational connection between the facts found and the choice
made."39
Applying the concepts of reasoned decisionmaking as an analytical
tool requires a clear understanding of what a particular agency has and
has not done. With health risk determinations, this understanding often
requires a technical knowledge of the underlying data and methodologies.
Further, it requires an ability to distinguish between purely technical
determinations and those based on the more subjective, science policy
determinations.
In this part of the article, we discuss the applicability of the reasoned
decisionmaking standard to the formaldehyde decisions, explore the sci-
ence policy issues surrounding human health risk assessment, and, fi-
nally, offer an analytical framework for evaluating agency decisionmaking
in this field of regulatory activity. This framework forms the basis for
our discussion of the formaldehyde decisions.
In developing a general analytical framework, we are not unmindful
of the judicial deference traditionally afforded agency decisions not to
act.40 In the past, legal challenges to agency decisions on health and
safety have come primarily in response to specific regulatory actions. An
agency's implementation of a statutory provision was challenged as either
too zealous 4' or insufficiently protective. 4 2 In the present antiregulatory
general concept of reasoned decisionmaking. Agencies operating under NEPA, said the
Court, must arrive at a "fully informed and well-considered decision." 435 U.S. at 558.
The Supreme Court remanded Vermont Yankee to the Court of Appeals for a deter-
mination whether the NRC decision "finds sufficient justification in the administrative
proceedings that it should be upheld by the reviewing court." 435 U.S. at 549. On remand,
the D.C. Circuit decided that it did not. 685 F.2d 459 (1982). The Supreme Court has
accepted this decision for review. 103 S. Ct. 443 (1982). Thus, further refinement of the
Overton Park doctrine may be forthcoming.
39. WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (citing Action for
Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 472 n.24, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
40. See infra note 66.
41. See, e.g., American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 449 U.S. 809 (1981) (OSHA
cotton dust standard); Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607
(1980) (OSHA benzene standard); ASG Indus. v. CPSC, 593 F.2d 1323 (CPSC safety
standard for architectural glazing materials); Aqua Slide 'n' Dive Corp. v. CPSC, 569 F.2d
831 (5th Cir. 1978) (CPSC water slide standards); American Iron and Steel Inst. v. OSHA,
577 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978) (OSHA coke oven emissions standard); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA,
541 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1976) (EPA gasoline lead additive regulation).
42. See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
435 U.S. 519 (1978) (Nuclear Regulatory Commission's decision to grant nuclear power
plant licenses); Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 655 F.2d 318 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(EPA's standards for particulates from diesel vehicles); Environmental Defense Fund v.
EPA, 636 F.2d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (EPA's PCB standards); Industrial Union Dep't v.
Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (OSHA asbestos standard).
- ---  - - · --- - · - _I - _1___._.
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climate, challenges to agency decisions not to act may assume greater
significance.43
Judicial deference to agency discretion in such situations is based
largely on respect for agency expertise in matters of resource allocation
and technical evaluation.4 4 Such deference is misplaced, however, where
an agency uses the cloak of expertise to disguise inadequate technical
analysis, improper decisionmaking procedures, or statutory misinterpre-
tation. An analysis of the formaldehyde decisions demonstrates why,
before deferring to an agency's decision not to take regulatory action to
protect human health, the courts should first take a "hard look" at the
agency's decision to determine whether such deference is, in fact,
warranted.45
A. Applying the Reasoned Decisionmaking Standard
EPA, OSHA, and CPSC each approached the formaldehyde issue
from a different statutory perspective. Nonetheless, all must meet the
reasoned decisionmaking standard.
43. Recent cases involving agency decisions not to act on health and safety matters
include Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Auchter, No. 83-1071, slip op. (D.C. Cir.
Mar. 15, 1983) (challenge to OSHA denial of emergency temporary standard for ethylene
oxide) and State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. v. Department of Transp., 680 F.2d 206 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (challenge to National Highway Traffic Safety Administration rescission of
automatic crash protection regulations).
The now famous Bazelon-Leventhal debate on the propriety of "procedural" versus
"substantive" review may be revitalized if review of decisions not to act becomes more
commonplace. See Bazelon, Science and Uncertainty: A Jurist's View, 5 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 209 (1981). When reviewing agency actions, courts can arguably arrive at the same
result whether they use a "procedural" or "substantive" standard of review. Here the
theoretical distinction between the two standards may well have little practical significance.
For decisions not to act, however, the remedy may well depend on the standard of review.
If the court engages in substantive review, it will be free to order the agency to reverse its
decision and to take the regulatory action that it had determined to avoid. But if the court
limits itself to a purely procedural review, it may be unable to do more than direct the
agency to reconsider the decision not to act, at least absent a finding that procedural
irregularities have so tainted the agency's deliberations that a substantive review is nec-
essary. The formaldehyde decisions are probably not an appropriate vehicle for resolving
this issue, however, as both the EPA and OSHA determinations were plagued by significant
substantive irregularities as well as by procedural flaws.
44. See infra note 66.
45. Indeed, in Public Citizen v. Auchter, the D.C. Circuit specifically inquired into
"the status of all other ongoing rulemakings" within OSHA as part of its review of the
agency's failure to issue an emergency temporary standard for ethylene oxide (EtO).
Although OSHA asserted that it was "currently engaged in three proceedings that . ..
would be disturbed by speedier EtO rulemaking," the court concluded that these other
proceedings did not so tax agency resources or health priorities as to justify delaying further
EtO regulation. Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Auchter, No. 83-1071, slip op. at
15 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 15, 1983). Thus, apparently reaching the substantive conclusion that
"some workers . . . currently encounter a potentially grave danger" from EtO, id. at 14,
the court ordered OSHA to expedite the section 6(b) rulemaking procedure that it had
already instituted for EtO. For a more detailed discussion of specific aspects of this case,
see infra text accompanying notes 58-60 & 401-08.
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1. The Environmental Protection Agency
The Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) grants EPA broad au-
thority to regulate toxic chemicals.4 6 EPA's formaldehyde decision in-
volved section 4(f) of the Act, which provides that upon receiving test
data or other information
which indicates to the Administrator that there may be a reasonable basis
to conclude that a chemical substance or mixture presents or will present
a significant risk of serious or widespread harm to human beings from
cancer, gene mutations, or birth defects, the Administrator shall ... initiate
appropriate action . .. to prevent or reduce to a sufficient extent such risk
or publish in the Federal Register a finding that such risk is not
unreasonable.4 7
EPA's ultimate decision to take no action on formaldehyde was thus a
determination that there was no information from which the Administra-
tor could find that there may be a reasonable basis to conclude that
formaldehyde poses a significant risk of human cancer.
To date, the courts have not had occasion to consider the proper
standard of review for a failure to make the threshold determination that
would trigger section 4(f), nor does the Act specifically set forth an
applicable standard of review.4 8 Nonetheless, it appears clear that judicial
review is available, and that "reasoned decisionmaking" is the appropri-
ate standard of review.
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides the most obvious
avenue of review. 49 Because the agency's formaldehyde decision was in
46. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 2603(f) (1976).
48. Section 19, 15 U.S.C. § 2618 (1976), provides for direct review at the circuit court
level of certain determinations made under sections 4, 5, 6, or 8, id. §§ 2603, 2604, 2605,
& 2607.
Section 4(f), id. § 2603(f), provides for review under the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA) of an EPA decision that the risk posed by a particular chemical is "not unrea-
sonable." Because such a finding is not required to be made by formal hearing, the
applicable standard of review under the APA is the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976). TSCA prescribes no standard of review, however, for the agen-
cy's failure to make the section 4(f) threshold finding that there may be a reasonable basis
to conclude that a chemical poses a significant risk of serious or widespread harm from
cancer. 15 U.S.C. § 2603(f).
49. 5 U.S.C §§ 701-706 (1976). An Administrator's failure to make a threshold finding
under section 4(f) will often be a "final agency action" for the purpose of Section 704 of
the APA. The formaldehyde decision appears to be such an action, because the agency not
only reversed its previous decision that section 4(f) had been triggered, but also considered
the data on formaldehyde at length and released a detailed written explanation of its
position. See supra notes 66-67 and infra notes 181-89 and accompanying text.
Furthermore, even though Congress specifically provided for review of a determina-
tion that a chemical does not present an unreasonable risk under section 4(f), its failure to
provide for review of a refusal to make a section 4(f) threshold determination should not
preclude review, especially in light of the strong presumption of reviewability inherent in
the APA. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1043 (D.C. Cir.
___I__·I C···_ · · __I___
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the nature of an informal rulemaking procedure, review would proceed
under the familiar "arbitrary and capricious" standard.5 0 As the D.C.
Circuit has recently emphasized, this standard demands an inquiry into
whether the agency has practiced reasoned decisionmaking, even when
applied to decisions not to act.51
Review may also be available under section 20 of TSCA, the "citizen
suit" provision, which authorizes civil actions "to compel the Adminis-
trator to perform any act or duty under this Act which is not discretion-
ary." 52 EPA's failure to make a threshold finding of a possibility of
significant cancer risk does not, in itself, constitute a failure to perform
a mandatory act. Once EPA makes that threshold determination, how-
ever, it must act in accordance with section 4(f): it must either take
remedial action or publish in the Federal Register its rationale for declin-
ing to take such action. For formaldehyde, considerable evidence indi-
cates that EPA initially made, but later rescinded, the necessary threshold
1979). The legislative history of TSCA indicates that Congress was particularly concerned
that the Act's strong public health mandate might be frustrated by EPA's hesitancy or
unwillingness to act. When discussing the Act's citizen suit provision, for example, the
Senate Report noted that "responsiveness of government is a critical concern," and indi-
cated its desire to "protect against lax administration of the bill." S. REP. No. 698, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1976).
50. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976).
51. The D.C. Circuit recently reviewed an FCC decision not to grant a petition to
amend the Commission's mandatory cable carriage rules to include subscription television
signals. WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Though the court noted that
the scope of review "should be extremely limited" in such a situation, id. at 817 (emphasis
in original), it nonetheless applied the four general principles of reasoned decisionmaking.
A year later, the same court reviewed the National Highway Traffic Safety Admin-
istration's decision to rescind passive restraint standards ten months before they were to
take effect. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. v. Department of Transp., 680 F.2d 206, 229
(D.C. Cir. 1982). The court noted that "rescission more resembles agency refusal to act
than an agency decision to act, and the distinction has significance for the degree of judicial
deference paid to the agency." Id. at 218. Citing NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291 (1965),
however, it also noted that "courts are 'not obliged to stand aside and rubber-stamp their
affirmance of administrative decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate
or that frustrate the congressional policy underlying a statute,"' and specifically applied
the concepts of reasoned decisionmaking. 680 F.2d at 229. Focusing on substantive rather
than procedural aspects of the Administration's decision, the court defined the scope of
review in different language than it had used in WWHT, but with similar significance for
the substantive aspects of the review process:
We ... review ... whether the agency has engaged in reasoned decisionmaking, making actualjudgments concerning the significance of the evidence in the record and supporting its decision
with "reasoned analysis." We must ascertain the facts on which [the agency] relied, determine
whether those facts have some basis in the record, and judge whether a reasonable decisionmaker
could respond to those facts as the agency did. The court must also assure itself that [the
agency's decision] is "based on consideration of the relevant factors."
680 F.2d at 229 (citations omitted); see also Natural Resources Defense Council v. SEC,
606 F.2d at 1053 (articulating similar standard). Thus, although the appropriate scope of
review may vary with the particular agency decision and the relevant statutory mandate,
the D.C. Circuit has repeatedly stressed its concern for ensuring that the agency made a
reasoned decision.
52. 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a)(2) (1976).
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determination.5 3 If so, review under TSCA's citizen suit provision may
well be appropriate. Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit has indicated that it
will treat a normally discretionary threshold action as a mandatory action
where the decision to act has been "arbitrarily withheld."5 4 Because many
aspects of EPA's formaldehyde decision were arguably arbitrary,55 sec-
tion 20 review may be appropriate under this doctrine as well.5 6
2. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration
OSHA reviewed formaldehyde following a request from several
unions that the agency set an emergency temporary standard (ETS) for
that substance under section 6 of the OSHAct. Section 6(c)(1) states:
The Secretary shall provide ... for an emergency temporary standard ...
if he determines (A) that employees are exposed to grave danger from
exposure to substances or agents determined to be toxic or physically
harmful or from new hazards, and (B) that such emergency standard is
necessary to protect employees from such danger."
53. See infra notes 155-75 and accompanying text.
54. Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
There, the court reviewed a decision by the Secretary of Agriculture to delay the issuance,
under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), of an order grant-
ing or denying a request for the suspension and cancellation of pesticides containing DDT.
The Secretary argued that a decision to delay such a determination was within the discretion
delegated to him by Congress, and was therefore not subject to review. The court disagreed:
The FIFRA gives the court jurisdiction to review any order granting or denying the cancellation
of a pesticide registration. The Secretary could defeat that jurisdiction, however, by delaying
his determination indefinitely. Petitioners contend that the Secretary's own findings with respect
to DDT compel him to issue cancellation notices, and hence that his action is "unlawfully
withheld or unreasonably delayed" within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act. In
order to protect our appellate jurisdiction, this court has jurisdiction to entertain a request for
relief in the form of an order directing the secretary to act in accordance with the FIFRA.
439 F.2d at 593.
Although the analogy is not perfect, this case parallels EPA's failure to make the
threshold determination for formaldehyde under section 4(f) of TSCA. That section grants
jurisdiction under the APA for review of an agency determination that a suspected human
carcinogen does not pose an unreasonable risk to human health. EPA "could defeat that
jurisdiction," however, by refusing to make the threshold finding that there may be a
reasonable basis to conclude that the chemical poses a significant risk. Where, as for
formaldehyde, the agency has substantial evidence that a chemical is an animal carcinogen
- which raises in most reasonable minds the possibility of significant human risk - a
section 20 action to compel the Administrator to determine whether the risk is unreasonable
would appear appropriate. Such action would seem consistent with the expressed purpose
of section 20 to "protect against lax administration of the bill." S. REP. No. 698, supra
note 49, at 13; see supra note 49.
55. See generally infra text accompanying notes 155-324.
56. See supra note 54.
57. 29 U.S.C. § 655(c)(1) (1970).
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OSHA, like EPA, decided to take no action. For OSHA, however,
the courts have spoken on the proper standard of review for such situa-
tions. Prior to denying the labor unions' request, OSHA denied a similar
request for ethylene oxide.5 8 The D.C. Circuit reviewed that denial and,
although it did not order OSHA to promulgate an emergency standard,
it did order OSHA to expedite permanent rulemaking procedures for
ethylene oxide.5 9 As the OSHAct provides no specific standard of review
for such a denial, the court applied traditional APA criteria and charac-
terized its review as "'thorough' and 'probing'." 6 0 The standard of review
for the denial of section 6(c)(1) petitions is thus the "arbitrary and capri-
cious" standard, in which the concept of reasoned decisionmaking is
inherent.
3. The Consumer Product Safety Commission
CPSC issued its ban on urea-formaldehyde foam insulation under
the CPS Act.61 Section 8 of the Act authorizes the Commission to ban a
"hazardous" product upon a three-tiered finding: (1) that the product "is
being, or will be, distributed in commerce"; (2) that it "presents an un-
reasonable risk of injury"; and (3) that "no feasible consumer product
safety standard ... would adequately protect the public from the unrea-
sonable risk of injury associated with such product."6 2 Judicial review of
such a ban is specifically authorized by the CPS Act,6 3 which directs the
reviewing court to determine whether the action is supported by "sub-
stantial evidence in the record taken as a whole." 64 In reviewing CPSC
actions taken under section 8, the D.C. Circuit has applied a reasoned
decisionmaking standard.6 5
4. Summary
Reasoned decisionmaking would appear to be the appropriate stan-
dard for reviewing each of the three formaldehyde decisions. Courts have
been somewhat more deferential to agency decisions not to take action,
like EPA's and OSHA's, than to decisions to take a particular action,
58. See OSHA Denies Request for Emergency Rule, Pledges Riulemaking to Reach
Lower Limit, [11 Curr. Dev.] O.S.H. REP. (BNA) No. 18, at 341 (Oct. 1, 1981).
59. Public Citizen Health Group v. Auchter, No. 83-1071, slip op. (D.C. Cir. Mar.
15, 1983).
60. Id. at 13-14 (citing Overton Park, 401 U.S. 402, 415). The court makes no specific
mention of the "arbitrary and capricious" standard, but its reliance on Overton Park and
the nature of its inquiries indicate that it followed the traditional concepts of reasoned
decisionmaking.
61. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2083 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
62. Id. § 2057.
63. Id. § 2060.
64. Id. § 2060(c).
65. See ASG Indus., Inc. v. CPSC, 593 F.2d 1323, 1331 & 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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like CPSC's.6 6 Such deference is unwarranted here67 in light both of the
significant procedural irregularities in the EPA and OSHA deliberations 6 8
and of the potentially significant consequences of these decisions for
human health.69 Whatever standard of review the courts may ultimately
apply to the EPA and OSHA decisions, however, the rubric of reasoned
decisionmaking provides an excellent framework for understanding and
evaluating each agency's decision.
B. Science Policy Issues and the Assessment of Cancer Risk
The term "science policy" denotes issues that are grounded in sci-
entific analysis but for which technical data are insufficient to support an
66. See supra note 51. The D.C. Circuit summarized six principal reasons for such
deference in National Resources Defense Council v. SEC: (1) that the issues involved turn
on "factors not inherently susceptible to judicial resolution," such as the management of
budget and personnel and the balancing of competing policies within a broad statutory
framework; (2) that there may be "such rapid technological development that regulations
would be outdated by the time they could become effective"; (3) that there may be
inadequate data currently available on which to base regulations; (4) that "[t]he circum-
stances in the regulated industry may be evolving in a way that could vitiate the need for
regulation"; (5) that the agency may not yet possess "the expertise necessary for effective
regulation"; and (6) that the record on review would be "of little use to a reviewing court
unless [it is] narrowly focused on the particular rule advocated by plaintiff." 606 F.2d 1031,
1046 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (citations omitted).
67. The D.C. Circuit's six reasons for deference, see supra note 66, are largely
inapplicable here. First, EPA's and OSHA's decisions can not truly be said to be discre-
tionary decisions not to regulate. Rather, they are failures, or refusals, to make certain
findings that trigger mandatory action under section 4(f) of TSCA and section 6(c) of the
OSHAct. Further, as both of these sections explicitly anticipate imminent actions to protect
public health, neither EPA nor OSHA has the authority to engage in the kind of discre-
tionary delay implicit in reasons two through five.
Even if the agencies had such authority, none of the specific factors that concerned
the D.C. Circuit, see id., is present here. There is no "rapid technological development"
in the use of formaldehyde, or in the detection of carcinogenicity, such that formaldehyde
regulations "would be outdated by the time they could become effective"; similarly, nothing
indicates that circumstances in formaldehyde industries are "evolving in a way that could
vitiate the need for further regulation." The courts have indicated that information of the
type here available to EPA and OSHA, given the present state of the art in carcinogenic
risk assessment, is an acceptable basis upon which to premise regulations. Industrial Union
Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 474-75 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Finally, both agencies have
sufficient expertise to assess carcinogenic risk. The sixth reason for deference is also
inapplicable. Both EPA and OSHA deliberated for over two years and made "narrowly
focused" technical and policy determinations. Indeed, the record of EPA's deliberations is
especially well developed, as many aspects of the agency's decision have been outlined at
congressional hearings.
68. See infra text accompanying notes 228-302 & 367-86.
In NRDC v. SEC, the court noted that "more exacting scrutiny" of decisions not to
act will be appropriate "when for some reason the presumption of agency regularity is
rebutted." 606 F.2d at 1049 n.23 (citation omitted). It enumerated four examples of situa-
tions in which that presumption will be overcome. Two of them are relevant here: "where
the agency has demonstrated undue bias towards particular private interests"; and "when
an agency has departed from its consistent and longstanding precedents or policies." Id. at
1049 n.23 (citations omitted).
69. See infra text accompanying notes 104-29.
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unequivocal scientific conclusion.70 The ultimate resolution of these is-
sues depends on determinations of social policy.7 1
Distinguishing science policy determinations from those of a truly
technical nature is a central step in evaluating the adequacy of an agen-
cy's assessment of human health risks. 72 Simply deferring to agency
expertise on all determinations that appear to be "scientific" overlooks
the subjective determinations at the heart of the agency's decisions. Such
an approach frustrates any effort to measure agency decisions against
the reasoned decisionmaking standard.
Professor Thomas McGarity has noted that science policy issues can
be divided into distinct conceptual categories.73 Understanding these
major categories can be useful in analyzing the extent to which agencies
practice reasoned decisionmaking.
1. Trans-Scientific Issues
Some science policy issues, called "trans-scientific" 7 4 issues, raise
scientific questions, but are not amenable to scientific study because of
methodological constraints.7 5 These issues are said to "transcend
science."7 6
The recent controversy over the impact of chlorofluorocarbons
(CFCs) on the upper atmosphere provides a familiar example.7 7 In the
last decade, the aerosol spray can was used to package household prod-
ucts ranging from deodorants to whipped toppings. Such cans contained
small quantities of chlorofluorocarbons as a pressurizing agent. When the
cans were used CFCs were released into the environment. In the early
1970's, researchers reported that the CFCs might be depleting the ozone
70. See generally McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative
Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67
GEO. L.J. 729 (1979).
71. Although they do not use the term "science policy," a number of other authors
have also recognized the extreme technical uncertainty inherent in certain types of "sci-
entific" decisions. See, e.g., Bazelon, supra note 43; Jasanoff & Nelkin, Science, Tech-
nology, and the Limits of Judicial Competence, 68 A.B.A. J. 1094 (1982); Kantrowitz,
Controlling Technology Democratically, 63 AMERICAN SCIENTIST 505 (1975); Mazur, Sci-
ence Courts, 15 MINERVA 1 (1977); Mazur, Disputes Between Experts, 11 MINERVA 243
(1973); Weinberg, Science and Trans-Science, 10 MINERVA 209 (1972).
72. See infra note 95 (discussing the several science policy determinations an agency
must make in assessing carcinogenic risk).
73. McGarity, supra note 70, at 732-47. Professor McGarity classifies science policy
issues into four categories: trans-scientific issues, decisionmaking based on insufficient
data, varying scientific interpretations, and disagreement over inferences. Although we find
his classification useful, we feel that his fourth category only describes the first two in
another way, and we have structured our discussion accordingly.
74. Scientist Alvin M. Weinberg coined the term "trans-scientific" in 1972. See
Weinberg, supra note 71, at 209.
75. See McGarity, supra note 70, at 733-36.
76. Weinberg, supra note 71, at 209.
77. See generally Rowland & Molina, Cairns & Jesson, The Ozone Question, 190
SCIENCE 1038 (1975) (exchange of correspondence); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, NA-
TIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF STRATOSPHERIC OZONE RE-
DUCTION: AN UPDATE (1982).
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layer in the upper atmosphere, which acts as a natural radiation shield,
and thus might pose a threat to the public health.7 Reputable scientists
disagreed, and credible hypotheses supported each side of the issue.79
Given existing scientific methodology, those hypotheses could be
meaningfully tested only through direct experimentation in the upper
atmosphere.8 Sufficient experimentation was impractical, however, be-
cause it was both prohibitively expensive and exceedingly difficult.81
CPSC nevertheless decided to regulate the pressurized can.82 This deci-
sion was not, and could not have been, based on scientific "fact." It was
based instead on the agency's assessment of a trans-scientific policy issue
in light of a statutory mandate to protect the public health. 83
Trans-scientific issues arise regularly in human health risk assess-
ment. For example, suppose that an agency wishes to evaluate the human
carcinogenic risk of a new chemical substance. 84 To do so, it must de-
termine the probable human response at relevant - and often very low
- exposure levels.8 5 Direct human testing would be morally objection-
able, and epidemiologic evidence is not available because the chemical
is not yet in use. Consequently, the agency must rely on the results of
other tests, principally animal bioassays.8 6 In such bioassays, 100 or more
78. Molina & Rowland, Stratospheric Sink for Chlorofluoromethanes: Chlorine Atom-
Catalyzed Destruction of Ozone, 249 NATURE 810 (1974). The ozone layer helps screen out
harmful radiation that would otherwise reach the earth's surface from the sun.
79. See Rowland & Molina, Cairns & Jesson, supra note 77; Molina & Rowland,
supra note 78; Lovelock, Atmospheric Halocarbons and Stratospheric Ozone, 252 NATURE
292 (1974).
80. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, PRO-
TECTION AGAINST DEPLETION OF STRATOSPHERIC OZONE BY CHLOROFLUOROCARBONS,
31-57 (1979); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, HALO-
CARBONS: ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF CHLOROFLUOROMETHANE RELEASE, 11-13, 21-
24, 51-53 (1976).
81. See references cited supra note 80.
82. For a discussion of CPSC's regulatory efforts, see Merrill, supra note 32, at
1318-23.
83. See id. EPA also took regulatory action against chlorofluorocarbons under TSCA.
See id.
84. For a general discussion of the procedures and tests involved in assessing carcin-
ogenic risk, see Office of Technology Assessment, Assessment of Technologies for Deter-
mining Cancer Risks from the Environment (June 1981) (U.S. G.P.O. #OTA-H-138); R.
Merrill, Federal Regulation of Cancer-Causing Chemicals, Draft Report to the Administra-
tive Conference of the United States, Part I (April 1982) (available from the Administrative
Conference); Leape, Quantitative Risk Assessment in the Regulation of Environmental
Carcinogens, 4 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 86 (1980).
85. See IRLG Risk Assessment Document, supra note 36, at 259.
86. Bioassays involve exposing test animals - commonly rats or mice - to various
doses of the substance in question, observing those animals and "control" animals over a
period of time, and comparing tumor growth in the test and control groups.
In addition. to bioassays, various tests may be used to assess the mutagenicity of a
chemical substance. Such tests provide useful data for evaluating carcinogenicity because
available evidence indicates that carcinogenesis may proceed by primary genetic mecha-
nisms. In brief, it is known that most cancers originate in single cells, that many carcinogens
are mutagenic and react directly or indirectly with DNA, and that well-characterized genetic
I _ --· ·-· C---C-------- ----·----i -  ----·--
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animals are commonly tested at a high dose level, because directly mea-
suring the effects of low-dose exposures would require testing tens of
thousands of animals.8 7 Thus arise two classic issues of trans-science:
how does the agency interpolate high-dose data to lower exposure levels?
and how does it extrapolate animal data to humans? Existing scientific
knowledge cannot supply a definitive answer.
From a regulatory perspective, the important feature of trans-sci-
entific issues is that, without a significant improvement in scientific meth-
odology, delaying a decision to await their resolution will not permit the
development of a "better" scientific answer. As Professor McGarity com-
ments, "correct answers to these questions may exist as a philosophical
matter, but the 'truth' is ultimately unascertainable in either the scientific
or the legal forum."88
2. Insufficient, but Obtainable, Scientific Data
Many science policy issues conceivably could be resolved through
current methodology without moral objection. Drawing from our previous
example, suppose that an agency seeks to evaluate the human carcino-
genic risk of a chemical that has long been in use. Here, science might
well be able to provide an answer or at least be able to narrow the
question. An epidemiologic study perhaps could isolate the nature and
extent of the human carcinogenic risk. 89 The relevant science policy
issue, then, is the propriety of delaying a risk determination until such a
study has been concluded. Depending on the available data base, a study
may take from two to forty years to complete. 90 When is such a delay
impairments in DNA repair processes increase the risks of specific kinds of tumors. See
F. VOGEL & A. MOTULSKY, HUMAN GENETICS - PROBLEMS AND APPROACHES, 326-29
(1979); Hattis, Ashford, & Hollomon, Regulation of Cancer-Causing Substances: Another
Point of View, CHEM. & ENG'G NEWS, Dec. 13, 1982, at 35. Positive mutagenicity results
are often considered as supporting evidence of a chemical's carcinogenicity. See, e.g.,
IRLG Risk Assessment Document, supra note 36, at 25-57.
For a more detailed discussion of the various tests, see Weisberger & Williams,
Chemical Carcinogens, in CASARETT AND DOULL'S TOXICOLOGY 124-33 (J. Doull, C.
Klassen, & M. Amdur 2d ed. 1980).
87. Humans are generally exposed to carcinogens at low levels in the environment
or workplace. Common risks of concern at such levels range from 1 cancer case per 1000
persons exposed to 1 per 1,000,000. In bioassays, the test animals are essentially surrogates
for people. Thus, in order to detect a risk of 1 per 1000 at a low exposure level, many
more than 1000 animals would have to be tested to assure significant results. Testing at
high exposure levels involves higher risks (e.g., 1 per 10 or 1 per 100) and thus fewer
animals need be used. Such results then must be interpolated to lower exposure levels.
For a discussion of this testing problem, see National Center for Toxicological Research,
Innovations in Cancer Risk Assessment (EDO] Study'), 3 J. E.NVTL. PATHOLOGY & TOXI-
COLOGY 1 (1980) (24,000 mouse experiment designed to detect 1 cancer per 100 mice).
88. McGarity, supra note 70, at 734.
89. Epidemiology is the statistical study of disease in human populations. G.
FRIEDMAN, PRIMER OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 1 (2d ed. 1980). For general discussions of the
benefits, and limits, of epidemiologic studies, see R. MONSON, OCCUPATIONAL EPIDE-
MIOLOGY (1980); B. MACMAHON & T. PUGH, EPIDEMIOLOGY: PRINCIPLES AND METHODS
(1970).
90. A suitable "retrospective" cancer study, in which investigators examine existing
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appropriate and when not? This is a question of social, not scientific,
policy. The agency must look to its statutory mandate, rather than to
science, for direction.9s In the many situations where a delay will be
inappropriate, the agency will have to treat the question of carcinogenic
risk as if it were a trans-scientific issue.
3. Disagreement Over Scientific Interpretation
The final category of science policy issues involves differences in
scientific judgment. Even when dealing with a scientific issue rather than
a trans-scientific one, scientists may disagree on the proper scientific
interpretation of the data. Different interpretations of the same data do
not stem from differences in social or political philosophy; instead, "sci-
entific judgment has more to do with scientists' views, growing out of
long years of study, on how things operate in the physical world with
which they are familiar."92 The science policy issue is the choice between
the different scientific interpretations. For these issues, as for trans-
scientific issues, science cannot now provide an answer.93
C. Evaluating Agency Decisionmaking in Health Risk Assessment
Acknowledging that science policy will often play a major role in
agency assessments of human health risks, we now consider how to
determine whether an agency has abided by the principles of reasoned
decisionmaking. These principles impose three primary responsibilities
on an agency assessing health risks: (1) it must adequately evaluate the
technical data; (2) it must follow proper administrative procedures; and
(3) it must correctly carry out its statutory mandate.9 4 In practice, these
functions overlap. An agency's interpretation of its statutory mandate,
for example, can influence both the nature of the technical data it ex-
amines and the manner in which it makes that examination. In analyzing
completed agency decisions, however, the three elements are separable
and provide a logical framework.
health records, might be conducted within a relatively short period provided that sufficient
data exist on exposure and outcome for the study population. A "prospective" study, in
which the investigators identify people currently exposed to a suspect chemical, takes much
longer to complete because the study must last as long as the latency period for cancer,
which can be up to 40 years. See generally MONSON, supra note 89, at 35-64.
91. In evaluating agency inaction under statutes designed to reduce human exposure
to toxic substances, courts must necessarily determine whether and to what extent Congress
intended the agency to act in the face of uncertainty. See Industrial Union Dep't v.
Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
92. McGarity, supra note 70, at 742.
93. See generally id. at 740-53.
94. This scheme, of course, is not unfamiliar. It reflects the framework that the
Supreme Court laid in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402
(1971), structured to accommodate science policy decisions. See supra note 38.
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1. Treatment of Technical Data
In evaluating the technical data relevant to determining the health
risk, an agency must delve deeply into scientific issues. The agency will
ordinarily engage in two levels of scientific analysis. On one level, it will
address "hard" scientific issues that can be resolved with currently avail-
able methodologies. On a second level, the agency will confront various
science policy issues, which cannot be answered solely on a technical
basis.95 Thus, a meaningful critique of an agency's treatment of technical
data requires both an understanding of the relevant technical methodol-
ogy and an ability to distinguish between "hard science" and "science
policy" determinations.
For example, most reputable toxicologists agree that an animal car-
cinogenesis bioassay will produce misleading results unless it allows
sufficient time - about two years - for the development of tumors.9 6
An agency that concluded that a substance was not carcinogenic on the
basis of a negative three-month bioassay would commit an identifiable
methodological error.
In contrast, there is considerable disagreement among toxicologists
on the proper interpretation of benign tumors in bioassays; 9 7 current
scientific understanding is simply insufficient to permit a conclusive as-
sessment of the significance of benign tumors in cancer risk assessment.9 8
When an agency makes a determination based on benign tumor data, it
operates outside the realm of hard science.
Scientific opinion on some science policy issues, such as the issue
of extrapolating animal data to humans,99 is much more uniform. Here
the analytical question is whether the agency has adhered to prevailing
scientific opinion. In appropriate circumstances, of course, the agency
may depart from scientific opinion on these issues. They do, after all,
95. The science policy determinations that agencies must make in assessing carcin-
ogenic risk include: (1) the extrapolation of animal data to humans; (2) the interpolation of
high-dose data to project low-dose risk; (3) the usefulness of short-term in vitro tests for
assessing carcinogenicity; (4) the usefulness of chemical structure for predicting carcino-
genicity; (5) the reversibility of cell transformation induced by carcinogens; (6) the distinc-
tion between benign and malignant tumors; and (7) the importance of negative human
epidemiologic data and negative animal experimental data.
96. See Weisberger & Williams, supra note 86, at 130 (exposures of two years for
rats, 21-24 months for mice and hamsters).
97. Benign tumors, unlike malignant ones, do not divide, become dislodged from
their original site, or invade surrounding tissues or organs. See Office of Technology
Assessment, supra note 84, at 127.
98. Compare AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON THE EVALUATION OF Low LEVELS OF EN-
VIRONMENTAL CHEMICAL CARCINOGENESIS, EVALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL CARCIN-
OGENS: REPORT TO THE SURGEON GENERAL 180 (1970) (benign tumors should be counted
as significant in assessing carcinogenicity) with Plant, A Dangerous Definition, CHEMICAL
& ENGINEERING NEWS, Oct. 20, 1975, at 4 (opposite conclusion). Further experimentation
will undoubtedly generate more data on the relationship between benign and malignant
tumors, but an ultimate answer does not seem immediately forthcoming.
99. See, e.g., IRLG Risk Assessment Document, supra note 36, at 248.
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involve policy determinations, and accordingly should be made by the
governmental entity charged with reflecting the will of the people through
the execution of a congressional mandate. Nonetheless, they are also
determinations that should be properly based on a sufficient understand-
ing of the underlying scientific evidence. When a majority position on a
science policy issue has evolved within the scientific community, then,
the agency should not depart from that position without acknowledging
and justifying the departure.
2. Adherence to Procedural Requirements
Science policy issues may also arise in the context of procedural
matters. Agencies often develop general policy guidelines for their reg-
ulatory actions, in the form of either formal generic standards, such as
OSHA's,' ° ° or informal statements of procedure, such as the Regulatory
Council's.'0 ' These guidelines not only promote regulatory continuity,
but also provide notice to affected industries and interested members of
the general public. As a matter of administrative procedure, an agency
must either adhere to its policy guidelines or identify and explain any
change in, or departure from, those guidelines.'0 2 To develop policy
guidelines in the area of health risk assessment, the agency must adopt
positions on science policy issues. Absent formal announcements of
changes in these positions, recognizing policy departures will require that
one first identify and understand the underlying science policy issues.
In addition, the agency must conform with a number of other pro-
cedural requisites. Of particular importance in evaluating health risk
determinations is the agency's use of outside technical experts, whose
opinions will often influence the agency's decision.' Here, proper scrutiny
of agency procedures will entail an examination of the agency's duties
under the Federal Advisory Committee Act,'0 3 which limits the solicita-
tion of advice from sources outside the agency.
3. Execution of Statutory Mandates
Finally, the agency must act in accordance with its statutory man-
'date. This responsibility has two elements. The agency must carry out
the specific duties of the particular statutory provisions under which it
is considering regulatory action. At the same time, it must faithfully
adhere to the more general aspects of the congressional mandate under-
lying its enabling legislation.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 29-31.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
102. See, e.g., State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. v. Department of Transp., 680 F.2d
206, 220 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("an agency changing its course must supply a reasoned analysis
indicating that prior policies and standards are being deliberately changed, not casually
ignored") (citing Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FTC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir.
1970)).
103. 5 U.S.C. app. 1 (1976).
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Any analysis of agency decisionmaking must carefully consider both
of these elements. In evaluating health risk determinations, particular
attention must be given to the ways in which assessments of science
policy issues reflect an agency's interpretation of its statutory mandate.
In close cases, for example, should the agency tip the balance in favor
of finding a human health risk, or in favor of deferring such a finding
until additional data are available?
III. FORMALDEHYDE CANCER RISK: AVAILABLE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
A. Evidence on Formaldehyde Carcinogenicity
1. Bioassay Evidence
The most important and conclusive evidence on formaldehyde car-
cinogenicity came from a two-year bioassay sponsored by the Chemical
Industry Institute of Toxicology (CIIT), an independent laboratory sup-
ported by chemical corporations.'0 4 Groups of rats and groups of mice
were exposed to nominal levels of zero, two, six, and fifteen parts per
million (ppm) of formaldehyde gas for six hours per day, five days per
week. Actual average exposure levels were measured at 0.0, 2.0, 5.6,
and 14.3 ppm. Each group consisted of 240 animals, half males and half
females, some of which died for reasons unrelated to formaldehyde ex-
posure and were excluded from the study.'°5 Final study results for the
rats showed the following: 0 6
Exposure # of rats # of malignant # of benign
level examined nasal tumors'0 7 nasal tumors'0 8
14.3 232 106 7
5.6 235 2 6
2.0 236 0 8
0 232 1 1
104. See Chemical Industry Institute of Toxicology, Final Report on a Chronic In-
halation Toxicology Study in Rats and Mice Exposed to Formaldehyde, CIIT Docket No.
10922 (1981).
105. Some animals from each group were sacrificed and examined after twelve,
eighteen, and twenty-four months. Id.
106. Chemical Industry Institute of Toxicology, Data Released to the International
Agency for Research on Cancer Working Group (Oct. 19, 1981) (Appendix A of Memoran-
dum from John A. Todhunter to Anne M. Gorsuch (Feb. 10, 1982)).
107. Of the 106 rats that developed cancer following exposure at 14.3 ppm, 103
developed squamous cell carcinomas. One of those rats also developed a nasal carcinoma
and another an undifferentiated carcinoma or sarcoma. The remaining three rats developed
a nasal carcinoma, an undifferentiated carcinoma or sarcoma, and a carcinosarcoma, re-
spectively. Of the two rats that developed cancer following exposure at 5.6 ppm, both
developed squamous cell carcinomas. One rat in the 0 ppm group developed an
osteochondroma.
108. All of the benign tumors were polypoid adenomas.
^.__ ________· · ·_L 1 1_^1__1_
Harvard Environmental Law Review
Two of the mice exposed at 14.3 ppm developed nasal tumors;109
these results were not statistically significant. 10 There was considerable
early mortality among the mice due to miscellaneous causes, including
fighting among the males."'
Also important were two inhalation bioassays conducted at New
York University (NYU). The first study exposed a group of 100 male
rats to a mixture of gaseous formaldehyde at 14.7 ppm and hydrogen
chloride at 10.6 ppm for six hours per day, five days per week, for life."2
Another group exposed to neither substance served as a control. Twenty-
seven exposed rats developed malignant nasal tumors, but no malignant
tumors were found among the control rats. The researchers were unable
to determine, however, whether the tumors were induced by formalde-
hyde, by bis(chloromethyl) ether (BCME), a product of the chemical
reaction of formaldehyde and hydrogen chloride, or by the interaction of
all three chemicals. Based on previous experience with BCME, 1" 3 the
researchers suggested that formaldehyde was probably the causal agent.
A later NYU study,' 14 the preliminary results of which were provided
to the agencies in 1981," 5 shed further light on this issue. This study
used the same methodology as the earlier NYU bioassay, but it added
three groups of 100 rats. The first group was exposed to a slighly different
mixture of formaldehyde and hydrochloric acid, the second was exposed
only to 14.6 ppm formaldehyde, and the third only to 10.6 ppm hydro-
chloric acid. By eighteen months, ten rats in the group exposed only to
formaldehyde had died and were found to have developed malignant
tumors, whereas a total of eighteen rats in the two groups exposed to a
mixture of formaldehyde and hydrochloric acid had developed such tu-
mors. Based on these preliminary results, the researchers tentatively
concluded that formaldehyde was the causal agent. Final results are not
yet available.
The results available from a number of other animal carcinogenesis
studies using a variety of experimental techniques were generally
inconclusive. 16
109. Both were squamous cell carcinomas.
110. The term "statistically significant" indicates that the probability that the observed
effect (here, nasal tumors), might have occurred by chance is below a certain predefined
level, generally five percent. See Office of Technology Assessment, supra note 84, at 123.
111. Chemical Industry Institute for Toxicology, Summary of Final Report on For-
maldehyde Study, 2 CIIT ACTIVITIES, Mar. 1982, at 9.
112. See Albert, et al., Nasal Cancer in the Rat Induced by Gaseous Formaldehyde
and Hydrogen Chloride, 4 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 597 (1982).
113. Kuschner, Laskin, Drew, Capiello, & Nelson, The Inhalation Carcinogenicity
of Alpha Halo Ethers (pt. 3: Lifetime and Limited Period Inhalation Studies with
Bis(chloromethyl) Ether at 0.1 ppm), 30 ARCHIVES ENVTL. HEALTH 73 (1975).
114. See Albert, et al., supra note 112.
115. Letter from Dr. Arthur Upton, Chairman, New York University Medical Center,
to Representatives of the NCI, NIOSH, OSHA, EPA, NIEHS, CPSC, AFL-CIO, and
Chemical Manufacturers' Association (Aug. 17, 1981).
116. Compare Federal Panel Report, supra note 7, at 151-54 (concluding that studies
_____I 1_1 · _
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2. Epidemiologic Evidence
The most important available epidemiologic evidence came from
studies by Walrath and Fraumeni," 7 Wong," 8 and Marsh. 1 9 The largest
of these three studies was Walrath and Fraumeni's study of embalmers
in New York state, which was based on 1106 deaths. Although Walrath
and Fraumeni found no deaths due to nasal cancer and no apparent
excess of deaths from respiratory system cancer, they did find suggestive
increases in the frequency of deaths from skin, kidney, and central nerv-
ous system cancer.
Evidence available from Wong's study of 2000 workers employed
by a formaldehyde manufacturer showed no nasal cancers or excesses
of other cancers in those that had died. As of the date of the study,
however, only 146 workers had yet died from any cause.
Marsh considered 592 deaths among workers at a plant that began
making formaldehyde-based products in 1938. Only 136 of-the workers,
however, had more than one month of "exposure" to formaldehyde.
Marsh observed no nasal or other noteworthy cancer excesses during
the study period, 1938 to 1976.120
3. Scientific Panel Evaluations
Before the agencies made their decisions, at least four scientific
panels had evaluated the available evidence on formaldehyde's carcino-
genicity. 12 1 Those four panels were the Federal Panel on Formaldehyde, 122
provide suggestive evidence of carcinogenicity) with INTERNATIONAL AGENCY FOR RE-
SEARCH ON CANCER, FINAL DRAFT EVALUATION OF FORMALDEHYDE (1981) (studies con-
sidered inadequate for evaluation) [hereinafter cited as IARC REPORT]; see also CPSC,
Ban of Urea-Formaldehyde Foam Insulation, 47 Fed. Reg. 14,365, 14,370, 14,375-76, 14,380
(1982) [hereinafter cited as CPSC Ban Notice].
117. Walrath & Fraumeni, Proportionate Mortality among New York Embalmers, in
THE THIRD CHEMICAL INDUSTRY INSTITUTE OF TOXICOLOGY CONFERENCE OF TOXICOL-
OGY: FORMALDEHYDE TOXICITY (J. Gibson ed.) (in press) [hereinafter cited as THIRD CIIT
CONFERENCE].
118. Wong, An Epidemiologic Mortality Study of a Cohort of Chemical Workers
Potentially Exposed to Formaldehyde, with a Discussion on PMR and SMR, in THIRD
CIIT CONFERENCE, supra note 117.
119. Marsh, Proportional Mortality Among Chemical Workers Exposed to Formal-
dehyde, in THIRD CIIT CONFERENCE, supra note 117.
120. Two of the workers, however, died of nasal cancer in 1979. Memorandum from
Peter F. Infante, Director, Office of Carcinogen Classification and Identification, OSHA to
Thorne G. Auchter (Jan. 19, 1982). See also Memorandum from John Martonik to Thorne
Auchter (Feb. 4, 1982) (formaldehyde exposure data lacking for cases reported by Infante).
121. In addition to the animal bioassay and epidemiologic studies described above,
mutagenicity tests provide secondary evidence of formaldehyde's carcinogenicity. Formal-
dehyde has been found to produce mutations in insects, bacteria, and mammalian cells.
See Federal Panel Report, supra note 7, at 148-49; CPSC Ban Notice, supra note 116, at
14,373. Test results generally indicate that formaldehyde is a weak mutagen.
122. Federal Panel Report, supra note 7.
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the Environmental Cancer Information Unit of the Environmental Sci-
ences Laboratory at the Mount Sinai School of Medicine, 12 3 the National
Research Council Committee on Aldehydes, 24 and the International
Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC). 25
The Federal Panel report was completed before the final CIIT data,
the second NYU study, or the epidemiologic studies were available. The
Panel concluded that "formaldehyde should be presumed to pose a car-
cinogenic risk to humans," and recommended future studies.' 26 The Mt.
Sinai and National Research Council reports also preceded the final
results of the CIIT study and the results of the second NYU study. The
Mt. Sinai scientists concluded that formaldehyde should be considered a
human carcinogen. 27 The National Research Council committee declined
to draw any conclusion because it judged the available data inadequate. 28
In October 1981, an IARC working group considered all of the evidence
summarized above and concluded:
There is sufficient evidence that formaldehyde gas is carcinogenic to
rats.
The epidemiological studies provide inadequate evidence to assess the
carcinogenicity of formaldehyde to man.
In the absence of adequate epidemiological data, formaldehyde gas
should be considered, for practical purposes, as if it represented a carcin-
ogenic risk to man. 29
B. Evidence of Human Exposure to Formaldehyde
1. Worker Exposures
Three estimates of worker exposure to formaldehyde have been
prepared. The first, by the Snell Division of Booz, Allen, and Hamilton,
Inc. ("Snell"),'3 0 and the second, by MIT's Center for Policy Alternatives
123. I. SELIKOFF & E. HAMMOND, MT. SINAI SCHOOL OF MEDICINE, CARCINOGEN-
ICITY OF FORMALDEHYDE - FINAL REPORT (1981) (prepared for the American Cancer
Society) [hereinafter cited as MT. SINAI REPORT].
124. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, FORMAL-
DEHYDE AND OTHER ALDEHYDES (1981).
125. IARC REPORT, supra note 116.
126. Federal Panel Report, supra note 7, at 1.
127. MT. SINAI REPORT, supra note 123.
128. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note
124.
129. IARC REPORT, supra note 116, at 2-3. The IARC categorizes data from positive
animal studies as either "inadequate," "limited," or "sufficient," with "sufficient" evidence
defined as "increased incidence of malignant tumors: (a) in multiple species or strains, or
(b) in multiple experiments (preferably with different routes of administration or using
different levels), or (c) to an unusual degree with regard to incidence, site or type of tumour,
or age at onset." IARC MONOGRAPHS ON THE EVALUATION OF THE CARCINOGENIC RISK
OF CHEMICALS TO HUMANS, SUPPLEMENT I (1979).
130. Foster D. Snell Division, Booz, Allen, & Hamilton, Inc., Preliminary Study of
the Costs of Increased Regulation of Formaldehyde Exposure in the U.S. Workplace (Apr.
1979) (prepared for the Formaldehyde Institute, Scarsdale, N.Y.) [hereinafter cited as Snell
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("MIT"),13 ' provided estimates only for occupations within the purview
of the OSHAct, and thus excluded education.'3 2 A third study, by EPA's
Office of Toxic Substances,'3 3 included education-related exposures.
Snell prepared its report in 1978 and 1979 for the Formaldehyde Task
Force of the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association. In
estimating the costs of industry compliance with stricter formaldehyde
regulations, Snell assessed exposures in seventeen industries based on
company responses to questionnaires.'3 4 The questionnaires requested
information on formaldehyde use, numbers of employees exposed, and
exposure levels. Employers were asked to judge workers' exposure levels
qualitatively on a scale of observed odor strength and eye irritation, and
to provide quantitative measurements if available. Snell extrapolated the
responses to develop industry-wide exposure profiles.
Snell estimated that a total of 1.4 million full- and part-time workers
were exposed to formaldehyde.'3 5 Based on the odor strength scale,'3 6
Snell's qualitative estimates were that formaldehyde exposure probably
exceeded 1.8 ppm five percent of the time in over 1.1 million workplaces,
twenty per cent of the time in over 120,000 workplaces, forty-five percent
of the time in over 7500 workplaces, and seventy percent of the time in
over 6000 workplaces.' 3 7 In addition, Snell indicated that formaldehyde
exposure exceeded 3.0 ppm about one percent of the time in at least
70,000 workplaces.'3 8
MIT completed its report for the Department of Labor in early 1981.
MIT rejected the Snell exposure level estimates as methodologically
deficient,'3 9 but relied in part on Snell's estimates of the numbers of
Report]. This report was published in a final form, entitled COSTS OF INCREASED REGU-
LATION OF FORMALDEHYDE EXPOSURE IN THE U.S. WORKPLACE (1980).
131. D. Hattis, C. Mitchell, J. McCleary-Jones, & N. Gorelick, Control of Occupa-
tional Exposures to Formaldehyde: A Case Study of Methodology for Assessing the Health
and Economic Impacts of OSHA Health Standards (Apr. 1981) (available as CPA-81-17
from MIT's Center for Policy Alternatives) [hereinafter cited as MIT Report].
Although all three authors of this article are currently affiliated with the Center for
Policy Alternatives and although the MIT study is sometimes referred to as "the Ashford
report," none of us participated in that study. In any event, the evidence of impropriety in
OSHA's formaldehyde deliberations appears strong regardless of the validity of the MIT
study.
132. Most educational institutions are controlled by state and local government and
are therefore excluded from OSHAct coverage. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 652(5), (7) (1976); 29
C.F.R. § 1975.5 (1982). Private institutions, however, are subject to OSHAct requirements.
133. OFFICE OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES, EPA, DRAFT PRIORITY REVIEW LEVEL 1: FOR-
MALDEHYDE (1981) [hereinafter cited as PRL-1]. In preparing this document, EPA relied
primarily on information from the IRLG Workgroup on Formaldehyde.
134. See Snell Report, supra note 130, at 53-70 (describing study methodology).
135. Snell Report, supra note 130, at 12.
136. Id. at 10.
137. Figures derived using data presented in Snell Report, supra note 130, at 9, 10,
89, 110, 128, 145, 158, 181, 207, 238, 256, 283, 294, 308, 318.
138. Id.
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workers exposed.' 14 0 To estimate exposure levels, MIT relied on quanti-
tative workplace and worker measurements drawn primarily from Na-
tional Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) surveys and
OSHA inspections. 141 These data were extrapolated to estimate industry-
wide exposure. 4 2 High, midrange, and low exposure estimates were
provided.
The data used by MIT indicated that of 640 measurements taken in
various industries, seventeen percent exceeded 1.0 ppm, seven percent
exceeded 2.0 ppm, and three percent exceeded 4.0 ppm. 143 Extrapolating
from this data, MIT estimated that the equivalent of between 0.6 and 2
million full-time workers were exposed to formaldehyde at levels above
0.03 ppm in 1979.'44 Exposures were estimated to exceed 1.0 ppm for the
equivalent of between 67 and 500 thousand workers;' 4 5 to exceed 2.0
ppm for the equivalent of between 27 and 200 thousand workers; and to
exceed 4.0 ppm for the equivalent of between 7 and 80 thousand workers.
EPA prepared its exposure estimates in 1980 and early 1981 as part
of the IRLG formaldehyde study effort, and included figures for worker,
consumer, and ambient exposures. To estimate the numbers of exposed
workers, EPA relied in part on the results of NIOSH's National Occu-
pational Hazard Survey and in part on its own estimates derived from a
variety of sources. 146 For exposure level estimates, EPA relied primarily
on the NIOSH results.'4 7
Excluding education-related exposures, the estimates indicated that
between 188,000 and 408,000 workers within these industries were ex-
posed to formaldehyde. EPA exposure level estimates generally range
from minimal to 2, 3, or 4 ppm, with associated average values generally
ranging from 0.25 to 1.5 ppm. 148 Estimates for education-related exposure
140. Id. at 3-12 to -14.
141. Id. at 2-32 to -42.
142. The methodology is described in the MIT Report, supra note 131, at 3-3 to -18.
143. MIT Report, supra note 131, at 2-37 to -39 (Table 2.11).
144. Id. at 3-15, -17. Workplace exposure levels vary greatly from hour to hour and
day to day. In the course of a year, individual workers will spend portions of their time at
a wide range of exposure levels. It is therefore not strictly accurate to represent exposures
in terms of "X workers at level A and Y workers at level B." The MIT Report essentially
estimated the total worker time spent at various exposure levels and reported the results
as "full-time equivalents" at specific levels.
145. These and the following estimates were calculated from data presented in the
MIT Report, supra note 131, at 3-10, -15, -17 (Tables 3.1-3.3).
146. PRL-1, supra note 133, at 54-63. Both Snell and MIT criticized the NIOSH
data. See Snell Report, supra note 130, at 53-56; MIT Report, supra note 131, at 2-54. The
EPA study covered formaldehyde producers and fifty-nine user groups, although data were
not available for all of the groups. PRL-1, supra note 133, at 65-68 (Table 8). For each
industry group for which data were available, EPA presented a range of expected exposure
levels, as well as average or median values, and a range of numbers of workers exposed.
Id.
147. Id. at 36-45.
148. Industries with particularly high exposure levels include furniture production,
embalming/funeral services, pathology labs, and mushroom farms. Id. at 65-70, Table 8.
_____ I C
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indicated that 35,000 college/university and high school biology instruc-
tors, 1.2 million college students, and an unknown number of high school
students were exposed to formaldehyde levels ranging from 0.1 to 14.8
ppm with an average value of 8.3 ppm.
At present, though they certainly indicate substantial exposure near
the current 3.0 ppm OSHA standard, 4 9 estimates of worker exposure are
somewhat uncertain and tentative. The Snell estimates are extrapolations
from qualitative survey responses. The MIT estimates, though based on
640 total measurements, were not based on a large number of measure-
ments in a number of specific industry groups. Moreover, the available
measurements were not from deliberately randomized samples. MIT at-
tempted to limit the uncertainty arising from the possible unrepresenta-
tiveness of the available data base by providing "high" and "low" esti-
mates, but it called its procedures for doing so "highly speculative."'5 0
Similarly, the EPA estimates were based on a small number of
measurements. 151
2. Consumer Exposures
Data for consumer exposures came primarily from EPA estimates 52
and from CPSC studies.' 53 EPA surveyed data for residents of mobile
homes and residents of conventional homes. It estimated that 2.2 million
mobile home residents were exposed to formaldehyde released from
particleboard or plywood at levels ranging from 0.01 to 2.54 ppm with a
mean value of 0.4 ppm, and an unknown number of conventional home
residents was exposed to formaldehyde from this source at levels ranging
from 0.08 to 2.24 ppm with a mean of 0.5 to 0.6 ppm. EPA also estimated
that 1.3 to 1.6 million residents of homes with urea-formaldehyde foam
insulation (UFFI) were exposed at levels ranging from 0.05 to 3.40 ppm
with a mean of 0.72 ppm.
CPSC estimated only exposure levels for residents of homes with
urea-formaldehyde foam insulation. The Commission's final estimates
were based on 1164 measurements in homes with formaldehyde insula-
tion, and on the results of laboratory foam panel tests. 5 4 Calculations
based on the former data set indicate that formaldehyde levels immedi-
ately after installation are approximately 3.0 ppm. They decline rapidly
to 0.12 ppm after 40 weeks, and then more slowly to 0.04 ppm after 9
years. Calculations based on the latter data set yielded an average value
of 0.07 ppm in a corner room for the first 464 days after installation, with
149. See infra note 331.
150. See MIT Report, supra note 131, at 3-9.
151. See PRL-1, supra note 133, at 71-75.
152. See id. at 42-43, 58-59, 63-64, 69.
153. See CPSC, REVISED CARCINOGENIC RISK ASSESSMENT FOR UREA FORMALDE-
HYDE FOAM INSULATION: ESTIMATES OF CANCER RISK DUE TO INHALATION OF FORMAL-
DEHYDE RELEASED BY UFFI (1981) [hereinafter cited as CPSC RISK ASSESSMENT].
154. See id. at 9-12. For a discussion of the major strengths and weaknesses of this
data set, see infra text accompanying notes 455-64.
Ilb"c-----·l '-- ' ' ' - ' - - - - -
1983] 323
Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 7:297
declining values thereafter. CPSC estimated that in 1981 there were 1.75
million residents of homes with formaldehyde insulation, and projected
that future installation of UFFI in additional homes would expose another
262,500 residents each year.
IV. EPA's DECISION NOT To DESIGNATE FORMALDEHYDE A SECTION
4(F) CHEMICAL
A. Background
1. Chronology of Events
EPA received the preliminary results of the CIIT bioassay in No-
vember 1979.' 55 In response, the agency participated in efforts by the
Interagency Regulatory Liaison Group (IRLG) to estimate formaldehyde
exposures. 56 A year later, the agency's Office of Toxic Substances (OTS)
received the Federal Panel on Formaldehyde report on the chemical's
carcinogenicity, and, shortly thereafter, IRLG's exposure data.'5 7 Based
on the available carcinogenicity and exposure information, OTS deter-
mined that formaldehyde might be a candidate for action under section
4(f) of TSCA. 58 In January 1981, OTS began to prepare a Priority Review
Level 1 (PRL-1) document on formaldehyde.' 5 9 A PRL-1 designation was
an internal EPA mechanism for identifying items of highest priority within
the agency. In March 1981, after estimating the potential formaldehyde
cancer risk to the general population, EPA's Deputy Assistant Admin-
istrator for Toxic Substances, together with other EPA officials, deter-
mined that there "may be a reasonable basis to conclude" that formal-
dehyde poses a significant cancer risk and that the threshold requirement
of section 4(f) had thus been met.' 60 Accordingly, they drafted a Federal
Register notice indicating that section 4(f) had been invoked, that addi-
tional information would be required before the agency could formulate
155. See 7 PESTICIDE & TOXIC CHEMICAL NEWS 10 (1979).
156. Gore EPA Hearings, supra note 18 (statement by Richard Dailey, EPA Office
of Toxic Substances). In December 1979 the IRLG established a work group on formal-
dehyde composed of representatives from the five member agencies - EPA, OSHA, CPSC,
the Food and Drug Administration, and the Department of Agriculture - and from the




159. Id. See PRL-1, supra note 133. See also Office of Toxic Substances, EPA,
Formaldehyde Designation as a Priority for Investigation Under the Toxic Substances
Control Act, Draft Federal Register Notice 6 (May 1981) [hereinafter cited as Draft Federal
Register Notice]. The PRL-1 was based largely on the Federal Panel report and the IRLG
exposure data.
160. Gore EPA Hearings, supra note 18 (statement by Richard Dailey, EPA Office
of Toxic Substances). See also 9 PESTICIDE & TOXIC CHEMICAL NEWS 27 (1981).
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a proper response, and that an expedited investigation to obtain the
necessary information would begin.' 6 '
When newly confirmed EPA Administrator Anne Gorsuch and Dep-
uty Administrator John Hernandez assumed office in May 1981, the draft
notice awaited them. Also awaiting them was a letter from John Byington,
a lawyer representing the Formaldehyde Institute, who disputed the work
of the EPA staff.' 62 Byington argued that section 4(f) had not been
"triggered" and that the available data was insufficient to support any
immediate action. He urged that further studies be undertaken outside
of official agency auspices. 63
Hernandez delayed further EPA action on formaldehyde and met
with representatives of the Formaldehyde Institute to review their posi-
tion. 164 Thereafter, he determined that the available scientific information
was insufficient to support a section 4(f) determination and called for
further study.' 65 During July and August 1981, he held a series of three
closed meetings with EPA staff, industry representatives, and a few
selected scientists from other institutions.' 6 6 In testimony at subsequent
congressional hearings, Hernandez characterized these meetings as "ex-
clusively scientific," and described their purpose as having been to "shed
some light" on the "scientific" issues.' 67
During the following months, EPA acted on several fronts. In a
September 11 memorandum, Don Clay, the newly appointed OTS direc-
tor, indicated to John Todhunter, the newly designated Assistant Admin-
istrator for Pesticides and Toxic Substances, 68 that consideration of
161. Draft Federal Register Notice, supra note 159, at 1, 5, 23. The agency was most
concerned about the limitations of the available exposure data, which it believed "suggest
the potential for significant human exposure," id. at 1, but which it recognized were
incomplete, id. at 15. Accordingly, EPA proposed to satisfy the section 4(f) requirement
to "initiate appropriate action" by "investigat[ing] those exposures of greatest concern and
determin[ing] whether they lead to unreasonable risks." Id. at 1.
162. Letter from John Byington to John Hernandez, Jr., (May'20, 1981).
163. Id. at 3. Byington wrote: "[W]e urge you not to proceed with a TSCA § 4(f)
proceeding on formaldehyde at this time. Rather we suggest that a voluntary program aimed
at the collection and analysis of additional scientific data be undertaken . . ." EPA even-
tually adopted Byington's approach. Id; see OTS Formaldehyde Workplan, in Memorandum
from John Todhunter to Anne Gorsuch, Attachment 1 (Feb. 10, 1982) [hereinafter cited as
Todhunter Memorandum].
164. Moffett Hearings, supra note 18, at 15 (prepared statement by John Hernandez,
Jr.). Hernandez met with seven Formaldehyde Institute representatives on May 27, 1981.
Id. at 15-16.
165. Id. at 16; see also Memorandum from Anne Gorsuch to Edwin H. Clark, Acting
Assistant Administrator for Pesticides and Toxic Substances (June 12, 1981), reprinted in
Moffett Hearings, supra note 18, at 29.
166. See Moffett Hearings, supra note 18, at 1-100, 162-96; Scheuer Hearings, supra
note 18, at 49-55, 88-96, 105-15.
167. Moffett Hearings, supra note 18, at 19 (statement by John Hernandez, Jr.).
168. John Todhunter resigned March 25, 1983. [13 Curr. Dev.] ENV'T REP. (BNA)
No. 48, at 2179 (Apr. 1, 1983).
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formaldehyde under section 4(f) was inappropriate. 16 9 Clay based his
position on several factors, including his belief that section 4(f) should
be reserved for "a crash effort to remedy a very serious hazard to public
health."'7 0 Between August and November 1981, the OTS staff revised
the original agency document on formaldehyde, reclassifying it from a
"Priority Review" status to a "Technical Document" status.17 ' During
October and November 1981, Administrator Gorsuch repeatedly stated
that the agency had yet to take a position on formaldehyde.' 72
EPA formally announced its position on February 12, 1982, by re-
leasing a memorandum from Todhunter that embraced Clay's earlier
position on formaldehyde.' 73 Unlike Clay, Todhunter supported this po-
sition with an analysis of the "scientific" issues inherent in formaldehyde
risk assessment. He also outlined a plan for further formaldehyde
study. 174 EPA characterized the Todhunter memorandum as "concluding
present agency action on the subject."' 75
Todhunter's analysis advanced theories that conflicted with preva-
lent scientific opinion in the field,' 76 and that departed from prior cancer
policies of EPA and other regulatory agencies.' 77 The memorandum ac-
cordingly created considerable controversy, within both the scientific
community and other agencies. 78 In response, congressional hearings
were held in May 1982 to explore the scientific basis for EPA's formal-
dehyde determination. 7 9 Following those hearings, both EPA and indus-
try have proceeded with further formaldehyde research.'8 0
169. Memorandum from Don Clay to John Todhunter (Sept. 11, 1981), reprinted in
Moffett Hearings, supra note 18, at 193 [hereinafter cited as Clay Memorandum].
170. Id. at 3, reprinted in Moffett Hearings, supra note 18, at 195.
171. TECHNICAL DOCUMENT, supra note 4. For a discussion of the evolution of this
document, see Gore EPA Hearings, supra note 18 (statements of John Todhunter and
Richard Dailey).
172. See Moffett Hearings, supra note 18, at 77; Scheuer Hearings, supra note 18,
at 230; 5 CHEM. REG. REP. (BNA) 950 (Nov. 20, 1981) (reporting that Gorsuch sent a letter
to the Natural Resources Defense Council saying that "scientific review and toxicological
interpretations of data" were nearly complete and that a decision would be released before
December 5,1981).
173. Todhunter Memorandum, supra note 163; EPA, Notice of Availability, EPA
ENVTL. NEws,.Feb. 12, 1982 (accompanying press advisory).
174. Todhunter Memorandum, supra note 163, at 1.
175. EPA, Notice of Availability, EPA ENVTL. NEWS, Feb. 12, 1982.
176. See infra notes 195-227 and accompanying text. See also Gore EPA Hearings,
supra note 18 (statements by Drs. Sidney Weinhouse, Norton Nelson, Roy Albert, Richard
Griesemer, and Federica Perera); Perera & Petito, supra note 17.
177. See infra notes 278-295 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 17. See also Marshall, EPA's High-Risk Carcinogen Policy, 218
SCIENCE 975 (1982).
179. Gore EPA Hearings, supra note 18.
180. For a listing of ongoing work, see Letter from James Ramey, Chairman, For-
maldehyde Institute, to Thorne Auchter, Attachment 1 (Nov. 25, 1981). Probably the most
important ongoing study is a joint National Cancer Institute-Formaldehyde Institute epi-
demiologic study of 20,000 workers. See 5 CHEM. REG. REP. (BNA) 1051 (Jan. 8, 1982);
see also FORMALDEHYDE INSTITUTE, PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE ON FORMALDE-
___ _______.._ 
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2. The Agency's "Statement of Reasons"
The substantive basis for EPA's decision is reportedly contained in
one, or both, of two documents: the four-page Clay memorandum and
the sixteen-page Todhunter memorandum. The two memoranda both
concluded that formaldehyde should not be designated a section 4(f)
priority, but for different reasons. Todhunter claimed that Clay's mem-
orandum represented the primary analysis and that his was simply an
update and concurrence. 8'
Clay based his memorandum on the risk assessments set forth in the
original PRL-1 document on formaldehyde and on an OTS "options
memorandum" prepared after EPA's meetings with representatives of the
formaldehyde industry.' 8 2 He offered two principal reasons for his con-
clusion that section 4(f) was inapplicable. First, though acknowledging
that formaldehyde was a "suspect human carcinogen," he argued that
the available epidemiologic data was unpersuasive.' 83 He recommended
delaying agency action until an epidemiologic study being conducted by
the National Cancer Institute was completed.' 84 Second, he argued that
the available exposure data did not support a finding of "serious" or
"widespread" harm.'8 5
Todhunter's memorandum was considerably more detailed. Char-
acterized by its author as a compilation of his "professional conclusions
and policy recommendations,"'8 6 it reviewed the available evidence on
formaldehyde carcinogenicity and exposure. Todhunter concluded that
there were "limited but suggestive" epidemiologic data supporting "the
notion that any human problems with formaldehyde carcinogenicity may
be of low incidence or undetectable."' 87 He also examined the language
of section 4(f), concluding that cancer risks estimated to fall in a range
of 1 in 10,000 or less should not be considered "significant" under the
terms of that section, and that formaldehyde fell within that range of
risk.' 8 8 He summarized his findings as follows:
(a) formaldehyde is a carcinogen in the rat by the inhalation route; (b) its
carcinogenic potential appears to vary significantly with species and route;
(c) under certain exposure conditions it could present some carcinogenic
risk to humans; and (d) given available data the risk estimates suggest that
certain populations may experience a carcinogenic risk - albeit low-
HYDE TOXICOLOGY: 1982 UPDATE (in press) (presenting. the results of recent formaldehyde
studies).
181. Todhunter Memorandum, supra note 163, at 1.
182. Clay Memorandum, supra note 169, at 1. See OFFICE OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES,
EPA, OPTIONS PAPER ON FORMALDEHYDE (1981).
183. Clay Memorandum, supra note 169, at 2.
184. See supra note 180.
185. Clay Memorandum, supra note 169, at 2-3.
186. Todhunter Memorandum, supra note 163, at 1.
187. Id. at 5.
188. Id.
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due to formaldehyde exposure. However, because of the nature of the
toxicology data and the unreliability in the exposure data one cannot rea-
sonably conclude, at this time, that formaldehyde poses a significant risk
among the U.S. population. 89
B. The Decisionmaking Process
In a real sense, any discussion of EPA's decisionmaking process
may be superfluous. Considerable evidence suggests that the incoming
EPA officials had determined their policy on formaldehyde long before
any "decisionmaking process" had been completed.
Some of this evidence is circumstantial. The Chemical Regulation
Reporter (CRR) reported in October 1981 that not long after Reagan
officials took over, EPA dropped formaldehyde as a priority considera-
tion.190 The CRR noted that in March 1981 OTS had cited a "Formalde-
hyde Notice of 4(f) Designation" as its fourteenth most pressing con-
cern.191 By July 1981, however, two months after Anne Gorsuch assumed
office and seven months before Todhunter's memorandum, OTS had
reshuffled its priorities. The new formaldehyde reference item was the
"Formaldehyde Program," and it was not designated as a priority.'92
Todhunter himself has provided more direct evidence. He testified
at congressional hearings that, upon his arrival at EPA in July 1981, he
was informed that the agency did not intend to take any action on
formaldehyde other than to conduct a two-year exposure assessment.193
If Todhunter is correct, the agency's eventual "statement of reasons"
was little more than an exercise in post-hoc rationalization, and its delib-
erations could scarcely be said to have met the criteria of reasoned
decisionmaking. 9 4 Assuming, however, that the Todhunter memorandum
does represent the culmination of a lengthy decisionmaking process, this
process was nonetheless flawed in numerous respects.
1. Analysis of Technical Data
An agency decision must evidence a "rational connection between
the facts found and the choice made."'95 Health risk assessments thus
189. Id. at 5-6.
190. 5 CHEM. REG. REP. (BNA) 789 (Oct. 16, 1981).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Florio Hearings, supra note 18, at 27. Todhunter testified: "When I arrived at
the Agency, .. . I was ... informed that the Agency at that time had no intention of
regulating formaldehyde other than conducting an exposure assessment over a 2-year
period." Id. See also 5 CHEM. REG. REP. (BNA) 1983 (Jan. 15, 1982) (citing Todhunter as
the source of their information, BNA reported that EPA's original decision to regulate
formaldehyde under section 4(f) was "scrapped at the suggestion of EPA legal counsel
before the agency held controversial private meetings with industry").
194. Post hoc rationalizations "have traditionally been found to be an inadequate
basis for review." Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419
(1971).
195. WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (citing Action for
___11 I___1_______1 llsl_ ___ · __
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require a careful analysis of the relevant technical data regarding both a
substance's toxicity and the extent of human exposure. Unquestionably,
an agency is properly accorded some discretion in its treatment of tech-
nical data. 96 Nonetheless, the agency's analysis must be free of overt
errors in technical methodology or reasoning.'9 7 EPA's treatment of the
formaldehyde data roused significant criticism. 98 A review of the agen-
cy's technical analysis reveals several examples of questionable scientific
reasoning.
a. Issues of "Hard" Science
The Todhunter memorandum apparently contains the technical basis
for the agency's decision. It also appears to contain significant lapses in
scientific judgment and methodology.
i. Analysis of Epidemiologic Data
Perhaps the most troublesome aspect of Todhunter's memorandum
is its reliance on the available epidemiologic studies. Todhunter seems
to have used the results of these studies as a partial basis for his conclu-
sion that formaldehyde does not pose a significant risk of human carcin-
ogenicity.' 99 Numerous factors, however, including small study popula-
tion and poor exposure documentation, limited the "sensitivity" of each
of the studies,20 0 as Todhunter himself apparently recognized. 2 0 ' Given
Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). See supra text accom-
panying note 39.
196. As Judge Skelly Wright of the D.C. Circuit wrote in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA: "the
court must give due deference to the agency's ability to rely on its own developed expertise.
The immersion in the evidence is designed solely to enable the court to determine whether
the agency decision was rational and based on consideration of the relevant factors." 541
F.2d 1, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (citation omitted).
197. In State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. v. Department of Transp., 680 F.2d 206, 230
(D.C. Cir. 1982), the court noted that a reviewing court must "judge whether a reasonable
decisionmaker could respond to those facts as the agency did." In Overton Park, the
Supreme Court said that a reviewing court must determine whether there was a "clear
error of judgment." 401 U.S. at 416.
198. See Gore EPA Hearings, supra note 18 (statements by Drs. Sidney Weinhouse,
Norton Nelson, Roy Albert, Richard Griesemer, Federica Perera, and Sorell Schwartz).
199. Todhunter Memorandum, supra note 163, at 11-12. In his one-paragraph dis-
cussion of the epidemiologic data, Todhunter wrote:
A number of small scale retrospective epidemiology studies on groups occupationally exposed
to formaldehyde have found no excess of cancers of any type, in particular nasal or oral, in
these groups which can be attributed to formaldehyde exposure when corrected for smoking and
drinking .... There does not appear to be any relationship, based on the existing data base on
humans, between exposure and cancer.
Id.
200. See OFFICE OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES, supra note 182, at 17; IARC REPORT, spra
note 116, at 2; CPSC Ban Notice, supra note 116, at 14,373; see also R. MONSON, spra
note 89, at 37-43 (general discussion of sources of error in epidemiologic studies).
201. Todhunter Memorandum, supra note 163, at 11-12 ("While I recognize the limits
of sensitivity inherent in epidemiology, such data are useful ... .").
`'---^--I--^-------·-·----- 
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these methodological limitations, the studies would have been expected
to produce largely negative results regardless of the true nature of the
carcinogenic risk. For this reason, several other reviewers - including
the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), the CPSC, and
even EPA's own Office of Toxic Substances - had declined to rely on
these studies in their analyses.20 2 Todhunter's interpretation of these
studies as suggesting "that any human problems with formaldehyde car-
cinogenicity may be of low incidence or undetectable" 20 3 was unjustified.
ii. Site Specificity
Todhunter also concluded that human carcinogenic risk from for-
maldehyde is likely limited to nasal and oral cancers.20 4 This conclusion
was likewise flawed. Todhunter correctly noted that the great majority
of tumors in the rat bioassays did occur in the nasal or oral cavities,205
and that IARC studies do indicate an eighty-percent concordance be-
tween sites at risk in humans and those at risk in animals.206 He failed,
however, to consider another equally important factor: unlike rats, which
breathe only through the nose, humans breathe through both the nose
and the mouth. Potential lung exposure to formaldehyde is, therefore,
much greater for humans than for rats.207 From a toxicological standpoint,
strict body site extrapolation is inappropriate, at least in the absence of
other supporting data. Todhunter's failure to consider this factor under-
mines his conclusion.
202. See sources cited supra note 116. Indeed some reviewers feel that the available
epidemiologic data gives positive indications of formaldehyde carcinogenicity. See, e.g.,
Federal Panel Report, supra note 7, at 159 (relying on study results available before October
1980).
203. See supra text accompanying note 187.
204. Todhunter Memorandum, supra note 122, at 11. Todhunter stated that CIIT
radio-isotope studies suggest that only the nasal and oral cavities would be at risk. In those
studies, radioactive tracers were used to ascertain how and where rats that inhale formal-
dehyde gas absorb it into their bodies. See Heck, Chin, & Schmitz, Distribution of 14C
Formaldehyde in Rats After Inhalation Exposure, in THIRD CIIT CONFERENCE, supra note
117.
205. In the CIIT rat study, two of the carcinomas were found in the rats' tear ducts.
The rest were found in the rats' nasal cavities. Gore EPA Hearings, supra note 18 (prepared
testimony by Dr. Richard Griesemer, Former Chairman of the Federal Panel on Formal-
dehyde, at 4). Lesions attributable to formaldehyde exposure were found in the rats'
trachea, bronchi, and bronchioles, suggesting that those sites were potentially at risk also.
Id.
206. Tomatis, et al., Evaluation of the Carcinogenicity of Chemicals: A Review of
the Monograph Program of the International Agency for Research on Cancer, 38 CANCER
RESEARCH 877 (1978).
207. Gore EPA Hearings, supra note 18, (prepared testimony by Dr. Richard
Griesemer, at 4). At one point in his memorandum Todhunter did acknowledge the signif-
icance of differences in breathing patterns. Todhunter Memorandum, supra note 163, at 8.
He failed to cite this factor, however, when he argued that the human sites at risk are
limited.
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iii. Species Specificity
On the basis of the statistically insignificant results of the CIIT mouse
study and other generally negative rodent studies, Todhunter concluded
that formaldehyde carcinogenicity is species specific to rats.208 This spec-
ificity, he suggested, tempers concern about formaldehyde's human car-
cinogenic potential.20 9
The Federal Panel on Formaldehyde, IARC, and a number of other
groups that have reviewed the formaldehyde data disagree. 0 Indeed,
several factors contradict the species specificity finding. Dr. Richard
Griesemer, chairman of the Federal Panel, has noted that the CIIT mouse
study was marred by fighting among the mice.2 ' When adjusted for the
resulting early mortality, the mouse study indicates a significant increase
in carcinomas at the 14.3 ppm dose level.212 The director of the CIIT has
noted that mice exposed at 14.3 ppm actually received approximately
half of the dose received by rats at that level because of differences in
the two species' breathing rates; thus, mouse results at 14.3 ppm are
comparable to rat results at 5.6 ppm. 21 3 In fact, the number of carcinomas
observed in mice at the 14.3 ppm level was identical to the number
observed in rats at the 5.6 ppm level.2 '4
None of the other negative rodent studies that Todhunter cited were
designed to test the carcinogenicity of formaldehyde. 2 5 From a toxicol-
ogical standpoint, then, they do not provide evidence of a lack of for-
maldehyde carcinogenicity.
iv. Irritant Effects
Todhunter argued that there is a "threshold" exposure level below
which formaldehyde produces no carcinogenic effects. 21 6 He based this
position, in part, on a finding that the irritant properties of formaldehyde
are a necessary link in the causal chain of formaldehyde carcinogenic-
ity.2 17 Because such irritation does not occur at relatively low exposure
208. Todhunter Memorandum, supra note 163, at 6-7.
209. Id. at 7.
210. For example, the Federal Panel examined the available bioassays and concluded
"[t]here is suggestive evidence that formaldehyde might be carcinogenic in other species
and tissues other than nasal." Federal Panel Report, supra note 7, at 152-54. The IARC
considered the studies that Todhunter cited to be inadequate for evaluation. IARC REPORT,
supra note 116, at 1. The Mt. Sinai report stated, "formaldehyde is a carcinogen in rats,
and, data suggest, in mice." MT. SINAI REPORT, supra note 123.
211. Gore EPA Hearings, supra note 18 (prepared testimony by Dr. Richard
Griesemer, at 3).
212. Id.
213. See CPSC Ban Notice, supra note 116, at 14,366, 14,370.
214. See supra notes 104-11 and accompanying text.
215. See Gore EPA Hearings, supra note 18, at 3-4 (prepared testimony by Dr.
Richard Griesemer). See also Federal Panel Report, supra note 7, at 151.
216. Todhunter Memorandum, supra note 163, at 11.
217. Id. at 8-9.
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levels, he concluded that carcinogenesis would not occur at those
levels. 218
In taking this position, Todhunter failed to note the NYU bioassays,
which suggest that formaldehyde is a carcinogen independent of its irri-
tant effects.21 9 If the irritant properties of formaldehyde do play a signif-
icant role in carcinogenicity, the addition of hydrochloric acid, another
irritant (though not by itself a carcinogen), should have heightened the
carcinogenic effect. The number of tumors found in rats exposed to the
combination of formaldehyde and hydrochloric acid, however, did not
differ significantly from the number found in rats exposed only to for-
maldehyde.22 0 Though these results are not conclusive, Todhunter's fail-
ure to discuss them reflects negatively on his scientific reasoning.
v. Exposure Data
Finally, Todhunter apparently based his conclusions on questionable
assumptions regarding human exposure to formaldehyde. Without sup-
porting evidence, Todhunter assumed that humans will avoid exposure
to levels above 2 ppm because they do not adapt to levels above 5 ppm,
and they find levels from 2 to 5 ppm unpleasant.2 2 1 Thus, he downplayed
reported exposure levels above 2 ppm, and generally considered only
exposures at lower levels. In light of contrary observations by other
scientists,2 2 2 Todhunter's failure to support this assumption with reliable
empirical data calls his conclusions into question. Furthermore,
Todhunter stated that formaldehyde exposure levels in homes with urea-
formaldehyde foam insulation have not been shown to exceed those in
other homes.2 23 He failed to note, however, that this statement holds true
only for homes observed long after the insulation has been installed.
Shortly after installation, significant differences have been measured. 22 4
218. Id. at 8-11.
219. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text. The NYU researchers stated
that "[t]he [experimental] results .. . do not decisively disprove the notion that the carcin-
ogenic response to HCHO [formaldehyde] is a nonspecific response to irritation, but they
do not support it either." Albert, supra note 112, at 601 (emphasis added). The formaldehyde
industry has argued that the concentrations of hydrochloric acid were not large enough to
test the "irritant effects" hypothesis. See Reply Brief of Petitioners at 7 n.14, Gulf South
Insulation v. CPSC, 701 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1983).
220. Albert, supra note 112, at 599-600.
221. Todhunter Memorandum, supra note 163, at 12.
222. Based on his own experience as a pathologist, Dr. Richard Griesemer testified
that some people develop partial tolerances to formaldehyde's irritant effects and continue
to work even at high exposure levels. See Gore EPA Hearings, supra note 18 (prepared
testimony by Dr. Richard Griesemer, at 8).
223. Todhunter Memorandum, supra note 163, at 11.
224. See supra text accompanying note 154; see also CPSC Ban Notice, supra note
116, at 14,377.
- --- - -----·l"ara*annnr.arsa . . ·
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b. Issues of Science Policy
In a number of the technical areas discussed above, EPA adopted
science policy positions inconsistent with prevailing scientific opinion.
For instance, even if the available negative epidemiologic studies had
been methodologically adequate, Todhunter would depart from prevailing
opinion in concluding that such evidence suggested an absence of hazard.
As noted by the scientific panel convened by the Interagency Regulatory
Liaison Group (IRLG), "[a]bsence of a positive statistical correlation [in
an epidemiologic study] does not by itself demonstrate absence of a
hazard."22 5
Similarly, Todhunter's arguments for site specificity are inconsistent
with scientific opinion on cancer risk assessment. The IRLG scientists
also noted that "no direct analogy of morphologic response can be ex-
pected from a carcinogen in animals of different species and in hu-
mans."2 26 Furthermore, even if the negative rodent studies that Todhunter
cited had been methodologically adequate, his assertion of species spec-
ificity would conflict with the IRLG's conclusions: "the finding of nega-
tive results in some other species generally does not detract from the
validity of a positive result as evidence of carcinogenicity for the test
substance. "227
In sum, EPA's formaldehyde deliberations reflected science policy
positions that represent the views of a minority within the scientific
community. While these positions may not be "wrong" in a purely tech-
nical sense, they demand justification. EPA neither acknowledged the
need for such justification nor supplied any.
2. The Procedural Aspects
The principle of reasoned decisionmaking further requires that an
agency deliberate "in a manner calculated to negate the dangers of arbi-
trariness and irrationality."2 2 8 Depending on the particular agency action
under review, courts have enumerated various specific procedural re-
quirements for reasoned decisionmaking. EPA's treatment of formalde-
hyde raises several procedural questions.
225. IRLG Risk Assessment Document, supra note 36, at 247. The IRLG document
is a particularly good source of prevailing scientific opinion as it was written by scientists
and published in the peer-reviewed and highly respected Journal of the National Cancer
Institute.
226. Id. at 255.
227. Id. at 253.
228. WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (citing Action for
Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 472 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1977)); O'Donnell v. Shaffer,
491 F.2d 59, 62 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Friends of the Earth v. United States Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 485 F.2d 1031, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 1973); EDF v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598
(D.C. Cir. 1971); see also supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
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a. Industry Bias
With the advent of the Gorsuch administration, EPA embarked upon
a decisionmaking process for formaldehyde that appears to have been
designed both to maximize input from the formaldehyde industry and to
minimize input from other sectors. Regardless of the ultimate substantive
validity of the agency's section 4(f) determination, the appearance of its
decisionmaking process lends credence to claims of impropriety.
i. "Science Meetings" with Industry
In general, agencies are encouraged to seek input from interested
parties before making regulatory decisions. 229 An agency is not free,
however, to accept such input in any way it chooses; it must balance its
approach.230 EPA's three industry meetings in the summer of 1981 are
troublesome in this regard, as they suggest that the agency based its
decision on input from the representatives of only one point of view.
The initial impetus for the meetings apparently came from indus-
try.2 3 ' Though EPA has subsequently characterized these meetings as
having been "exclusively scientific in nature, 2 32 the rosters of those
present reveal that the sessions were dominated by the perspectives of
the formaldehyde industry. With the exception of one or two "neutral"
scientists at each meeting, 233 the Formaldehyde Institute selected all of
the non-EPA participants.2 3 4
229. See Delong, supra note 38, at 302, 306.
230. The D.C. Circuit has indicated that "the presumption of agency regularity" will
be refuted if "the agency has demonstrated undue bias toward particular private interests."
Natural Resources Defense Council v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1049 n.23 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
231. Moffett Hearings, supra note 18, at 19 (statement of Deputy Administrator John
W. Hernandez, Jr.). In prepared congressional testimony, Hernandez noted that the sessions
"grew out of requests, made orally and in writing, by representatives of the Formaldehyde
Institute ... for an opportunity to meet with me to discuss the scientific issues pertaining
to formaldehyde."
232. Id. at 18.
233. Id. at 57-59 (meeting participant lists). Of the 24 participants at the June 19
meeting, 14 were from EPA, nine represented industry, and one, Richard Griesemer, former
chair of the Federal Panel, was not affiliated with either industry or EPA. At least two of
the industry participants were lawyers, including John Byington, who later met privately
with Todhunter, see infra text accompanying notes 250-260.
The roster of the July 28 meeting was similar. Of the 33 participants, 17 were from
EPA, 14 represented industry, and Robert G. Tardiff attended on behalf of the National
Academy of Sciences. Richard Griesemer was also present..
Finally, there were 35 participants at the August 14 meeting: 21 from EPA, 12
representing industry, and David Gaylor of the Food and Drug Administration. Again, at
least three industry lawyers were present. The subject of the final meeting appears to have
been risk assessment, certainly an area of science policy. See Memorandum from Joseph
J. Merenda, Director, Assessment Division, EPA Office of Pesticides and Toxic Substances
to Edwin H. Clark II, Acting Assistant Administrator for Pesticides and Toxic Substances
(Aug. 12, 1981).
234. Hernandez described the selection process as follows:
_·_ _I_ ___I · i i·
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Rather than solicit a variety of viewpoints, EPA closed the meetings
to the public. 23 5 Conspicuous by their absence were scientists represent-
ing groups that might be expected to oppose the formaldehyde industry's
position.2 3 6 Also absent were representatives of other regulatory agencies
and the Interagency Regulatory Liaison Group (IRLG). Indeed, the
agency reportedly refused to admit two scientists who requested permis-
sion to attend: Andrew Ulsamer of CPSC and Han Kang of OSHA, both
members of the IRLG formaldehyde group.23 7
Another objectionable characteristic of these three meetings was the
agency's failure to maintain transcripts or detailed minutes. Although
some of the participants prepared "points of agreement" memoranda,
these memoranda provide little insight into the workings of these other-
wise closed sessions.2 3 8 As the D.C. Circuit has noted in a similar context,
It was left to the Formaldehyde Institute to decide whom they wanted to bring. I asked the
Acting Assistant Administrator for Pesticides and Toxic Substances to decide which Agency
personnel - as well as outside scientists - should be invited. The only injunction I laid down
to those doing the inviting was that participants in the discussion were to be those who could
shed some light on the scientific issues.
Moffett Hearings, supra note 18, at 19.
235. The agency gave no public notice of any of the meetings. Id. at 23 (statement
of Gorsuch). Indeed, the meetings came to public attention only after a House subcommittee
staff member happened to hear about the last of three similar meetings on di-(ethyl-
hexyl)phtalate (DEHP). See id. at 33.
236. Scientists from several environmental and consumer groups, such as the Natural
Resources Defense Council, had a longstanding interest in toxic substance risk assessment.
Other scientists, including the NYU bioassay team, had researched the carcinogenic risk
from formaldehyde, and scientists at OSHA and CPSC also were assessing that risk. Finally,
a number of prominent scientists had extensive experience in the broader topic of carcin-
ogenic risk assessment. EPA was aware of the interests of all these scientists, yet asked
none of them to attend.
237. Gore EPA Hearings, supra note 18 (testimony of Richard Dailey). We have
confirmed this testimony with Dr. Ulsamer.
238. At least eight of these "points of agreement" memoranda were prepared: two
by EPA staff members, five by members of the Formaldehyde Institute, and one by
Professor Robert L. Sielken, Jr., of Texas A&M University, who was apparently employed
by the Formaldehyde Institute as a consultant. The memoranda are largely conclusory, and
reveal little about the process of deliberation, the points considered, or the arguments
presented.
In general, the industry-prepared memoranda are the most detailed. Many of them
are in the nature of proposed "findings of fact" - covering both science and science policy
issues - for EPA use in preparing its statement of reasons. Several of the points proposed
in the industry memoranda are quite similar to points that Todhunter made in his February
10 memorandum. Furthermore, these memoranda indicate that statutory interpretation and
regulatory policy, in addition to science and science policy, were discussed at these meet-
ings. The memorandum prepared by James Ramey, Chairman of the Formaldehyde Insti-
tute, for example, includes the following statement as its last "point of agreement":
There is no driving force to promulgate restrictive regulations on formaldehyde. There are no
apparent health crises or significant human health risks associated with formaldehyde exposure.
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such documentation "hardly provides a substitute sufficient to allow for
the 'searching and careful' judicial inquiry required." 23 9
As other observers have suggested,24 0 these meetings may also have
violated the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA).2 41 That statute
recognizes that agencies have come to rely on technical "advisory com-
mittees" as an aid to decisionmaking, and establishes specific procedural
requirements for such committees.2 4 2 The Act requires that advisory
committees be formally chartered, be composed of a "fair balance"
among opposing viewpoints, give notice of their meetings and open them
to the public, and maintain accurate and detailed minutes of those
meetings.243
FACA covers "any committee, board, commission, council, confer-
ence, panel, task force, or other similar group ... established or utilized
by one or more agencies, in the interest of obtaining advice or recom-
mendations."2 4 4 Meetings with an interest group merely for the purpose
of soliciting its position have been held to be outside the scope of the
Act.2 4 5 EPA's "science meetings," however, appear to have involved
more than mere solicitation of position. EPA Deputy Administrator John
Hernandez has written that the primary function of those sessions was
to allow him to meet with "scientific and technical experts" to "discuss
the scientific merits of the available information."2 46 The meetings, he
indicated, "were designed . .. to explore fully the scientific and technical
issues."2 4 7 He later testified that the purpose of the meetings was to "get
all the scientific information pertaining to the exposure and toxicity of
these substances out in the open." 248
If this characterization is accurate, the meetings would probably fall
within FACA's purview. Clearly, EPA departed from the Act's proce-
dural requirements in numerous particulars. Certainly, the narrow range
239. United States Lines, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 584 F.2d 519, 541-42
(D.C. Cir. 1978).
240. See, e.g., R. MERRILL, supra note 84, Part III, at 153; see also Memorandum
from Rep. Toby Moffett to the House Subcommittee on Environment, Energy, and Natural
Resources, (Oct. 6, 1981) reprinted in Moffett Hearings, supra note 18, at 25.
241. 5 U.S.C. app. I (1976).
242. See generally Cardozo, The Federal Advisory Committee Act in Operation, 33
AD. L. REV. 1 (1981); C. Kaufman, A Sociohistorical View of Advisory Committees (June
1981) (unpubished paper presented at the Charles F. Kettering Foundation Conference on
Federal Advisory Committees).
243. See 5 U.S.C. app. I, §§ 5, 9, 10 (1976).
244. Id. § 3(2).
245. See, e.g., Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Dep't of Health, Educ.,
& Welfare, 409 F. Supp. 473 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd, 551 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Nader v.
Baroody, 396 F. Supp. 1231 (D.D.C. 1975).
246. Letter from John Hernandez, Jr. to Rep. Toby Moffett (Oct. 5, 1981) reprinted
in Moffett Hearings, supra note 18, at 54-64.
247. Id. at 2, reprinted in Moffett Hearings, supra note 18, at 55.
248. Moffett Hearings, supra note 18, at 22.
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of viewpoints represented at the industry meetings implicates the "fair
balance" requirement of the Act.24 9
ii. Todhunter's Informal Contacts with Representatives of the Formal-
dehyde Industry
A substantial amount of evidence indicates that before releasing his
February 10 memorandum, Todhunter met on several occasions with
John Byington, attorney for the Formaldehyde Institute, and Len
Guarraia, then a director of the American Industrial Health Council
(AIHC) and Director for Governmental Relations for the Synthetic Or-
ganic Chemical Manufacturer's Association (SOCMA). Both AIHC and
SOCMA have strong ties to the Formaldehyde Institute. AIHC is an
industry research and lobbying group.2 50 Until 1979, the Formaldehyde
Institute was a part of SOCMA, where it was known as SOCMA's
"Formaldehyde Task Force."2 5 t All three organizations maintain their
offices in Scarsdale, New York, and all currently share the same phone
number.2 52
Todhunter was questioned about his contacts with Byington and
Guarraia at two congressional hearings, but his testimony was inconsis-
tent.2 53 The principal interrogator at the first hearing was Representative
Toby Moffett (D-CT), who had obtained Todhunter's appointment cal-
endar for the relevant time period.2 54 Initially, Todhunter denied meeting
249. 5 U.S.C. app. I, § 5(b)(2), (c) (1976). Although some commentators have ex-
pressed doubt about the meaning of this provision, see, e.g., Cardozo, supra note 242, at
55, its plain language and its legislative history give a fairly clear indication of what Congress
intended. Certainly, fairness demands more than a token representation of an opposing
viewpoint; a good faith effort at parity is required. See National Nutritional Foods Ass'n
v. Califano, 603 F.2d 327, 336 (2d Cir. 1979) (addresses Congress's concern "that agency
action might be dominated by one particular viewpoint"); H.R. REP. No. 1017, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3491, 3496 (FACA intended
to prohibit a "heavy representation of parties whose private interests could influence their
recommendations").
See generally Ashford, The Role of Advisory Committees in Resolving Regulatory
Issues Involving Science and Technology: Experience from the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency, in LAW AND SCIENCE
IN COLLABORATION: RESOLVING REGULATORY ISSUES OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 165
(J. Nyhart & M. Carrow eds. 1983).
250. See AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL HEALTH COUNCIL, AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL
HEALTH COUNCIL 2-3 (1983) (available from AIHC, Scarsdale, NY).
251. See FORMALDEHYDE INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 4; Snell Report, supra note
130, at 3-4.
252. Directory Assistance, Scarsdale, N.Y. (Apr. 23, 1983).
253. See Florio Hearings, supra note 18, at 23-33; Gore EPA Hearings, supra note
18.
254. Reprinted in Florio Hearings, supra note 18, at 194. The calendar shows that
between July 15, 1981, and November 13, 1981, Assistant Administrator designee Todhunter
scheduled three meetings with Guarraia. Between November 13, 1981, his confirmation
date, and February 10, 1982, the date of his memorandum, Todhunter scheduled seven
meetings with Guarraia and two meetings with Byington.
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with Byington. 2 55 When Moffett informed him that his calendar listed two
meetings with Byington and six with Guarraia between November 1981
and February 1982, however, Todhunter admitted that he met with
Byington on January 26, 1982, but claimed that another meeting sched-
uled for earlier in the month had been "snowed out."2 56 He later confirmed
that he had met with Byington once, and perhaps twice, during January.2 57
He also admitted meeting with Guarraia, but he denied that they dis-
cussed formaldehyde.25 8 At another hearing two months later, however,
he denied having met with Byington prior to drafting the February 10
memorandum.2 Upon further questioning, he acknowledged that he had
talked briefly with Byington at one breakfast meeting.260
Although the precise nature and scope of these gatherings is difficult
to deduce from the congressional testimony, it seems apparent that
Todhunter did meet with formaldehyde interests before drafting EPA's
position paper on the section 4(f) determination. 261 As the D.C. Circuit
has noted, "[t]he inconsistency of ex parte contacts with reasoned deci-
sionmaking and fairness to the public has been increasingly recognized
in recent years .... 262 The court added that such contacts "foreclose
effective judicial review of the agency's final decision." 2 63 Accordingly,
in the absence of substantial justification, the mere existence of ex parte
communications may so taint an agency's informal decisionmaking pro-
cess as to warrant reversal of the agency's decision.2 64
255. Florio Hearings, supra note 12, at 26-27. Todhunter stated that he had attended
one of the industry meetings with Byington. The participant lists for those meetings indicate
that Todhunter attended two of them. See Moffett Hearings, supra note 18, at 58-59.
256. Id. at 28.
257. Id. at 29. At this point Todhunter said he was unsure if January 26, 1982, had
been one of those occasions.
258. Id. at 28. Todhunter testified that he had known Guarraia socially for some time
and that Guarraia had "no interest in formaldehyde one way or the other."
259. See Gore EPA Hearings, supra note 18.
260. Id. Todhunter said that on January 26, 1982, he was scheduled to have breakfast
with Byington and others, but that he overslept. He said he arrived just in time to say hello
and goodbye.
261. Even if the meetings with Byington never took place, one must wonder why
they were scheduled.
262. United States Lines, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 584 F.2d 519, 540 n.8
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (emphasis added).
263. Id. at 541.
264.
[W]here, as here, an agency justifies its actions by reference only to information in the public
file while failing to disclose the substance of other relevant information that has been presented
to it, a reviewing court cannot presume that the agency has acted properly, but must treat the
agency's justifications as a fictional account of the actual decisionmaking process and must
perforce find its actions arbitrary.
Id. at 541 (quoting from Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 54-55 (D.C. Cir. 1977))
(citations omitted).
_I _I _ _
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iii. Insular Deliberations
In addition to discouraging input from major segments of the public,
the new EPA administrators ceased to cooperate with the other federal
agencies that were assessing formaldehyde carcinogenicity. Consistent
with its statutory mandate to consider all categories of human exposure
to formaldehyde 26 5 and to coordinate its efforts with those of other federal
agencies,26 6 EPA had initially exchanged technical information and as-
sessments with both OSHA and CPSC. 267 By September 1981, however,
the Interagency Regulatory Liaison Group (IRLG) had been disbanded,
and EPA had little or no further contact with either OSHA or CPSC
regarding formaldehyde. 2 6 8 Indeed, EPA officials appear to have avoided
such contact.269
EPA also isolated itself from its own Science Advisory Board. Con-
gress created the Board, which by the terms of its charter is a "body of
independent scientists and engineers of sufficient size and diversity to
provide a range of expertise required to assess the scientific and technical
aspects of environmental issues."270 On October 29, 1981, the Board's
Executive Committee recommended that EPA submit the formaldehyde
issue to the National Academy of Sciences before it concluded its section
4(f) determination.2 7 ' EPA instead permitted Todhunter to draft his tech-
nical memorandum on formaldehyde without such assistance.2 7 2
265. Section 4(f), like the other operative provisions of TSCA, is not limited to
certain classes of exposure. Congress clearly intended the generic regulation of suspect
chemicals, not exposures, and directed other agencies to provide "such information, data,
estimates, and statistics" to the Administrator as will further this purpose. 15 U.S.C.
§ 2625(a)(2) (1976). This appears to anticipate that other agencies - such as OSHA and
CPSC - would be providing relevant exposure (and effect) information to EPA on suspect
chemicals.
266. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2608(d), 2609(g) (1976).
267. Formal exchange occurred under the auspices of the IRLG Formaldehyde work-
group. See supra note 156. In addition, before Gorsuch and Hernandez took office, OTS
had planned to coordinate its activities with those of other agencies once it designated
formaldehyde a section 4(f) priority. Draft Federal Register Notice, supra note 159, at 19
& 25-27.
268. The IRLG was purportedly replaced by the Interagency Regulatory Working
Group on Science and Technology, an informal group under the aegis of the White House
Office of Science and Technology Policy. See 5 CHEM. REG. REP. (BNA) 592 (Oct. 2,
1981). We have seen no evidence that that group met to coordinate agency formaldehyde
decisionmaking prior to Todhunter's February 10, 1982, memorandum.
269. Gore EPA Hearings, supra note 18 (testimony of Dr. John Todhunter). In ad-
dition, Dr. Peter Preuss, Associate Executive Director for Health Sciences at CPSC,
testified that CPSC became aware of Todhunter's memorandum only after the Formalde-
hyde Institute submitted it to the Commission. Id.
270. USEPA, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY ADVISORY COMMITTEES:
CHARTERS, ROSTERS, AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS 30-32 (Jan. 1980).
271. See 9 PESTICIDE & TOXIC CHEM. NEWS (Nov. 4, 1981).
272. See infra notes 296-300 and accompanying text.
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b. Inadequate Explanation of Decisionmaking Rationale
The courts have long required agencies to "articulate with reasonable
clarity their reasons for a decision." 273 In the words of an oft-cited opin-
ion: "the orderly functioning of the process of review requires that the
grounds upon which the administrative agency acted be clearly disclosed
and adequately sustained." 274 EPA's formaldehyde deliberations fell far
short of this standard.
The only articulated bases for the agency's decision appear in the
Clay and Todhunter memoranda, the latter of which is considerably more
comprehensive. 27 5 As discussed above, Todhunter's analysis contains
several lapses in technical reasoning,27 6 and relies heavily on determi-
nations made in the realm of science policy rather than hard science.277
To the extent that these defects stem from a failure to consider contrary
empirical evidence, they call into question the procedural adequacy of
the memorandum as a statement of reasons. The more troublesome pro-
cedural problem, however, lies in Todhunter's failure to acknowledge his
departure from prior agency positions on many of the science policy
issues involved. Where an agency has changed a previously articulated
policy or departed from a relevant agency precedent, the courts have
required the agency to provide a detailed rationale.2 7 8 Altough EPA never
promulgated a formal cancer policy, it published informal cancer guide-
lines in 1976,279 endorsed the Interagency Regulatory Liaison Group risk
assessment document in 1979,28°0 and participated in the Regulatory Coun-
cil's September 1979 policy statement on regulation of chemical carcin-
ogens. 28' Being most recent, the Regulatory Council's statement was the
logical foundation for EPA's approach to formaldehyde. 282 Yet
Todhunter's positions differ from the Council's in several areas.283
273. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. F.T.C., 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
274. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943). Since this case, the requirement
of an adequate statement of reasons has become ensconced as a fundamental principle of
administrative law. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,
420 (1971).
275. See supra text accompanying notes 181-189.
276. See supra text accompanying notes 195-224.
277. See supra text accompanying notes 225-27.
278. See cases cited supra note 102.
279. EPA, Health Risk and Economic Impact of Suspected Carcinogens: Interim
Procedures and Guidelines, 41 Fed. Reg. 21,402 (1976).
280. See IRLG Risk Assessment Document, supra note 36.
281. See Regulatory Council Statement, supra note 34.
282. The summary of the Council statement read: "This policy is being published in
the Federal Register to inform the public of the practices and principles the participating
Federal regulatory agencies will follow in initiating regulatory actions relating to chemical
carcinogens." 44 Fed. Reg. 60,038 (1979). EPA was a participating agency.
EPA subsequently published additional guidelines for carcinogen regulation under
certain air and water programs, see 44 Fed. Reg. 58,642 (1979); 45 Fed. Reg. 79,318, 79,350
(1980), but not for TSCA activities.
283. The Clay memorandum also departs from a major position in the Council guide-
__ 1_ 1~~~~~~1~~1_1~--
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The guidelines specify that: (1) negative epidemiologic studies will
not be presumed to indicate that a substance is not carcinogenic; 28 4
(2) sites exposed by routes other than those tested will be presumed to
be at risk;2 85 (3) negative bioassay results for some species, even in well-
conducted tests, will not be said to detract from well-established positive
evidence for other species;2 86 and (4) a no-effect threshold level will not
be assumed to exist for carcinogenic substances. 287 Todhunter adopted a
contrary position on each of these points.
Todhunter also suggested that positive data in more than one species
at more than one dose level should be a prerequisite to a determination
of human risk.288 The Council guidelines require only positive data in a
single species at one dose level.289 Similarly, Todhunter discounted find-
ings of benign tumors in bioassay data and considered only verifiably
malignant tumors,2 90 while the Council concluded that benign tumors
should be considered evidence of potential malignancy.2 91 The Council
statement also indicates that agencies will attempt to estimate the maxi-
mum risk that could reasonably be expected.29 2 Todhunter consistently
assumed policy positions that minimized estimated risks.293
In its failure to explain, or even acknowledge, these policy reversals,
lines. Where Clay advised that EPA delay action until the National Cancer Institute epi-
demiologic study was complete, see supra note 169, the Council's policy is that agencies
not wait for epidemiologic evidence, see Regulatory Council Statement, supra note 34, at
60,039.
284. Compare Regulatory Council Statement, supra note 34, at 60,039, with
Todhunter Memorandum, supra note 163, at 11-12; see also supra note 199 and accom-
panying text.
285. Compare Regulatory Council Statement, supra note 34, at 60,040, with
Todhunter Memorandum, supra note 163, at 11; see also supra note 204 and accompanying
text.
286. Compare Regulatory Council Statement, supra note 34, at 60,040, with
Todhunter Memorandum, supra note 163, at 6-7; see also supra notes 208-09 and accom-
panying text.
287. Compare Regulatory Council Statement, supra note 34,' at 60,040-41, with
Todhunter Memorandum, supra note 163, at 10; see also supra notes 216-18 and accom-
panying text.
288. Todhunter Memorandum, supra note 163, at 2. Todhunter's position is one that
has generally been advanced only by industry groups. See Office of Technology Assess-
ment, supra note 84, at 128-29.
289. Regulatory Council Statement, supra note 34, at 60,040.
290. Todhunter Memorandum, supra note 163, at 3. Todhunter stated: "Section 4(f)
also draws a distinction between benign and malignant growths by use of the term 'cancer'
rather than 'tumors."' His distinction contradicts not only the Regulatory Council position,
see infia note 291, but also previous agency interpretations of the meaning of "cancer"
under TSCA. For example, section 4(b) of TSCA requires testing for "carcinogenicity,"
which literally refers only to malignant tumors. Yet in 1979, EPA proposed standards under
section 4(b) which would have required testing for both benign and malignant tumors. See
EPA, Proposed Health Effects Test Standards for Toxic Substances Control Act Test Rules,
44 Fed. Reg. 27,334, 27,335 (1979).
291. Regulatory Council Statement, supra note 34, at 60,040.
292. Id. at 60,041.
293. See Todhunter positions discussed supra at notes 279-88 & 290.
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EPA fell short of its procedural responsibility. Especially here, where
the issues lie within the'realm of "controversial, normative, or empirical
determinations,"2 9 4 and where the agency departed from its prior position
on the specific carcinogenic risk, a detailed rationale is all the more
necessary. 2 95
EPA's formaldehyde deliberations powerfully illustrate the ease with
which matters of policy may be confused with matters of science. The
agency's technical analysis hides significant procedural deficiencies.
Whether intentional or not, the result is an invidious one: the analysis
purports to justify, in the name of science, a risk assessment policy far
less protective of human health than the agency's prior policy.
In this regard, it is noteworthy that Todhunter's memorandum was
not reviewed by his scientific peers either inside or outside the agency.296
The failure to garner peer review, especially on matters so controversial,
ran counter to the professed goal of the new EPA administrators to
improve the scientific basis of the agency's regulatory decisions.29 7 It
may also have violated internal EPA procedures. In January 1982, EPA
implemented a new internal policy governing the review of scientific,
informational, and educational materials.298 The policy, which applies to
"any material prepared for distribution to anyone outside the agency," 299
294. Natural Resources Defense Council v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633, 658 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Tamm, J., concurring), rev'd. sub. nom.
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S.
519 (1978). In reversing the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme Court spoke favorably of Judge
Tamm's approach. See 435 U.S. at 549.
295. See, e.g., State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. v. Department of Transp., 680 F.2d 206
(D.C. Cir. 1982). In vacating the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's rescis-
sion of its automatic crash protection standards, the D.C. Circuit noted that the agency's
explanations were "arbitrary in their failure to address obviously relevant considerations"
and concluded that the agency had not provided "a reasoned or rational foundation" for
reversing its course. Id. at 242.
296. Gore EPA Hearings, supra note 18 (statements by Dr. John Todhunter).
Todhunter's testimony indicates that no other scientists, except perhaps Dr. John
Hernandez, Jr., reviewed the memorandum before its release on February 12, 1982.
Todhunter testified that in May 1982, three months after its release, he had telephone
conversations with several scientists to whom he had sent the memorandum.
297. See, e.g., Nominations of Anne M. Gorsuch and John W. Hernandez, Jr.:
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 288 (May 1 & 4, 1981) (Hernandez testified: "I come to the agency with a single
personal goal: that the agency attain a national and international reputation for quality and
excellence in its development and use of science and technology in its decisionmaking
process."); Nominations of Matthew N. Novick and John A. Todhunter, Hearings Before
the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (Sept. 22
& Oct. 16, 1981) (Todhunter testified: "I see my nomination as an opportunity to contribute
to ... the cultivation of sound science as a data base for regulatory decisionmaking.").
298. Memorandum from Anne Gorsuch to Associate, Assistant, and Regional Ad-
ministrators and Staff Office Directors (Dec. 18, 1981) (reprinted in Scheuer Hearings,
supra note 18, at 183). The memorandum was circulated on December 18, 1981, and the
policy went into effect on January 18, 1982.
299. Id. at I (with exceptions not relevant here).
1______1__
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requires that at least two specialists review all such materials.30 0 None-
theless, the Todhunter memorandum was released to the public without
prior peer review.
3. The Statutory Mandate
As noted, the courts have not yet interpreted section 4(f) of TSCA,
nor is there any legislative history specifically pertinent to this section.3 01
The plain language of the statute, however, lends itself to common-sense
interpretation. Section 4(f) requires the agency to take action whenever
the available information indicates
that there may be a reasonable basis to conclude that a chemical substance
or mixture presents or will present a significant risk of serious or widespread
harm to human beings from cancer, gene mutations, or birth defects .. .302
Congress apparently designed section 4(f) as a mechanism for early
identification and regulation of those chemicals that were of particular
concern because they are likely carcinogens, mutagens, or teratogens.
EPA's current interpretation of that section, however, will frustrate this
scheme.
a. The Possibility of Harm
As noted, section 4(f) requires agency action if there "may be a
reasonable basis" to conclude that a risk of harm exists.30 3 In both com-
mon usage304 and judicial interpretation,3 0 5 the term "may" indicates the
possibility of occurrence. Under the plain language of section 4(f), then,
EPA cannot delay its threshold determination until a risk has become
300. EPA, Order 2200: Review Process for Scientific, Informational, and Educational
Documents, at 3 (undated) (reprinted in Scheuer Hearings, supra 18, at 188). The order
also specifies that documents containing "significant scientific or technical uncertainties"
are subject to review by the Science Advisor. Id. at 5.
301. EPA's Office of General Counsel has noted that there appears to be a "dearth
of explicit Congressional discussion on the purposes of section 4(f)." Memorandum from
D. Menotti and S. Atkinson to S. Jellinek 9 (Oct. 30, 1980) (subject: Primer on TSCA 4(f))
[hereinafter cited as Primer on 4(f)].
302. 15 U.S.C. § 2603(f) (1976).
303. Id. (emphasis added).
304. The common definition of "may" relevant here is "be in some degree likely to."
WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 711 (1976).
305. See, e.g., United States v. Lexington Mill & Elevator Co., 232 U.S. 399 (1914)
("may" equivalent to "might").
The legislative history of TSCA indicates that a similar meaning was intended to be
ascribed to "may" in Section 4. In discussing Section 4(a), which provides for the treating
of chemicals that "may present an unreasonable risk," the Conference Committee Report
noted that testing is to occur when "there is a basis for concern," and that EPA "need not
show that the substance does or will present a risk." H.R. REP NO. 94-167a, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 64 (1976).
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certain or probable, but rather must take action upon learning of a cred-
ible possibility of such risk.
Presumably, EPA had made that threshold determination in early
1981, when it prepared its preliminary Federal Register notice on for-
maldehyde.3 06 In subsequently reversing that determination, the agency
offered a markedly different interpretation of the section 4(f) threshold.
In essence, EPA redefined the word "may" in a manner inconsistent with
both common usage and TSCA's statutory framework.
Todhunter's memorandum is particularly noteworthy in this respect.
In summarizing the formaldehyde data, Todhunter noted that "there may
be human exposure situations . . . which may not present carcinogenic
risk which is of significance."3 7 He thus stated the required statutory
finding in the negative. The logical converse of this statement - that
there may be human exposure situations that do present significant car-
cinogenic risk - is precisely the finding that requires EPA to proceed
under section 4(f). The agency's, failure to do so is simply a misinterpre-
tation of statutory language.
EPA documents indicate that the agency continues to endorse this
interpretation of section 4(f). EPA's Office of General Counsel has pre-
pared a "Primer on TSCA 4(f),"3 08 which details the agency's interpre-
tation of its duties under that section. The Primer concludes that Congress
must have intended "may" in this section to refer to a "reasonably high
probability" of occurrence.30 9 Given the agency's limited resources, the
Primer argues, section 4(f) must be viewed as having been reserved for
only a small number of highly probable risks.310 In addition to being
inconsistent with the plain language of section 4(f), this interpretation
ignores that section's place in the overall scheme of TSCA. Section 7 of
the Act specifically provides for expedited action on "imminent haz-
ards,"31 ' and section 6 details the actions to be taken against "unreason-
306. See Draft Federal Register Notice, supra note 159. The notice stated:
EPA believes that formaldehyde has met the criteria of sec. 4(f) for the following reasons. First,
the results of a recently reported bioassay study demonstrate that formaldehyde is carcinogenic
in rats .... Second, review of the available information on the use of formaldehyde and resulting
human exposure suggests that large numbers of people are potentially exposed to harmful
concentrations of formaldehyde. Accordingly, the Agency finds that there may be a reasonable
basis to conclude that formaldehyde presents a significant risk of widespread harm to humans
from cancer.
Id. at 5-6 (emphasis added).
307. Todhunter memorandum, supra note 163, at 5 (emphasis added).
308. Primer on 4(f), supra note 301. This primer was prepared under the Carter
Administration. EPA's Office of General Counsel reportedly prepared another 4(f) analysis
in May 1982. 6 CHEM. REG. REP. (BNA) 315 (1982). EPA has not publicly released that
document, and we therefore must assume that the Primer still represents EPA's views.
309. Primer on 4(f), supra note 301, at 21.
310. Id.
311. 15 U.S.C. § 2606 (1976).
___1_1__·_1_ 1 __ I
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able risks."31 2 If EPA's interpretation were correct, section 4(f) would
merely duplicate these other sections. As one commentator has noted,
the agency's interpretation "effectively writes the [4(f)] provision out of
TSCA."313
b. The Nature and Extent of the Possible Harm
The agency's assessment of the kind of risk that it is to consider
under section 4(f) may also be inaccurate. The Clay memorandum, for
example, argues that section 4(f) "should be reserved only for [carcino-
gens] of the most serious concern" and for "those situations that require
a crash effort to remedy a very serious hazard to public health."3 14
Once again, the statute itself provides relatively clear guidelines,
which point to a contrary interpretation. Congress dealt with both short-
term and long-term risk in 4(f), which addresses chemical substances
that either "present" or "will present" a significant risk of harm. The Act
does not define the phrase "significant risk," but the context suggests
that "significance" pertains to the likelihood of occurrence.3 ' 5 By provid-
ing that the risk that may exist must be significant, the Act seems to
require only the possibility of a probable occurrence. Evidence indicating
the possibility of a significant risk thus triggers the threshold determina-
tion that compels EPA to assess the risk more precisely.
In its risk assessment, the agency must consider both "serious" and
"widespread" harm. By specifically distinguishing between these two
categories of harm in section 4(f), Congress clearly indicated that either
one will trigger a threshold determination. One element focuses on the
extent to which the chemical may pose a risk of serious harm. Here the
concern is not so much the number of people who may be affected, but
how severely they may be affected. A low incidence of a debilitating
cancer, then, would suffice. An alternate element is the extent to which
the chemical may pose a risk of widespread harm. Here a higher incidence
is required, but the harm need not be as severe.
c. The Nature of the Required Action
EPA's formaldehyde decision also reveals some confusion within the
agency as to what it must do once it makes a section 4(f) threshold
determination. Although Clay's reference to "a crash effort to remedy a
312. Id. § 2605.
313. Gore EPA Hearings, supra note 18 (prepared testimony by Jacqueline Warren,
NRDC, at 6).
314. Clay Memorandum, supra note 169, at 195.
315. In common usage, "significant" means "having or likely to have influence or
effect." WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1079 (1977). Although in a technical
sense the term can mean statistically significant, nothing indicates that Congress intended
this narrower meaning here.
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very serious hazard to public health" may occasionally describe section
4(f) actions, 31 6 it more properly applies to actions under the "imminent
hazard" provisions of section 7.317
After making a threshold determination of possible significant risk,
EPA must decide, within a prescribed time period,3 8 whether regulatory
action is appropriate. If the agency determines that the risk is not unrea-
sonable, it must subject this finding to public scrutiny by publishing it in
the Federal Register.3 19 If, on the other hand, the agency does not con-
clude that the potential risk is not unreasonable, it must "initiate appro-
priate action ... to prevent or reduce to a sufficient extent such risk."3 2 0
Depending on the severity of the risk, various actions may be ap-
propriate. The agency is free to exercise its reasoned discretion in se-
lecting which of TSCA's other regulatory authorities to call into play, so
long as it designs its action to reduce the risk sufficiently. In some cases,
a chemical labeling requirement may be adequate.3 21 In others,3 22 the
agency may have to limit the uses of the chemical,3 23 or ban it outright.324
While we express no opinion here as to the appropriate regulatory re-
sponse to formaldehyde under TSCA, it appears that section 4(f) requires
something more of EPA than the agency's actions to date.
V. OSHA's DECISION NOT TO ISSUE AN EMERGENCY TEMPORARY
STANDARD
A. Background
After receiving the results of the preliminary CIIT bioassay in late
1979, both OSHA and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health (NIOSH) joined ongoing formaldehyde studies by the Interagency
Regulatory Liaison Group (IRLG) and Federal Panel on Formaldehyde.
They also began preparing a joint Current Intelligence Bulletin (CIB) on
formaldehyde. 32 5 A pre-publication version, co-signed by Eula Bingham,
316. Clay Memorandum, supra note 169, at 195. Again, Clay's reference to "crash
efforts" illustrates the agency's narrow reading of 4(f).
317. 15 U.S.C. § 2606 (1976).
318. Ordinarily, the Administrator has 180 days to decide upon an appropriate course
of action. Id. § 2603(f). Section 4(f) also permits an additional period of up to 90 days for
"good cause shown." Id.
319. Id. § 2603(f) (1976).
320. Id.
321. See § 6(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(1)(3) (1976)..
322. If a statement of reasons is published in the Federal Register as to why no action
is being taken under sections 5, 6(a), or 7, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2304, 2305(a), 2306 (perhaps because
there is convincing evidence that the public is being adequately protected through voluntary
industry actions), then a monitored program of toxicological testing may suffice.
323. See § 6(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a)(2) (1976).
324. See § 6(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a)(1) (1976).
325. The formaldehyde CIB is the thirty-fourth in a series available from NIOSH;
_ _III______ _____IC__I__C_______1_·---------- I
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then Assistant Secretary of Labor for OSHA, and Anthony Robbins,
then Director of NIOSH, was made available to the public in December
1980.326 The CIB contained information on formaldehyde uses, produc-
tion, toxicity, and workplace exposures and recommended that "formal-
dehyde be handled as a potential occupational carcinogen and that ap-
propriate controls be used to reduce worker exposure."3 27
In March 1981, Thorne Auchter assumed office as Assistant Secre-
tary of Labor for OSHA. Soon thereafter, he withdrew OSHA's spon-
sorship of the CIB, explaining later that the agency "lacked confidence
in the data" on which it was based.32 8 In April 1981, NIOSH published
the CIB without OSHA's sponsorship.3 29
Also in April, OSHA received a formaldehyde regulatory analysis
that it had requested from a research team at MIT.3 3 0 The report analyzed
the cancer risks and economic impacts associated with several possible
exposure levels. The authors estimated that under current OSHA stan-
dards,331 between four and 5,700 workers contract cancer each year
because of workplace exposure to formaldehyde.3 3 2 After obtaining com-
ments on the report from formaldehyde industry scientists,33 3 and from
a scientist whose theories on cancer risk assessment have been adopted
the CIBs provide information on workplace health hazards. See Gore OSHA Hearings,
supra note 18, at 51.
326. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Formaldehyde; Evidence
of Carcinogenicity, NIOSH Current Intelligence Bulletin #34 (Dec. 23, 1980).
327. Id. at 1.
328. See Gore OSHA Hearings, supra note 18, at 60 (statement by Thorne Auchter).
The basis of Auchter's decision to withdraw sponsorship was discussed extensively at this
hearing.
329. See 5 CHEM. REG. REP. (BNA)-91 (Apr. 24, 1981).
330. MIT Report, supra note 131.
331. The current OSHA formaldehyde standards limit the eight-hour time-weighted
average concentration to 3 ppm, the ceiling concentration to 5 ppm, and the maximum
peak above the ceiling concentration to 10 ppm for no more than a total of 30 minutes
during an eight-hour shift. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.100, Table Z-2 (1981). In 1976, NIOSH rec-
ommended a new standard to limit concentrations to no more than 1 ppm for any 30-minute
sampling period. This recommendation was based solely on formaldehyde's irritant effects,
not on its carcinogenic potential.
332. MIT Report, supra note 131, at 3-65, Table 3.25. The authors emphasized the
uncertainty inherent in such estimates and discussed the sources of that uncertainty. See
id. at Chapter 3.
333. The industry scientists were Dr. Joel Bender and Linda S. Mullin of DuPont, a
company whose annual formaldehyde production capacity of over one billion pounds is
exceeded by that of only two other U.S. manufacturers. STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE,
supra note 3, at 658.5032K. Dr. Bender was also then Chairman of the Formaldehyde
Institute's Medical Committee. See letter from Joel Bender to Thorne Auchter (Aug. 28,
1981).
For a copy of Bender's and Mullin's comments, see Criticisms of Health Aspects of
Ashford Document, Appendix B to OSHA, PRELIMINARY COMMENTS ON SHORTCOMINGS
OF ASHFORD'S ARGUMENTS FOR FURTHER OSHA REGULATION OF FORMALDEHYDE, AND
OBSERVATIONS AS TO WHAT, IF ANYTHING, OSHA SHOULD Do WITH ASHFORD'S STUDY
(May 28, 1981) [hereinafter cited as MIT REPORT REVIEW]. The author of the review
appears to have relied heavily on Bender's and Mullin's comments.
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by the industry,33 4 OSHA determined that further action on formaldehyde
was unnecessary.3 3 5
In July 1981, John Martonik, then chief of OSHA's Division of
Health Compliance Programming, advised Han Kang, OSHA's represen-
tative to the IRLG formaldehyde workgroup, that OSHA no longer en-
dorsed the IRLG formaldehyde risk assessment efforts.33 6 Martonik
stated that the preliminary CIIT bioassay did not "persuade OSHA that
it needs to immediately regulate formaldehyde." 3 3 7
In October of that year, the United Auto Workers and thirteen other
major labor unions petitioned OSHA3 3 8 to promulgate an emergency
temporary standard (ETS) for formaldehyde under section 6(c) of the
OSHAct.3 3 9 In a letter dated January 29, 1982, Auchter denied the petition
and gave the following rationale for this decision:3 40
Section 6(c) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act allows the Secretary
to promulgate an emergency temporary standard without rulemaking only
if he determines that (a) employees are exposed to a grave danger from
exposure to toxic agents or from new hazards, and (b) that such emergency
standard is necessary to protect employees from such danger. I believe that
emergency temporary standards are appropriate only in response to ex-
traordinary conditions which result in the exposure of employees to a grave
danger during the course of their employment.34'
Auchter dismissed the CIIT and NYU animal bioassays,3 42 noting that
the carcinogenic response was "statistically significant only at exposure
levels of approximately 15 ppm, substantially above the current permis-
sible exposure limit (PEL) for formaldehyde of 3 ppm."3 43 He concluded
that, at the 3 ppm level, exposure to formaldehyde was not a risk "suf-
334. This scientist was Dr. Frank Carlborg. For a copy of his comments, see MIT
REPORT REVIEW, spra note 333, at Appendix A. Carlborg favors high-dose to low-dose
extrapolation models that estimate risks at low doses solely on the basis of observed risks
at high doses. See Carlborg, Multi-Stage Dose-Response Models in Carcinogenesis, 19
FOOD COSMET. TOXICOLOGY 361 (1981). By contrast, the regulatory agencies generally
endorse models that also assume that risks at low doses vary in linear proportion to dose.
See, e.g., IRLG Risk Assessment Document, supra note 36, at 260-61; EPA, Notice of
Water Quality Criteria Documents, 45 Fed. Reg. 79,318, 79,350 (1980). The former class
of models generally produce lower risk estimates and have been adopted by industry. See,
e.g., Gore EPA Hearings, supra note 18 (statements by Dr. Robert Sielken of the Formal-
dehyde Institute) (advocating use of such models).
335. MIT REPORT REVIEW, supra note 333, at 1-2.
336. Memorandum from John Martonik to File (July 29, 1981). From available doc-
umentation, it is unclear whether OSHA staff continued to participate in the IRLG efforts.
337. Id. at 1.
338. Letter from Howard Young, Director, Social Security Department, UAW to
Thorne Auchter (Oct. 26, 1981).
339. 29 U.S.C. § 655(c) (1976).
340. Letter from Thorne Auchter to Howard Young (Jan. 29, 1982).
341. Id.
342. See supra text accompanying notes 104-16.
343. Letter from Thorne Auchter to Howard Young (Jan. 29, 1982).
~~~~~~~~~___ ~~~~~~~~~~_ _ _ _ ~    ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~----I_
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ficient to warrant a finding of 'grave danger' and resulting emergency
action."3 4 4
Auchter went on to say:
In all ETS situations, OSHA must not only sustain the burden of proving
that the ETS is justified by a grave danger, which we do not believe exists
here, but also that the emergency action is necessary to protect employees.
[Available information] . . . indicates that exposure levels are generally
below the current PEL of 3 ppm. This information is corroborated by
OSHA inspection data. In addition, other OSHA standards ... help pro-
vide additional protection to employees exposed to liquid formaldehyde. 34 5
In light of these other standards and the existing 3 ppm exposure limit,346
Auchter concluded that "the data ... submitted would not enable us to
make a showing that the emergency action . .. is necessary." 347
On August 25, 1982, the United Auto Workers filed suit to compel
OSHA to promulgate an ETS for formaldehyde. 3 4 8
B. The Decisionmaking Process
In many ways, OSHA's deliberations on formaldehyde mirror
EPA's. Although OSHA's departures from sound technical reasoning
and established administrative procedure were perhaps less blatant than
EPA's, they were nonetheless significant. OSHA's treatment of science
policy issues provides an excellent example of how such issues can cut
across all three levels of an agency's administrative responsibility. 3 4 9
1. Analysis of Technical Data
The decision to deny the petition for an emergency temporary stan-
dard was apparently based on two evaluations performed by agency
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id. Auchter cited standards requiring employees to use "protective equipment
and eye and face protection when any chemical, including formaldehyde, is used in such a
manner that it is capable of injuring or impairing employees." Id.
347. Id.
348. United Auto Workers v. Donovan, No. 82-2401 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 25, 1982).
349. This section of the article discusses some decisions made and actions taken
before the agency received the ETS petition from the unions. Such intermediate actions
are considered important by reviewing courts. As Delong stated in his comprehensive
review of informal rulemaking practices,
courts originally applied the [arbitrary and capricious] test only to the agency's final substantive
decision. The process by which that decision was reached was immaterial. The recent cases
require the agency to describe its decisionmaking processes in detail, and the court will examine
the rationality of the processes as a part of its analysis of the final result. Phrased another way,
final agency actions now are seen as the product of myriad intermediate choices. If the agency
has made such choices irrationally, the taint is presumed to carry over into the final action, and
the final action will be held arbitrary.
Delong, supra note 38, at 285 (citations omitted).
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personnel after Auchter took office. The first of these is a detailed and
highly critical review of the MIT formaldehyde report.35 0 Dated May 28,
1981, but unsigned, the review relies heavily on input from formaldehyde
industry scientists,3 51 and concludes that the available data warrant no
additional agency regulation of formaldehyde.3 5 2 The second evaluation,
a preliminary risk assessment attributed to Mary Yurachek of the OSHA
Health Standards staff, was apparently prepared after the ETS petition
had been submitted to the agency.35 3 Positions expressed in each of these
documents found their way into Auchter's ultimate statement of ration-
ale, although the extent to which they contributed to the ETS decision
is not altogether clear.35 4
The review of the MIT study inappropriately relied on the formal-
dehyde epidemiologic studies, on arguments of species specificity, and
on arguments of minimal exposure. As discussed above,355 the epidemi-
ologic studies are marred by a number of technical inadequacies, which
render them far less sensitive than they would need to be in order to
provide a reasonably accurate picture of potential human risk. Nonethe-
less, the OSHA review characterized the epidemiologic evidence as
"quite reassuring," and argued that it "clearly justifies" the postponement
of any further regulatory action.3 56 Although several factors seriously
undermine an argument of species specificity for formaldehyde, 3 57 the
review placed great weight on the observation that different rodent spe-
cies exhibit different reactions to formaldehyde.3 58 The review also as-
sumed that workers are exposed only to low levels of formaldehyde,
350. MIT REPORT REVIEW, supra note 333.
351. See supra note 333 and accompanying text.
352. MIT Report Review, siupra note 333, at 1-2.
353. M. Yurachek, OSHA, Preliminary Quantitative Risk Assessment for Formal-
dehyde (undated) (author not identified but believed to be Yurachek).
354. In addition, formaldehyde exposure risks were evaluated by Dr. Han Kang of
OSHA's Office of Carcinogen Identification and Classification. Kang produced a quanti-
tative risk assessment based on preliminary CIIT data. H. Kang, Preliminary Cancer Risk
Assessment for Formaldehyde (undated) (attached to Memorandum from Peter Infante to
John Martonik (Jan. 4, 1982)). The Yurachek analysis used a similar methodology and the
final CIIT data and could be considered to have superceded Kang's analysis. Kang's risk
estimates were approximately twice the magnitude of Yurachek's. Kang also reviewed the
MIT formaldehyde report and found it "well-organized and scientifically defensible." (Mem-
orandum from Han Kang to Peter Infante (Dec. 3, 1981)) (attached to Memorandum from
Peter Infante to John Martonik (Jan. 4, 1982)). On the basis of Kang's evaluations, Dr.
Peter Infante, Director of OSHA's Office of Carcinogen Identification and Classification,
recommended that OSHA take action on formaldehyde. (Memorandum from Peter Infante
to John Martonik (Jan. 4, 1982)).
355. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
356. MIT REPORT REVIEW, supra note 333, at 10.
357. See supra notes 210-14 and accompanying text.
358. MIT REPORT REVIEW, supra note 333, at 7. ("In brief, there are no scientific
data that demonstrate any risk of cancer to humans. Rodents produce extremely different
responses to formaldehyde exposure. Whereas 1.5% of the rats developed nasal tumors at
6 ppm, it takes 15 ppm to produce tumors in 2.5% of mice, and hamsters apparently remain
unaffected at even much higher exposures.")
___*
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avoiding exposures above 3 ppm because of their irritating effects.3 59
Like the EPA Todhunter memorandum,3 6 0 the OSHA review cited no
empirical evidence for this assumption and apparently ignored data on
exposures above the 3 ppm level.361
OSHA also departed from prevailing scientific opinion on science
policy issues. Auchter's letter of denial stressed that the statistically
significant cancer results in the rat data occurred at exposure levels well
above the 3.0 ppm level of the current workplace standard. It thus implied
that there is a threshold level for carcinogenesis or that it is inappropriate
to interpolate high-dose data to low-dose exposures. Although the sci-
entific community has not yet reached a consensus on the threshold
issue,36 2 the position of the Interagency Regulatory Liaison Group (IRLG)
on high-dose interpolation is that "[t]esting should be done at doses and
under experimental conditions likely to yield maximum tumor
incidence."363
The review of the MIT study also departs from prevailing scientific
opinion in a number of ways. As previously noted, the review presumes
species specificity and relies on negative epidemiologic data. Neither
position is consistent with current scientific opinion.3 64 In an even more
striking departure, the review does not merely question the way that the
results of animal bioassays are extrapolated to humans, but rather argues
that such extrapolation is meaningless: "Because of the vast uncertainties
in extrapolating from experimental rodent studies to man, such experi-
ments do not and cannot predict or measure human risks."3 6 5 Accord-
ingly, the review concludes that "there are no scientific data [on formal-
dehyde] that demonstrate any risk of cancer to humans."3 6 6 At best, this
sweeping denunciation of accepted science policy must be characterized
as a controversial minority opinion.
2. The Procedural Aspects
a. Departure from the Generic Cancer Policy
Perhaps the most significant procedural deficiency in OSHA's delib-
erations was the agency's failure to adhere to its own policy on cancer
risk assessment. Although that policy was promulgated as a formal
359. Id. at 8.
360. See supra notes 221-22 and accompanying text.
361. MIT REPORT REVIEW, supra note 333, at 8.
362. IRLG Risk Assessment Document, supra note 36, at 259.
363. Id. at 250. The IRLG scientists offered several reasons for their position: (1)
bioassays on even a few hundred animals have relatively low sensitivity; (2) people have
varying degrees of sensitivity; and (3) high-dose testing provides a "safety margin" to guard
against false negative results. Id.
364. See supra notes 225-26 and accompanying text.
365. MIT REPORT REVIEW, supra note 333, at 10 (emphasis added).
366. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
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agency regulation,3 6 7 which is still in effect, Auchter's denial letter did
not acknowledge it. Indeed, Auchter's treatment of the formaldehyde rat
data and the agency's failure to consider benign tumor data conflict with
the policy's plain language.3 68 The OSHA review of the MIT report also
departs significantly from the agency's cancer policy, again without ac-
knowledging or explaining the departure.3 6 9
An agency has an affirmative obligation to explain adequately a
substantial departure from prior agency policy.3 70 Where that policy is
embodied in a formal regulation, it is binding upon the agency as a matter
of law; before the agency may deviate from the policy, it must amend
the regulation.3 7' A few weeks before denying the ETS formaldehyde
petition, OSHA called for new comments on its generic cancer policy. It
emphasized, however; in both the Federal Register notice3 7 2 and its press
release,3 73 that the policy on cancer risk assessment remained in effect
and unchanged.
367. Identification, Classification, and Regulation of Potential Occupational Carcin-
ogens, 29 C.F.R. § 1990 (1981). Section 1990.111(a) states that the policy "establishes the
criteria and procedures under which substances will be regulated by OSHA as potential
occupational carcinogens."
368. 29 C.F.R. § 1990.143(g) specifies, with exceptions not relevant here, that
"[p]ositive results for carcinogenicity obtained in mammals exposed to high doses of a
substance will be used to establish a qualitative inference of carcinogenic hazard to
workers." A related provision, section 1990.143(h), specifies that "[n]o determination will
be made that a 'threshold' or 'no effect' level of exposure can be established ... ."
One other provision is particularly pertinent. Section 1990.143(i) provides that
"[r]esults based on the induction of benign' or malignant tumors, or both, will be used to
establish a qualitative inference of carcinogenic hazard to workers." Auchter's statement
that the CIIT results were statistically significant only at 15 ppm indicates that he did not
consider the benign tumors found at the 2 and 6 ppm levels. If those tumors are considered,
the CIIT results show statistically significant increases in tumors at 2 and 6 ppm. See
Memorandum fom Dr. Peter F. Infante to Dr. Richard Griesemer (April 2, 1982) (evaluation
of polyploid ademonas attached); and letter from Dr. Richard Griesemer to Dr. Peter Infante
(May 17, 1982). Although section 1990.143(i) requires the agency to consider benign tumor
data only in qualitative risk assessments, section 1990.11 1(j), which specifies that "cautious
and prudent assumptions will be utilized to perform risk assessments," would seem to
require the agency to consider benign tumor data in quantitative risk assessments as well.
369. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1990.143(c), 1990.144(a) (use of negative epidemiologic stud-
ies); § 1990.143(d) (species specificity); §§ 1990.143(b)-1990.143(c) (use of positive animal
bioassays where human epidemiology is negative).
370. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
371. An agency's failure to comply with its own regulations is grounds for judicial
intervention. See 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7:21 (2d ed. 1979).
372. 47 Fed. Reg. 178, 188 (1982). The notice was termed an "[a]dvance notice of
proposed rulemaking and proposal for partial stay pending completion of rulemaking pro-
ceedings." OSHA proposed to stay certain policy requirements not relevant here and stated
that "[o]ther provisions of the Policy will continue in effect under the terms of this proposed
stay." Id. at 188.
373. Office of Information, U.S. Dep't of Labor, OSHA Asks for Public Comment
on Carcinogen Policy, NEWS Dec. 31, 1981. The release stated that "during the comment
period [length not defined] the carcinogen policy as well as OSHA's other individual rules
on protection from carcinogens remain in effect."
I · II I ----
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b. Other Deficiencies in Stated Rationale
In addition to these policy reversals, the Auchter letter also may fail
to meet the requirements of section 6 of the OSHAct.37 4 Subsection (e)
of that provision requires the Administrator to support "any rule, order,
or decision" under the OSHAct with a written "statement of reasons,"
which must be published in the Federal Register.3 75 The courts have
applied this requirement to decisions to issue an ETS;3 76 it would seem
equally applicable to decisions not to issue an ETS, especially where, as
here, that decision is made in response to a formal petition.377 The courts
have specified that the statement of reasons for an ETS "should indicate
which data in the record is being principally relied on and why that data
suffices.3 78
Although the Auchter letter contains a statement of rationale, that
statement does not identify the agency "risk assessments" on which it
says it relies. 37 9 Does it refer only to the OSHA assessment made after
the ETS petition was filed, or does it refer also to the agency's earlier
review of the MIT study? Indeed, the OSHA assessment appears to have
been prepared in written form sometime after Auchter's letter was deliv-
ered to the unions.3 80 This fact, along with the conclusory nature of
Auchter's analysis, calls into question the letter's adequacy as a "state-
ment of reasons." As one court has noted,
a conclusory statement of reasons places too great a burden on interested
persons to determine and challenge the basis for the [decision], and makes
possible in any subsequent judicial review the use of post hoc rationaliza-
tions that do not necessarily reflect the reasoning of the agency at the time
381
The possibility of post hoc rationalization looms large here.
374. 29 U.S.C. § 655(e) (1976).
375. Id.
376. Dry Color Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. Department of Labor, 486 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1973);
Florida Peach Growers Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 489 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1974).
377. Where there has been a formal petition, OSHA's failure to issue an ETS cannot
be characterized as a mere discretionary determination regarding the proper allocation of
agency resources. It is a determination to take a certain course of action on a narrowly
defined issue in response to a public request. Even absent a specific statutory requirement,
the principles of reasoned decisionmaking require an adequate statement of rationale. See
supra note 274 and accompanying text.
378. Dry Color Mfrs. Ass'n, 486 F.2d at 106.
379. Letter from Thorne Auchter to Howard Young (Jan. 29, 1982).
380. On the last page of the copy we were able to obtain, Yurachek's name appears,
along with the date February 26, 1982. Furthermore, Auchter's letter compares formalde-
hyde risks to "other occupational risks," but the only analysis of such other risks that has
surfaced to date, also authored by Yurachek, is dated February 1, 1982. See Memorandum
from Mary Yurachek to John Martonik (Feb. 1, 1982). Auchter's letter was dated January
29, 1982.
381. Dry Color Mfrs. Ass'n, 480 F.2d at 106.
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c. Disregard of Internal Science Advice
A final procedural problem with OSHA's formaldehyde deliberations
is that the agency disregarded and mischaracterized the advice of its own
scientists. Although Auchter publicly stated that the agency withdrew its
support of the formaldehyde Current Intelligence Bulletin (CIB) because
it "lacked confidence in the data" on which the CIB was predicated,382
all of the technical personnel within OSHA's carcinogenicity assessment
group supported both the CIB and the underlying data.3 83 Later, when
Peter Infante, Director of OSHA's Office of Carcinogen Identification
and Classification, wrote to the International Agency for Research on
Cancer (IARC) recommending that formaldehyde be classified as an an-
imal carcinogen, the agency took steps to have him dismissed.3 84 The
matter became the focus of a congressional hearing.385 Subsequently, the
dismissal proceedings were cancelled. 38 6
3. The Statutory Mandate
The issuance of an ETS for a workplace chemical under section 6(c)
depends upon a finding that "employees are exposed to grave danger
from exposure" to that chemical. 3 87 Once the requisite danger has been
established, OSHA must issue an ETS; no public hearing occurs.38 8 As
Auchter commented in denying the formaldehyde petition, the expedited
section 6(c) process represents something of a departure from conven-
tional administrative rulemaking procedures. The ETS is, as he noted,
an "extraordinary" remedy.389 Nonetheless, it is a remedy that must be
imposed when appropriate circumstances arise. A review of OSHA's
382. See Gore OSHA Hearings, supra note 18, at 60 (statement by Thorne Auchter).
The same explanation was later given when the agency withdrew support from the IRLG
formaldehyde risk assessment efforts. See supra notes 336-37 and accompanying text.
383. Id. at 8-9 (statement of Dr. Bailius Walker, then Director of Health Standards,
OSHA). Dr. Walker testified that he was not aware of any scientist within OSHA who
"lacked confidence" in the data upon which the CIB was based.
The only document made available to Gore subcommittee investigators that supported
the withdrawal decision was a memorandum to Auchter from Mark Cowan, then Special
Assistant for Regulatory Affairs and Director of Policy, U.S. Dep't of Labor. Memorandum
from Mark Cowan to Thorne Auchter (undated), reprinted in Gore OSHA Hearings, supra
note 18, at 13. Cowan, an attorney, wrote that the evidence upon which the CIB was based
was "at best, conflicting, at worst, biased," and recommended that OSHA withdraw its
sponsorship. He wrote the memorandum just after meeting with John Byington and another
attorney representing the Formaldehyde Institute.
384. See Letter from Dr. Peter Infante to Dr. John Higginson, Director, IARC (May
12, 1981), reprinted in Gore OSHA Hearings, supra note 18, at 31; and Letter from Dr.
Bailius Walker to Dr. Peter Infante (June 29, 1981) (proposing Infante's removal), reprinted
in Gore OSHA Hearings, supra note 18, at 17.
385. Gore OSHA Hearings, supra note 18.
386. See 11 O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 205 (Aug. 13, 1981).
387. 29 U.S.C. § 655(c)(1) (1976); see supra text accompanying note 57.
388. Section 6(c)(1) allows the agency to promulgate a standard without regard to the
informal rulemaking requirements of the APA. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
389. See supra text accompanying note 341.
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formaldehyde decision indicates that the agency may have adopted a
more limited interpretation of section 6(c) than the statute will permit.
Clearly, cancer is a "grave" illness. 390 The question is what degree
of cancer risk constitutes a "grave danger" under section 6(c). Decisions
from three courts provide considerable guidance.
a. The Danger from Exposure
The Fifth Circuit offered general remarks in a 1974 case that did not
involve exposure to a potential carcinogen.3 9' The court characterized
section 6(c) as requiring a "determination of danger from exposure to
harmful substances, not just a danger of exposure; and, not exposure to
just a danger, but to a grave danger. .".. 392 Thus, the danger must stem
from current levels of worker exposure, not merely possible or probable
levels of future exposure.
The Third Circuit provided more specific guidance in a 1973
opinion393 that vacated ETSs for two substances regulated as carcino-
gens.394 The agency had not set forth its grounds for concluding that the
chemicals were carcinogenic.39 5 Noting that an ETS cannot issue on a
mere speculation of danger, the court stated that, "[wihile the Act does
not require an absolute certainty as to the deleterious effect of the sub-
stance on man, an emergency temporary standard must be supported by
evidence that shows more than some possibility that a substance may
cause cancer in man."396
390. Dry Color Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. Department of Labor, 486 F.2d 98, 104 (3d Cir.
1973).
391. Florida Peach Growers Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 489 F.2d 120 (5th Cir.
1974).
392. Id. at 130.
393. Dry Color Mfrs. Ass'n, 486 F.2d at 98 (challenging ETSs for 3,3'-dichloroben-
zedine and ethyleneimine).
394. 38 Fed. Reg. 10,929 (1973). OSHA based its findings of potential carcinogenicity
on rodent bioassays.
395. In the early 1970's, neither agencies nor scientists had reached general agreement
that positive animal study results indicate potential human carcinogenicity. In promulgating
the two ETS's, OSHA failed to cite available scientific papers supporting that approach.
For this reason the court vacated the standards. Later, when OSHA properly cited such
papers in promulgating a permanent standard for ethyleneimine, the court upheld that
standard. See SOCMA I, 503 F.2d 1155. The court indicated that OSHA's decision was
essentially a policy judgment to be supported by evidence sufficient to satisfy the OSHAct.
Id. at 1158-60.
396. Dry Color Mfrs. Ass'n, 486 F.2d at 104 (emphasis added).
The evidentiary burden for a temporary standard under section 6(c) appears less than,
nonetheless consistent with, the evidentiary burden that the Supreme Court more recently
enunciated for permanent standards under section 6(b). Industrial Union Dep't v. American
Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980). In reviewing OSHA's permanent standard for ben-
zene, the Court interpreted section 3(8) of the OSHAct as requiring an indication that "it
is at least more likely than not that long-term exposure ... presents a significant risk of
material health impairment." Id. at 653 (emphasis added). This language suggests that a
permanent standard requires a semi-quantitative analysis indicating that some estimable
number of workers are likely to contract cancer.
111___11__________11_1__11 ·11 I -l . . .
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A review of OSHA records shows that such evidence was available
during the formaldehyde deliberations. Extrapolating from the CIIT rat
bioassay results, the agency's own risk analysis indicates that four for-
maldehyde-related cancer deaths per 1000 exposed workers would be
expected at the currently permitted exposure level of 3 ppm. 397 Because
OSHA estimated that the average occupational mortality rate for manu-
facturing workers, from all reported occupationally related causes, is
also four per thousand, Auchter concluded that formaldehyde does not
pose a grave risk of danger.3 98 This comparison misses the mark. The
question is not how the risk from formaldehyde compares with the ag-
gregate of all other risks, but rather how many lives can be saved by
regulating formaldehyde exposure. Furthermore, if the agency's estimate
of average aggregate risk is valid, the fact that exposure to formaldehyde
alone presents a risk of comparable magnitude should give rise to con-
siderable concern.
This evidence of carcinogenic potency appears to be sufficient to
warrant the issuance of an ETS, assuming that a determination of "grave
danger" under section 6(c) may be made by extrapolating from animal
data. Dicta from the Third Circuit again provide substantial guidance:
"Extrapolation from animal experiments may in appropriate cases be
used to establish a sufficient probability of harm to man."39 9 Moreover,
the courts have indicated that evidence of animal carcinogenicity is by
itself sufficient to justify a permanent standard.4 0 0 A greater burden would
397. M. Yurachek, supra note 353, at Table 3. Yurachek used a multistage extrapo-
lation model to derive a maximum likelihood risk estimate of 4.4 cancer cases per 1000
workers exposed at 3 ppm and a 95% upper confidence limit estimate of 7.3 cases per 1000
workers. If Yurachek had included benign tumor data, the risk estimates would have been
substantially higher. See spra note 368. As a very rough indication of the difference,
consider that in the CIIT study eight of the 236 rats exposed at 2 ppm developed benign
tumors, as did one of the 232 rats at zero exposure. See supra notes 104-110 and accom-
panying text. After adjusting the observed 2 ppm-figure to exclude the control group tumor,
extrapolating the figure to humans yields a lifetime risk estimate of 30 cancer cases per
1000 workers at 2 ppm.
398. In his'letter denying the ETS petition, Auchter noted that "the risk from for-
maldehyde exposure at the [present exposure level], when compared with other occupa-
tional risks, is not sufficient to warrant a finding of 'grave danger' and resulting emergency
action." Letter from Thorne Auchter to Howard Young (Jan. 29, 1982), at 2. Auchter
apparently was referring to an analysis prepared by Mary Yurachek. See Memorandum
from Mary Yurachek to John Martonik (Feb. 1, 1982). Yurachek's estimates, derived from
Bureau of Labor Statistics data, indicate that injury and illness risk rates in the manufac-
turing sector range from 0.3 to 6 deaths per 1000 workers with median and mean values of
approximately 4 deaths per 1000 workers.
399. Dry Color Mfrs. Ass'n, 486 F.2d at 104.
400. The Third Circuit has upheld a permanent standard for ethyleneimine on the
basis of extrapolations from rodent data "in the absence of evidence of carcinogenicity in
humans." SOCMA I, 503 F.2d 1155, 1160 (3d Cir. 1974) and SOCMA II, 506 F.2d 385 (3d
Cir. 1974). The Supreme Court gave implicit approval to this approach in the benzene
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hardly seem appropriate for a temporary standard. In addition to contra-
vening both its own cancer policy and the Interagency Regulatory Liaison
Group guidelines on this issue, OSHA contravened its section 6(c) man-
date as well.
b. Worker Exposure
The remaining inquiry is whether the evidence of worker exposure
to formaldehyde is sufficient to warrant the issuance of an ETS. In a
recent decision involving ethylene oxide (EtO), the D.C. Circuit declined
to compel OSHA to issue an ETS where the evidence indicated that only
"some" workers are exposed to EtO at levels that present a "significant
risk" of "grave danger." 401 On the basis of this finding, however, the court
ordered OSHA to expedite ongoing procedures to set a permanent stan-
dard to reduce worker exposure to EtO.40 2 Although the court's use of
the term "significant risk" is somewhat confusing,40 3 this decision indi-
cates that OSHA may not be required to impose an ETS for a suspected
human carcinogen unless (1) the substance is a probable animal carcin-
ogen, and (2) a significant number of workers are exposed to the sub-
stance at levels that pose a risk of cancer.40 4
The formaldehyde exposure data appears stronger than the EtO data,
both in the detail and reliability of the exposure information 40 5 and in the
401. Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Auchter, No. 83-1071, slip op. (D.C.
Cir. Mar. 15, 1983). The district court had ordered OSHA to issue the ETS within 20 days.
Public Citizen Health Group v. Auchter, No. 81-02343, slip op. (D.D.C. Jan. 5, 1983). On
expedited review, the court of appeals held that "[w]hile it is a close question, our review
of the record indicates that, in ordering an emergency standard, the most drastic measure
in the Agency's standard-setting arsenal, the district court impermissibly substituted its
evaluation for that of OSHA." Public Citizen, No. 83-1071 (D.C. Cir.) at 6.
402. OSHA had issued an "Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking" for a permanent
standard in January 1982 and had projected that it would promulgate a final regulation by
the fall of 1984. Citing mandates for expedition in both the OSHAct and the APA, the court
held that "a more than three-year span from [the ETS] petition to projected final regulation
is not tolerable." Id. at 7.
403. In the OSHA context, the Supreme Court has used the term "significant risk"
to refer to a serious risk to a sufficient number of workers. See supra note 396. In the EtO
case, the D.C. Circuit appears to use the term to refer to the severity of the risk, regardless
of the number of workers exposed to that risk.
404. The court apparently deferred to OSHA's determination that EtO exposures at
10 ppm and below do not pose a "grave danger," and it noted that it was "unable to venture
even a guess as to existing exposure patterns over [10 ppm]." Public Citizen, No. 83-1071
(D.C. Cir.) at 13.
405. The court noted that "nothing offered to the district court" contradicted OSHA's
estimates of a 10 ppm average exposure level to EtO and a statistically lower risk of harm
at that level. Id. at 12. The current EtO eight-hour time-weighted average permissible level
(PEL) is 50 ppm. By contrast, each of the three formaldehyde exposure studies indicates
exposures at, near, and above the current PEL of 3 ppm, and OSHA's own risk estimate
postulates a substantially higher risk at this level (4.4 deaths per 1000 at 3 ppm, compared
to 0.16 per 1000 at 1 ppm). See supra text accompanying notes 397-98.
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number of workers exposed.4 0 6 As OSHA has not yet begun procedures
to revise its permanent exposure standard for formaldehyde, and has not
indicated that it intends to do so, an ETS presents the most likely pos-
sibility of expeditious regulation. Accordingly, formaldehyde may well
meet the criteria that the D.C. Circuit enunciated in the EtO case. The
evidence seems sufficient either to permit OSHA to issue an ETS on its
own volition or for a court to compel it to do so.407 Further, the EtO case
seems to stand for the proposition that OSHA will not be allowed to
delay affirmative regulatory action of some kind on substances such as
EtO and formaldehyde. 4 0 8 Indeed, the D.C. Circuit's approach in the EtO
case may also be appropriate for formaldehyde. An order to commence
a procedure to set a permanent standard for formaldehyde would set the
stage for an objective appraisal of the cancer risk from formaldehyde and
of the need for further worker protection.
VI. CPSC's DECISION TO BAN UREA-FORMALDEHYDE FOAM
INSULATION
A. Background
I. Chronology of Events
CPSC also received the results of the preliminary CIIT bioassay in
late 1979. By this time, the Commission had already begun to study the
health problems associated with the use of urea-formaldehyde foam in-
sulation (UFFI).4 0 9 As early as 1976, CPSC had received complaints from
residents of UFFI-insulated homes who had suffered acute irritation
406. NIOSH estimated that 75,000 workers were regularly exposed to EtO and an-
other 25,000 were casually or intermittently exposed. Public Citizen, No. 83-1071 (D.C.
Cir.) at 9. In contrast, the Snell study estimates that some 1.4 million workers are exposed
to formaldehyde. See supra notes 134-51 and accompanying text.
407. In Public Citizen, the court hints broadly at the propriety of a voluntary ETS
for EtO: "All we say today is that in the absence of a more complete record as to exposure
levels, we are hesitant to compel the Assistant Secretary to grant extraordinary relief. We
express no opinion as to whether the same record would support voluntary issuance by
OSHA of an emergency standard." No. 83-1071 (D.C. Cir.) at 13 (emphasis in original).
408. The court's directive for expedited rulemaking does not appear to be dependent
on OSHA's having already begun a section 6(b) procedure. Throughout the opinion, the
court speaks the language of substantive review. It clearly examined the factual record in
detail.
409. UFFI has been used to insulate existing structures, both residences and com-
mercial buildings, rather than new ones. It is prepared on-site by mixing urea-formaldehyde
resin and compressed gas to form a substance resembling shaving cream. This substance
is pumped into the cavities in a wall, where it firms. Formaldehyde gas is released through
the wall at rates that vary with conditions at the site. In general, the release rate is highest
immediately after installation and diminishes with time. Releases may occur for several
years after installation. See CPSC Ban Notice, supra note 116.
------^----- 1110*1 -- _.._. . . .
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possibly attributable to formaldehyde exposure.410 By March 1979, the
Commission had decided to gather information on the issue. 4 1
CPSC joined the Interagency Regulatory Liaison Group (IRLG) for-
maldehyde study efforts in late 1979.412 In March 1980, when the need
for further study became apparent, the Commission organized the Federal
Panel on Formaldehyde. 41 3 In June 1980, the Commission proposed a
rule requiring UFFI manufacturers to inform prospective buyers of UFFI
health effects. 414 CPSC received the Federal Panel report in November
1980, and in February 1981 it proposed to ban UFFI altogether.41 5
The Commission set a 60-day notice and comment period, and held
an informal public hearing on March 20, 1981. 416 CPSC subsequently
gathered additional data, and in November 1981 solicited comment from
industry, consumer groups, and other members of the public on issues
related to that data.4 17
In January 1982, an industry group charged that the CPSC staff "had
sought to substantiate a prejudgment on [UFFI] by using only selected
and interpreted data - along with a host of hunches and assumptions -
and knowingly provided false or misleading information" to Congress
and the public, as well as tothe CPSC Commissioners. 418 Five months
later, the Commission promulgated a final rule banning UFFI as of August
1982. 4 19
On April 12, 1982, the Formaldehyde Institute filed a suit to challenge
the CPSC ban.420 On August 10, 1982, a federal judge refused to issue a
temporary injunction, and the ban took effect on that date.421 The Fifth
Circuit vacated the UFFI ban on April 7, 1983.422
410. In October 1976,.CPSC received a petition under section 10 of the CPS Act, 15
U.S.C. § 2059 (1976) (since repealed), from the Metropolitan Denver District Attorney's
Consumer Office for regulation of certain insulation products, including UFFI. CPSC Ban
Notice, supra note 116, at 14,367.
411. 44 Fed. Reg. 12,080 (1979) (denying petition for regulation of foam insulation).
412. CPSC Ban Notice, supra note 116, at 14,369.
413. See id.; Federal Panel Report, supra note 7, at 139; Gore EPA Hearings, supra
note 18 (statement by Richard Dailey).
414. 45 Fed. Reg. 39,434 (1980). The proposed rule was based in part on a report
prepared for CPSC by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS). The NAS concluded that
there is no formaldehyde exposure level below which no person would experience irritant
effects. See COMMITTEE ON TOXICOLOGY, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, FORMAL-
DEHYDE - AN ASSESSMENT OF ITS HEALTH EFFECTS, (1980) (NTIS Document No. ADA-
087854).
415. 46 Fed. Reg. 11,188 (1981).
416. Id. at 11,188.
417. See 46 Fed. Reg. 49,140 (1981); 46 Fed. Reg. 56,762 (1981).
418. See Toxic MATERIALS NEWS, Jan. 27, 1982, at 29 (quoting the National Insu-
lation Certification Institute, whose members included manufacturers and installers of
UFFI).
419. CPSC Ban Notice, supra note 116. The Commission had voted four to one in
favor of the ban on February 22, 1982. Id.
420. 6 CHEM. REG. REP. (BNA) 113 (Apr. 23, 1982).
421. 6 CHEM. REG. REP. (BNA) 648 (Aug. 20, 1982).
422. Gulf South Insulation v. CPSC, 701 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1983).
_ _ 
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2. The Cancer Risk Assessment
CPSC summarized its analysis of the cancer risks of UFFI use in
the final notice of the UFFI ban.423 On the basis of the Federal Panel
recommendations and the NYU bioassay results, the Commission con-
cluded that formaldehyde is a carcinogen, and that the existing epide-
miologic studies were "insufficient to assess the carcinogenic risk in
humans. 424
Noting the absence of any information demonstrating a threshold
below which exposure poses no risk of cancer, the Commission then
reviewed the exposure data:
Research conducted for the Commission has shown that U.F. foam
insulation releases measurable amounts of formaldehyde in the laboratory
even after installation under optimum conditions. In addition, increased
levels of formaldehyde have been measured in residences where U.F. foam
insulation has been installed. In some cases, the levels of formaldehyde in
these homes are within an order of magnitude of the levels in the CIIT
study that produced tumors in rats.425
The Commission also cited a risk assessment prepared by the CPSC
staff on the basis of that data, which predicted "up to 1.8 additional cases
of cancer from every 10,000 residences insulated."4 26
B. The Decisionmaking Process
Especially when viewed in contrast to the EPA and OSHA deliber-
ations, CPSC's formaldehyde deliberations might be considered a model
of reasoned decisionmaking. The Commission was subject to more strin-
gent statutory requirements than were EPA and OSHA.42 7 However,
CPSC not only met these requirements, but exceeded them.
423. CPSC Ban Notice, supra note 116, at 14,369-73.
424. Id. at 14,371-72. The Commission enumerated four points leading to its
conclusion:
1. Formaldehyde can interact with genetic material and cause irreversible changes in several
cell systems,
2. Formaldehyde is carcinogenic in animals,
3. There are no significant qualitative differences in the manner in which formaldehyde is
metabolized by animals and humans, and




426. Id. That assessment was prepared using the model developed by the Federal
Panel.
427. When CPSC develops a consumer product safety rule or ban under sections 7
or 8 of the CPS Act, it must follow procedures specified in section 9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2056-
2058 (1976), amended by 15 U.S.C. § 2057-2058 (Supp. V 1981).
_____ ____ ____11___1_·_ ___ __ __ _ 11  _11___1
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1. Analysis of Technical Data
During the notice and comment rulemaking period for the UFFI ban,
CPSC responded to many comments that specifically questioned its tech-
nical risk analysis. A search of the Commission's stated rationale,428
background documents,4 29 and comment responses 43 0 reveals no clear
errors in scientific reasoning. In technical areas where EPA and OSHA
used questionable reasoning, CPSC's analysis seems solid.
a. Issues of "Hard" Science
For example, where EPA and OSHA unduly relied on the inconclu-
sive epidemiologic evidence,4 31 CPSC explained the methodological in-
adequacies of that evidence, noting that "none of [the] studies included
enough deaths among individuals potentially exposed to formaldehyde
... for a meaningful evaluation." 43 2 CPSC also cited the similar conclu-
sion reached by the International Agency for Research on Cancer
(IARC).43 3 Unlike EPA's Todhunter memorandum4 34 and OSHA's review
of the MIT report,43 5 which declined to extrapolate from rat studies to
humans because of species specificity, CPSC noted that apparent speci-
ficity may be explained by other factors such as differences in breathing
rates.436 Whereas Todhunter stated that formaldehyde's irritant properties
are evidence of a threshold level for carcinogenesis,4 3 7 CPSC noted that
the second NYU bioassay results suggest otherwise.4 3 8
b. Issues of Science Policy
CPSC conformed to prevailing scientific opinion on science policy
issues. For example, the Commission extrapolated animal results to hu-
mans, and high-dose results to low doses.43 9
428. CPSC Ban Notice, supra note 116.
429. See M. Cohn, Risk Assessment for Formaldehyde Released from Urea-Formal-
dehyde Foam Insulation (Nov. 1980); and M. Cohn, Revised Carcinogenic Risk Assessment
of Urea-Formaldehyde Foam Insulation: Estimates of Cancer Risk Due to Inhalation for
Formaldehyde Released by UFFI (Oct. 26, 1981).
430. See CPSC Ban Notice, supra note 116, at 14,373-80; Memorandum from
Harleigh P. Ewell, CPSC Attorney, to the Commission (Jan. 29, 1982) (Briefing Package
on Urea-Formaldehyde Foam Insulation); Memorandum from K. Gupta and M. Cohn to
Harry Cohen (Feb. 19, 1982) (discussing Health Sciences Analysis of Comments on the
Proposed Ban of UFFI).
431. Regarding EPA, see supra text accompanying notes 199-203; regarding OSHA,
see supra text accompanying notes 355-56.
432. CPSC Ban Notice, supra note 116, at 14,373.
433. Id.
434. See supra text accompanying notes 204 -07.
435. See supra text accompanying notes 357-58.
436. CPSC Ban Notice, supra note 116, at 14,370.
437. See supra text accompanying notes 216-20.
438. CPSC Ban Notice, supra note 116, at 14,378.
439. Id. at 14,371-72.
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2. The Procedural Aspects
In promulgating its UFFI ban, CPSC was subject to the procedural
provisions of the CPS Act, which require an opportunity for notice and
comment.44 0 In addition, as a commission headed by a "collegial body,"
CPSC must comply with advance notice and open meeting requirements
of the Government in the Sunshine Act.4 41 CPSC appears to have con-
formed with these requirements4 42 and to have comported with the prin-
ciples of reasoned decisionmaking. It established and maintained a de-
cisionmaking framework that allowed for input from all interested parties.
Indeed, the Commission appears to have exceeded its procedural require-
ments in many ways. Its response to the initial CIIT findings is illustra-
tive. Although EPA and OSHA initially joined the Interagency Regula-
tory Liaison Group and Federal Panel on Formaldehyde, CPSC led those
efforts. CPSC's Dr. Andrew Ulsamer chaired the IRLG Formaldehyde
Workgroup,4 43 and CPSC initiated and coordinated the Federal Panel.444
CPSC's UFFI science policy decisions were consistent with the
Regulatory Council policy on the regulation of carcinogens, which CPSC
explicitly endorsed.4 4 5 The Commission also provided a detailed state-
ment of reasons for its decision to ban UFFI.4 46 That statement explains
the basis of the ban, cites specific sources of data, and responds to
numerous comments.
3. The Statutory Mandate
The CPS Act requires the Commission to make certain findings
before it promulgates a product rule.447 The provision pertinent to cancer
risk assessment states that CPSC must consider "the degree and nature
of the risk of injury the rule is designed to eliminate or reduce." 448 For
UFFI, CPSC specified that the nature of the injury is cancer, as well as
acute effects, and estimated the risk to be "up to 1.8 additional cases of
cancer from every 10,000 residences insulated." 44 9
The Commission thus satisfied the statutory requirements for its
assessment of UFFI cancer risks. Having made this risk estimate, CPSC
440. 15 U.S.C. § 2058 (1976).
441. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976).
442. In fact, in its suit to overturn the UFFI ban, the Formaldehyde Institute alleged
no procedural deficiencies on CPSC's part. See Brief for Respondent at 16, Formaldehyde
Institute v. CPSC, No. 82-4135 (5th Cir. filed Apr. 12, 1982).
443. Gore EPA Hearings, supra note 18 (statement by Dr. Peter Preuss, CPSC).
444. See supra note 413 and accompanying text.
445. See CPSC, Proposed Methodology for Commission Consideration of Findings
Under Section 9(c) of the Consumer Product Safety Act, 45 Fed. Reg. 85,772, 85,775 (1980).
446. CPSC Ban Notice, supra note 116.
447. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2057, 2058(c) (1976), amended by 15 U.S.C. §§ 2057, 2058
(Supp. V 1981) (making minor wording changes in § 2057 and renumbering § 2058(c) as
2058(f)(1)(A)).
448. 15 U.S.C. § 2068(c)(1) (1976).
449. CPSC Ban Notice, supra note 116, at 14,372.
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then had to consider the public need for the product, the alternatives to
the proposed standard, and the reasonableness of the risk in light of
various economic factors.450 We express no opinion here as to the ade-
quacy of the Commission's treatment of these issues.
C. The Fifth Circuit Opinion Overturning the UFFI Ban
The Fifth Circuit does not share our sanguinity regarding the CPSC
cancer risk assessment. Rather, the court has recently held that the
Commission relied on an "inadequate" data base in making that assess-
ment and, as noted, has vacated the UFFI ban.4 5' We have no quarrel
with the standard of review invoked by the court in reaching this decision,
nor with the court's approach in applying that standard to the adminis-
trative record before it. Quite properly, the court employed the concepts
of reasoned decisionmaking, 45 2 and examined the technical aspects of the
record in some detail. Many of its conclusions regarding that record,
however, do not appear appropriate. The court criticized two aspects of
the Commission's cancer risk assessment: the manner in which homes
were selected for measurements of in-home formaldehyde levels, and the
use of the CIIT rat data to project levels of human carcinogenic risk from
formaldehyde. 4 53 The court indicated that CPSC's handling of either of
these factors would be sufficient to warrant reversal of the UFFI ban.4 54
We disagree.
1. The Selection of UFFI Homes
As discussed previously, 4 55 CPSC based its estimate of likely for-
maldehyde exposure levels on 1164 measurements from homes insulated
with UFFI, and on laboratory tests conducted on UFFI panels. Of the
in-home measurements, 827 were conducted in residences whose occu-
pants had complained about UFFI-related health problems, and 337 in
450. 15 U.S.C. § 2058(c) (1976), amended by 15 U.S.C. § 2058 (Supp. V 1981) (re-
numbering § 2058(c) as § 2058(f)(1)(A)).
451. Gulf South Insulation v. CPSC, 701 F.2d 1137, 1143 (5th Cir. 1983).
452. Id. at 3638 ("The ultimate question is whether the record contains 'such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion."') (quoting Aqua
Slide 'N' Dive v. CPSC; 569 F.2d 831, 838 (5th Cir. 1978), in turn quoting Universal Camera
v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 478 (1951) (emphasis added). The court further indicated, again
citing Aqua Slide, 569 F.2d at 837, that it was taking a "harder look" at the administrative
record. 701 F.2d at 1150.
453. The court also concluded that CPSC's findings on acute irritant effects were not
supported by substantial evidence, and that CPSC erred by failing to proceed against
formaldehyde under the Federal Hazardous Substances Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-1276) rather
than under the CPSAct. Our analysis of the court's decision does not extend to these
aspects of the opinion.
454. Early in the opinion, the court indicates that it "need examine only [these two
issues] in detail" in order to reach its decision. 701 F.2d at 1143. Later, however, the court
indicates that its holding may be based solely on the perceived inadequacy of the in-home
data. 701 F.2d at 1147.
455. See supra text accompanying note 154.
- ---------- --------------- I-·-----*--- ·-- --··lla------^---- I -- --I---
1983] 363
Harvard Environmental Law Review
homes selected for other reasons. In concluding that these in-home mea-
surements were an improper basis for the Commission's risk assessment,
the court points to two "significant omissions:"
The Commission does not explain its reliance on a data base comprised
largely of complainant houses. Nor does the agency justify its failure to
conduct a study of randomly selected UFFI homes before issuing the
product ban.456
In truth, however, the agency did explain its willingness to rely on
the in-home data. According to the final risk assessment, all of the in-
home measurements (for both "complaint" and "non-complaint" homes)
were grouped according to the time that had elapsed between the date
that UFFI had been installed in the home and the date that the measure-
ment had been taken.4 57 The groupings were by 10-week periods, over
an overall period of nine years. Average measurements for complaint
homes were compared with average measurements for non-complaint
homes within each of these ten-week periods, but no statistically signif-
icant differences were found.4 58 Thus, the agency concluded, there is no
reason to believe that formaldehyde levels in the complaint homes were
significantly higher than those in other homes insulated with UFFI. The
court simply appears to have overlooked this evidence. While the statis-
tical comparison employed by the agency does not rule out the possibility
456. 701 F.2d at 1145.
457. CPSC RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 153, at 9.
458. The widest gaps between the ten-week averages occur during the first four
intervals; the average of the complaint home measurements is higher than the average of
the non-complaint home measurements for each of those four intervals. Thereafter, the
differences are generally much smaller, and in several of the intervals the non-complaint
homes are higher than the complaint averages.
CPSC's risk assessment indicates that, in addition to the interval-by-interval com-
parisons, the agency examined the statistical significance of the difference between the
overall averages of the complaint and non-complaint residences. This difference was found
to lack statistical significance at the five percent, level. (The term "statistical significance"
is discussed at supra note 110.)
Two points need to be made about the statistical tests employed by the agency. One
is that the number of measurements for some of the later intervals was not large enough
to reveal a statistically significant difference, if indeed such a difference existed. In these
cases, however, the range in the measurements was generally quite small. Second, the test
used by the agency assumed that all of the samples examined were normally distributed,
but in fact at least some of them were log-normally distributed. Strictly speaking, then, the
agency's use of the normal "t-test" may have been inappropriate. As a practical matter,
however, this error would probably make it more likely that any statistically significant
difference would have been detected. CPSC's conclusion on the lack of statistical signifi-
cance thus appears sound.
Regardless of this lack of strict statistical significance, the non-complaint home mea-
surements are consistently lower over the first four intervals. For the reasons discussed at
note 459 infra, however, we do not believe that this would appreciably affect the agency's
cancer risk assessment.
_I ·  I C_ _I
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that the use of complaint homes did influence the data to a certain degree,
the data indicate that the effect of any such influence on the ultimate
cancer risk projection would be relatively small.459
The failure to use a randomized sample is perhaps a closer question.
Although selecting a study population through random sampling would
be scientifically preferred, failing to do so does not necessarily vitiate
the value of a study. The purpose of random sampling is to insure that
the results of the study are not biased by the manner in which the study
population is selected. Whether a lack of randomization invalidates a
study thus depends on whether the results are in fact biased.
The obvious source of potential bias in the CPSC data - and the
only one cited by the court - is the possibility that formaldehyde levels
were appreciably higher in the complaint homes than in other homes.460
If the higher levels had themselves triggered the complaints by consum-
ers, then reliance on measurements from those homes would produce
biased data. As noted, however, comparisons between complaint and
non-complaint homes revealed no statistically significant differences in
formaldehyde levels.
There remains a possibility that the lack of randomization allowed
some other, presently unknown source of bias to influence the results.
As the in-home measurements were largely consistent with the results of
the laboratory tests, this possibility seems rather slight.461 Nonetheless,
some uncertainty remains. In choosing to take regulatory action in the
face of this uncertainty, CPSC implicitly made a policy determination
that the potential risk to human health from continued use of UFFI
insulation did not permit it to delay action until a large randomized study
of UFFI homes could be completed. In vacating the UFFI ban, the court
has substituted its own policy judgment for that of the agency. As a
matter of administrative law, a court may reverse an agency's policy
determination only where that determination conflicts with the statutory
mandate .462
459. Overall, the difference appears to be something less then two-fold. Even if this
difference were statistically significant, its effect would be small in comparison to the total
level of uncertainty (generally at least two orders of magnitude) that prevails in any cancer
risk assessment. Indeed, recalculating the CPSC risk assessment solely on the basis of the
non-complaint measurements still projects a substantial cancer risk. CPSC's final projection
was 51 additional deaths per million persons exposed. Based on the non-complaint data
alone, the figure would be roughly 34 to 40 additional deaths per million.
460. As noted by the court, the formaldehyde industry argued that levels were higher
in complaint homes because of faulty installation. 701 F.2d at 1144.
461. The court acknowledged this point, but concluded that it was immaterial. Id. at
1144-45. Though the fit between the data sets is not a perfect one, the general congruence
between the in-home and laboratory results does serve to narrow the relevant range of
uncertainty in the exposure data. Further, of the non-complaint homes, some were'reported
to have been randomly selected, others selected because the occupants requested mea-
surement, and the remainder selected through a variety of other means. Thus, the overall
data would not be likely to exhibit any consistent bias.
462. As the D.C. Circuit recently noted:
*-·-L·aB - --- -------- -- - ·
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Does the CPSAct require the Commission to conduct a controlled
test from a randomly selected study population before imposing a product
ban? Clearly the statute itself contains no explicit direction in this regard.
Rather, both the statutory language and the legislative history indicate
that considerable discretion is to be afforded to the Commission in its
choice of study designs, so long as it bases its conclusions on generally
reliable data.463 Furthermore, in a prior case interpreting the CPSAct the
Fifth Circuit has held that the Commission is not required to conduct
"an elaborate cost benefit analysis," but rather need only meet its burden
of "producing substantial evidence" that "the relevant factors ... weigh
in favor" of the regulatory path chosen.4 64 By rejecting the rigorously
quantitative approach of a cost benefit analysis, the court's language
appears to allow the agency a fair degree of discretion in choosing the
manner in which that evidence is to be compiled.
The Fifth Circuit's formaldehyde decision is ambiguous. One could
interpret it as a retreat from the court's earlier language and as an attempt
to narrow the agency's discretion in employing technical methodology.
If this reading is correct, the decision is ill-advised. Although random
sampling might be required in order to obtain reliable evidence in certain
situations it is not the only means of producing an adequate data base.
Where, as here, the general reliability of the data can be shown by other
means, the need for random sampling is far less pressing.
A more accurate reading, however, may be that the court would not
require random sampling as a predicate to all CPSC product bans, but
required such sampling here in order to overcome perceived bias that
the court believed arose from CPSC's reliance on complaint home data.
Because, as noted above, any such bias is probably insubstantial, the
court's concern is largely unwarranted and does not justify a reversal of
the agency's ban.
2. The Use of the CIIT Data
Declaring that "it is not good science to rely on a single experiment,"
the court found the Commission's "exclusive reliance" on the CIIT rat
If the agency clearly articulates a reasonable basis for [its] action, we must defer to the policy
judgments and expertise of the agency. By no means may we substitute the court's judgment,
or fail to "guard against the danger of sliding unconsciously from the narrow confines of law
into the more spacious domain of policy."
State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. v. Department of Transp., 680 F.2d 206, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(quoting Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941)).
463. See generally S. REP. No. 835, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); H.R. REP. No. 1153,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). The House Report states that a full cost-benefit analysis is not
required, but cautions that the agency must provide "reasonable assurance that the fre-
quency or severity of injuries or illness will be reduced." H.R. REP. No. 1153, supra, at
33. As noted by Dean Richard A. Merrill of the University of Virginia School of Law,
"[t]hese delphic instructions have left the agency a wide range of discretion." Merrill, supra
note 32, at 1281.
464. Aqua Slide 'N' Dive v. CPSC, 569 F.2d 831, 840 (5th Cir. 1978).
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bioassay in its projection of human cancer risk to be "unsupportable." 4 6 5
As discussed at the outset of this article,466 the extrapolation of animal
data to predict human cancer risk is ultimately an issue of policy; "good
science" is simply unable to provide a precise calculation of formalde-
hyde's carcinogenicity in humans. Consistent with the federal cancer
policy set forth in the Regulatory Council Statement,4 67 CPSC based its
projections on a single, well-conducted animal bioassay. Although the
court makes no mention of the Council statement in its review of the
Commission's action, its rejection of that action is an implicit repudiation
of carefully established federal administrative policy. All indications are
that the court did not base this position on its reading of the Commission's
statutory mandate, but rather on its own understanding of scientific meth-
odology. As such, the court has confused science with science policy,
and has once again substituted its policy judgment for that of the agency.
The court's analysis of the CIIT bioassay also incorporates signifi-
cant technical inaccuracies. It characterizes the 240-rat study as "small."
If anything, however, the CIIT study was substantially larger than the
average long-term bioassay, and was certainly large enough to produce
statistically significant results.46 8 The court also criticized the study's
exposure protocol. That protocol has been evaluated and deemed ac-
ceptable by numerous scientists. 46 9 Finally, the court refers to a "wide
gap" between the CIIT results and the results of the second NYU bioas-
say.4 70 This is simply an inaccurate characterization of the data. Indeed,
when the results of the two studies are properly compared they appear
quite consistent. At the end of 18 months, 10% of the NYU rats at risk
had died with malignant tumors, compared with 14.5% of the rats at risk
at the 14.3 ppm level in the CIIT study.4 71 This difference is hardly
465. 701 F.2d at 1146.
466. See supra text accompanying notes 84-88.
467.
If a substance has been shown to be carcinogenic under the conditions of a single properly
designed and conducted test, it should be considered as posing a risk of cancer to humans.
Although the agencies should attempt to obtain additional data, they should not take the risk
involved in waiting the two to four years required to complete an additional animal bioassay
before initiating regulatory action.
Regulatory Council Statement, supra note 27, at 60,040.
468. The CIIT study used 240 rats at each of three dose levels, plus 240 "control"
rats given no formaldehyde. The official National Cancer Institute guidelines recommend
using at least 100 rats at each level. Sontag, Page & Saffiotti, Guidelines for Carcinogenic
Bioassay in Small Rodents (1976).
469. The protocol was evaluated by the Federal Panel, the IRLG, and a group from
the CIIT. Federal Panel Report, supra note 7, at 140, 150.
470. 701 F.2d at 1146 n.19.
471. Indeed, the results of the two studies have been termed "strikingly similar."
Albert, supra note 112, at 601. At 18 months, 38 of the 100 rats exposed only to formal-
dehyde in the NYU study had died, and 10 of these had squamous cell carcinomas. At 18
months, 44 of the 240 CIIT 14.3 ppm rats had died; 28 had squamous cell carcinomas and
one had a spindle cell carcinoma. As 40 rats of the original 240 had been sacrificed prior
--- -- ---- ---- 
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striking, and may well be explained by the fact that the two studies used
different strains of rats for their respective study populations.4 72
In sum, though we must again emphasize that we express no opinion
as to the other aspects of the Commission's decision, nor of the court's
review thereof,4 73 we find the Fifth Circuit's analysis to be unpersuasive
in its evaluation of CPSC's cancerrisk assessment for formaldehyde. 4 74
CONCLUSION
Reasoned decisionmaking has evolved as a common standard for
judicial review of agency action, and is a particularly appropriate criterion
by which to evaluate the conduct of agencies responsible for protecting
public health by regulating exposure to toxic substances. Although it was
initially applied to decisions to take regulatory action, this standard has
been increasingly applied to decisions not to act as well. This is a wel-
come development. In these anti-regulatory times, decisions not to act
are becoming more numerous, and adequate review is needed to ensure
that the agencies adhere to their statutory mandates.
This article has offered a logical framework for evaluating the extent
to which agencies practice reasoned decisionmaking in human health risk
assessments. This three-tiered framework involves an analysis of: 1) the
to 18 months, only 200 of the CIIT rats were "at risk" at 18 months. (It is not clear from
the reported data whether the spindle cell carcinoma was malignant. If not, the relevant
malignant tumor percentage for the CIIT study would be 14% rather than 14.5%.)
472. The CIIT study used 7-week-old male and female Fischer 344 rats, while the
NYU study used 9-week-old male SD rats (Charles River CD).
473. We should note, however, that "other contentions" regarding the cancer risk
assessment that are cited, but not relied on, by the court are an equally insufficient basis
for reversing the agency's action. The court characterizes the agency's assumptions con-
cerning species specificity and threshold levels as "of questionable validity." 701 F.2d at
1147 n.20. As discussed previously, these are issues of science policy; the Commission's
positions are consistent with the Regulatory Council guidelines. See supra text accom-
panying notes 282-87. Furthermore, the court's concern that the assumption of no threshold
level for formaldehyde "leads inescapably to the conclusion that ambient air is carcino-
genic," id., is irrelevant. The fact that formaldehyde is generally compatible with human
life at ambient levels does not necessarily mean that it does not cause cancer at those
levels. Finally, industry also argued that the agency risk assessment is flawed because it
predicts an upper limit of risk, rather than an estimate of average risk. 701 F.2d at 1143.
As noted, however, cancer risk assessment is presently a very imperfect science. The use
of upper limit estimates is consistent with the policy guidelines set forth in the Regulatory
Council Statement. See supra text accompanying notes 282-87. It is also consistent with
protecting those members of the population who may be more susceptible to formaldehyde.
Protection of these people is well within the Commission's statutory authority.
474. Interestingly, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has recently upheld
the UFFI ban imposed in that state by the Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department
of Public Health. Borden, Inc. v. Commissioner of Public Health, No. S-2849, slip op.
(Mass. Apr. 12, 1983). Although the standard of judicial review applied there was less
stringent than the reasoned decisionmaking standard imposed by federal courts, the Mas-
sachusetts court did note that the "evidence supports a rational determination that UFFI
'presents an imminent danger to the public health and safety'." Id. at 26 n.19.
i I - - , -- ·
368 [Vol. 7:297
Federal Regulation of Formaldehyde
agency's treatment of technical matters, including both hard science and
science policy issues; 2) the agency's procedures; and 3) the agency's
interpretation of its statutory mandate.
The case of formaldehyde presents an excellent opportunity to ex-
amine the principles of reasoned decisionmaking and to evaluate three
separate regulatory responses to a human health problem. Applying the
analytical framework developed in this article, we reach the following
conclusions:
(1) CPSC assessed the available data on the carcinogenic risk from
formaldehyde exposure in a manner free from significant technical error
and in accordance with prevailing scientific opinion on science policy
issues. In contrast, OSHA gave undue weight to questionable negative
epidemiologic findings and to arguments of species specificity and limited
exposure. Furthermore, OSHA departed from prevailing scientific opin-
ion on science policy issues in discounting the value of interpolating high-
dose animal data to low-dose human risk. EPA committed numerous
technical errors: not only did it rely too heavily on the epidemiologic
data, but it ignored empirical data contrary to its own conclusions and
failed to substantiate a controversial assumption on exposure data. Like
OSHA, EPA also departed from majority viewpoints on important sci-
ence policy issues.
(2) CPSC conducted its deliberations in an open and fair manner,
avoiding ex parte contacts and encouraging public participation at all
stages. OSHA, on the other hand, departed without notice or justification
from the carcinogen risk procedures set forth in its own generic cancer
standard and in the Regulatory Council policy to which it had been party.
Moreover, it ignored the advice of its own scientific experts and failed
to provide an adequate statement of reasons. EPA likewise departed
from the Regulatory Council policy guidelines, and it engaged in other
procedural irregularities as well. Agency personnel had apparent ex parte
contacts with industry, provided an inadequate statement of reasons, and
may have made a decision before fully examining the data.
(3) In assessing the human cancer risk from urea-formaldehyde foam
insulation, CPSC operated well within the discretion permitted it under
the CPS Act. In light of its own data assessment, OSHA appears to have
violated its statutory mandate in failing to take action to reduce worker
exposure to formaldehyde. EPA made an indefensible interpretation of
section 4(f) of TSCA and may have violated that provision in not taking
regulatory action on the existing data.
This review of the OSHA and EPA actions demonstrates the need
to examine scientific determinations carefully, lest social policy decisions
be hidden in alleged assessments of technical or scientific fact. Science
policy decisions based on sound, well-articulated technical grounds must
be distinguished from politically motivated post hoc rationalizations.
Finally, the formaldehyde case raises important questions about the
proper status for an environmental agency. Of the three agencies exam-
ined here, only the one structured as a Commission acted responsibly.
_ _L _  · ·: _ ____ · __
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Recent concern over the political manipulation of environmental agencies
has prompted proposals to convert EPA into a "hybrid commission." 4 5
Although structural changes can help insulate an agency from political
influence, continued judicial and congressional scrutiny of executive
branch agencies may - at least for the short term - provide the most
practical check on agency impropriety. The courts and Congress thus
must take a "hard look" in order to ensure that agencies exercise reasoned
decisionmaking in their approach to toxic substance control.
475. See 6 CHEM. REG. REP. (BNA) 1306 (Feb. 25, 1983) (bills introduced into the
Senate by Sens. Moynihan and Mitchell and into the House by Rep. Scheuer).
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